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Abstract
The accelerated evolution towards jointly considering the physical, cyber, and
social space is expected to dramatically increase the interest of the research and
industrial community to build efficient, resilient, and secure Cyber Physical Social
Systems. In this dissertation, we focus our research activities on devising decentralized intelligent decision making models, frameworks, and algorithms to support
the smooth operation of Cyber Physical Social Systems. The proposed decentralized intelligent decision making models are jointly exploiting theories from the field
of Economics, such as Game Theory and Contract Theory, and from the field of
Computer Science, such as Reinforcement Learning concepts. Reinforcement learning is applied to allow for humans to make informed decisions in the considered
Cyber Physical Social Systems based off of the dynamically changing environment
around them. Additionally, contract theoretic and game theoretic models allow for
us to accurately depict the relationships between the different involved entities in the
examined system. Several research problems have been examined which can be sum-

v

marized as follows: (i) socio-physical human orchestration in smart cities, (ii) socioaware public safety framework design, (iii) unmanned aerial vehicle or UAV-enabled
dynamic multi-target tracking and sensing framework, (iv) resource orchestration in
wireless powered communication public safety systems, (v) health data acquisition
from wearable devices during a pandemic by following a techno-economics approach,
(vi) museum and visitor interaction and feedback orchestration enabled by labor economics, and (vii) design and operation of prosumer-centric self-sustained smart grid
systems. Finally, all the above problems are thoroughly evaluated and tested via a
series of simulations and emulations with regards to the main characteristics of their
operation, as well as against other approaches from the literature.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Motivation

Many recent advances in cyber-physical systems have allowed for new and more
sophisticated interactions in smart cities [1]. As there is more access to information
and data, it becomes more important to not just utilize or provide data, but to
do so in an intelligent and informed manner [2]. Providing this data and utilizing
it correctly helps facilitate better smart services throughout people’s lives as these
systems will have the information available to them to make informed decisions about
how to best provide for their individuals [3]. Additionally, it is important to more
accurately model human decision making, while it would be easy to simply provide
all information to these smart systems, it would not accurately model human decision
making [4]. Human’s will naturally exhibit risk averse decision making behaviours, a
reluctance to participate without a reward, and competitiveness amongst each other
while sharing the same pool of resources [5].
Motivated by the above observations and due to the rising human-centric technological achievements, Cyber Physical Social Systems (CPSS) arise as a new Cyber
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Physical Systems paradigm that encompasses the digital fusion among human, computers, networks, and smart objects and devices [6]. CPSS consist not only of raw
sensing and actuating hardware and software, but also consider the humans behavior,
actions, decisions, interactions, and social characteristics in order to plan their efficient operation [7]. Given the joint consideration of all those heterogeneous aspects
within CPSS, these systems are characterized as complex and nowadays, they lack
effective design approaches to systematically study their operation [8]. The ultimate
goal of the CPSS is to bridge the gap among the Cyber Physical and the Cyber Social
systems in order to meet the humans’ social interaction demands and appropriately
adapt to the physical world conditions. Indicative applications of the CPSS include,
but are not limited to, smart home [9], smart cities [10, 11], autonomous vehicles
[12], recommendation and advertisement systems [13, 14, 15], smart medical services
[16, 17], smart grid systems [18, 19, 20], smart agriculture [21, 22, 23], public safety
[24, 25], interactive cultural spaces [26], smart secure systems [27, 28, 29], just to
name a few of them [30, 31].
CPSS is developed in a virtual three dimensional environment, consisting of the
(i) social, (ii) physical, and (iii) cyberspace dimensions. The building components of
the CPSS are (1) the sensing devices, (2) physical objects and smart things [32], (3)
the humans, and the (4) networking [33], computing, communications, and control
functionalities [34, 35, 36]. Within the created three dimensional research space of
the CPSS, the main research challenges that have been identified are listed below
[37, 38]:
1. Human behavior and interaction with the environment
2. Human-computer interaction
3. Context awareness and management
4. Device management and discovery
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5. Social computing
6. Seamless migration technologies
7. Security, and privacy

Given the increased heterogeneity and complexity of the CPSS, the methodologies, which should be devised in order to deal with the aforementioned research
challenges, should be of distributed and decentralized nature. The latter observation
is a fundamental principle within CPSS, as centralized approaches could not scale in
such complex systems for the following indicative reasons: (a) the physical infrastructure is owned by different service, internet, network, computing, content providers,
(b) the humans social and behavioral characteristics are private and known only by
each entity itself, (c) the cyberspace is by nature distributed with out having a single point of control. The decentralized nature of the CPSS motivates the study of
decentralized approaches that can provide the enhanced flexibility both to the CPSS
as a whole, and to its entities to act in an autonomous and intelligent manner and
adapt in a real-time manner in the dynamic changes of the environment.
Based on the above observation, this Ph.D. dissertation is motivated by the need
of devising decentralized methodologies, frameworks, models, and algorithms in order to study the CPSS and their variety of functionalities, applications, and services
that they can offer to the end-users, i.e., the humans. In the following subsection, we
present the main characteristics and properties of three main theoretical techniques
that have been used in order to perform the presented research. Those techniques
are: (i) Contract Theory [39], (ii) Game Theory [40], and (iii) Reinforcement Learning [41]. Based on those techniques, which define the fundamentals of this Ph.D.
dissertation, several applications within smart cities scenarios have been examined,
such as human orchestration in visiting points of interest [42], data collection from
citizens in public safety scenarios [43], multi-target tracking and sensing assisted by
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles [44], resource management in wireless powered communications [45], health data acquisition during a pandemic, humans interactions within
cultural places, and demand response management within smart grid systems.

1.2

Decentralized Intelligent Decision-Making

1.2.1

Contract-theoretic Models

Contract theory models the relationship and interactions between an employer and
an employee [39]. This model allows for expectations for effort and reward to be
balanced based on the capability of each employee, with the employee providing an
appropriate amount of effort based on their own individual ability [46]. This results
in the employer providing a personalized reward that encourages getting this effort
from the employee.
Specifically, Contract Theory (CT), lying in the area of Labor Economics, provides the mathematical foundations to create mutually agreeable contracts or arrangements between economic players, i.e., principal or employer(s) and agents or
employees, in presence of complete or incomplete information (often referred to as
asymmetric information). The incompleteness of information refers to the unknown
by the principal agents’ private characteristics that under typical circumstances steer
the contract formulation. Under this concept, the principal creates contract bundles
based on the statistical knowledge of the potential agents’ private information, i.e.,
the agents’ types, to motivate them provide back their effort and hence, reveal their
actual type [47].
As a means of providing the appropriate incentives to the humans to cooperate
in the direction of the CPSS’s ultimate objective, Contract Theory encompasses the
notion of the end-users’ personal utility satisfaction, i.e., the end-users’ achievement
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of a payoff greater or equal to a threshold value. Therefore, the maximization of the
ultimate CPSS’s objective is pursued subject to the end-users’ personal utility functions satisfaction [48]. From the CPSS’s perspective, the principal and the agents can
correspond to different entities of the CPSS architecture under consideration and can
target different metrics. Under this concept, a wide variety of optimization problems
can be formulated, concurrently, targeting different metrics from the system’s and
the humans’ perspective.
In the following subsections, we present the two major models of agency problems that are formulated and solved under the principles of Contract Theory, namely
the Adverse Selection and the Moral Hazard, whose potential of expressing typical
CPSS problems (e.g., crowd-sourcing [49], human-orchestration under different principal and agents’ utility functions) will be evaluated in the context of the Ph.D.
dissertation.

1.2.2

Adverse Selection Problem

One of the most common problems that arises between a principal and an agent
that falls into the range of adverse selection problem modeling is the ”employment”
contract, under which the agent’s desired performance/effort by the principal and the
principal’s reward back to the agent, are agreed. Specifically, the principal is unaware
of the prospective agent’s capabilities, i.e., the agent’s private information, and tries
to elicit this private information via its contract offer. Following the revelation
principle, the principal can offer multiple employment contracts destined to differentcapability agents, and each agent selects the appropriate contract offer for its type,
i.e., the one that maximizes its personal utility. As such, the agent ultimately reveals
its actual type to the principal.
Let us consider that there are N different agent types, denoted as θi , i ∈ {1, · · · , N }
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that bear different private information. Although there exists information asymmetry
between the principal and the agents, the principal possesses statistical information
regarding the existence/occurrence of different agent types. Hence, we define as λi
N
P
the probability of facing the agent type θi , such that
λi = 1. The contract bundle
i=1

designed and offered by the principal to each agent i is denoted as {pi , ri }, where
pi corresponds to the agent’s effort wanted by the principal and ri is the principal’s
reward provided back to the agent. Therefore, we formulate the principal’s expected
utility function as the principal’s expected profit by the agents’ efforts minus their
N
P
provided rewards, i.e., Upr = [λi · (pi − C · ri )], where C ∈ R+ is the principal’s unit
i=1

cost of its provided reward to each agent. In a similar manner, the agent’s i personal
utility function is defined as Ui = θi · e(ri ) − pi , where the first term expresses the
agent’s evaluation of its received reward minus its provided effort. Specifically, the
agent’s evaluation function of reward e(ri ) is strictly increasing and concave with
respect to the agent’s i received reward (i.e., e(0) = 0, e′ (ri ) > 0, e′′ (ri ) < 0) and is
√
commonly modeled as ri or log(1 + ri ).
Following the adverse selection problem formulation, the principal’s utility function Upr is maximized subject to the agents’ satisfaction of their personal utilities
Ui , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, expressed by the Individual Rationality and Incentive Compatibility constraints, as described below.
Definition 1. (Individual Rationality (IR)) A contract bundle {pi , ri } satisfies
the individual rationality constraint if each agent receives a non-negative utility, i.e.,
θi · e(ri ) − pi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N }.

(1.1)

Definition 2. (Incentive Compatibility (IC)) Each agent must select the contract bundle {pi , ri } that is designed specifically for their own type θi , i.e.,
θi · e(ri ) − pi ≥ θi · e(ri′ ) − p′i , ∀i, i′ ∈ {1, . . . , N }, i ̸= i′ .

(1.2)

The IR constraint ensures the participation of each agent in the contract agreement,
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by marginally satisfying the agent’s personal utility function, while the IC constraint
guarantees that each agent can only receive the highest utility when selecting the
contract bundle designed for its own type. Therefore, the optimization problem to
be solved can be written as,

max

{pi ,ri }∀i∈{1,...,N }

Upr

N
X
=
[λi · (pi − C · ri )]

(1.3a)

i=1

s.t. θi · e(ri ) − pi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N }

(1.3b)

θi · e(ri ) − pi ≥ θi · e(ri′ ) − pi′ , ∀i, i′ ∈ {1, . . . , N }, i ̸= i′

(1.3c)

It should be noted that the adverse selection problem model presented in the current section corresponds to the discrete agent type case and can, also, be generalized
to the continuous agent type case to fit more realistic scenarios.

1.2.3

Moral Hazard Problem

In the adverse selection problem formulation, the notions of agent’s effort and agent’s
performance were interchangeably used, assuming that a specific amount of effort
yields in a proportional manner to an amount of performance. However, in several
realistic scenarios, the agent’s effort is costly and its ultimate performance observed
by the principal differs from the effort that has been actually exerted. In order
to model such problems, where the agent’s effort is hidden and only the final performance is observable by the principal, the moral hazard problem formulation is
adopted.
According to the basic moral hazard model, the agent’s performance q is defined
as a noisy signal of its actual provided effort a, such as q = a + εq , where εq ∼
N (µq , σq2 ). Given that the principal is unaware of the agent’s effort, the principal
has to strategically reward the agent considering a double compensation scheme that
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includes a fixed reward t and a variable s. The fixed amount of reward is intended
to incentivize the agent to provide its best effort and hence, is offered while signing
the contract. On the contrary, the variable reward is offered as long as the principal
observes the agent’s ultimate performance and its purpose is to compensate the
agent’s incurred cost of providing its best effort. Thus, the total reward provided
to the agent is defined as r = t + s · q. The agent is assumed to have constant
absolute risk averse (CARA) preferences, meaning that the agent’s attitude towards
risk is constant as its reward increases. As a result, we formulate the agent’s personal
utility as Ua = −e−η[r−ψ(a)] , where η > 0 is the agent’s coefficient of absolute risk
′′

′

aversion (η = −Ua /Ua ), the higher the value of which corresponds to less incentives
for the agent to exert an effort. Also, the term ψ(a) corresponds to the agent’s cost
function of providing its effort and is assumed to be quadratic, such as ψ(a) = 12 ca2 .
The principal’s utility function is modeled as the evaluation of the agent’s ultimate
performance minus its total offered compensation, i.e., Upr = q − r = (1 − s) · a − t.
Considering the problem description above, the contract bundle designed and
offered by the principal to the agent is denoted as {a, r}, where a corresponds to
the agent’s actual effort and r is the principal’s total provided reward. Similarly to
the adverse selection model, the principal’s utility Upr is maximized subject to the
agent’s satisfaction of its personal utility Ua . Thus, the optimization problem to be
solved can be written as follows.
max Upr = (1 − s) · a − t

(1.4a)

s.t. E[−e−η[r−ψ(a)] ] ≥ Umin

(1.4b)

a ∈ argmax E[−e−η[r−ψ(a)] ]

(1.4c)

a

where Umin is the minimum acceptable utility for the agent to sign the contractual
agreement. In accordance with the adverse selection model, the principal has to
reassure the agent’s marginal participation in the contract by satisfying its personal
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utility function, as imposed by the first constraint of the optimization problem, i.e.,
the IR constraint. The second constraint maps to the IC constraint and guarantees
that the agent can maximize its personal utility when selecting the right amount of
effort.

1.2.4

Game Theory & Reinforcement Learning

Game Theory has been recognized as a field of applied mathematics targeting at
the study of strategic decision making in conditions of competition, collaboration,
and/or conflict, holding its foundations from the book of John von Neumann and
Oskar Morgenstern in “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior”, while it was
further extended and formalized by John Nash, who mainly focused his research
work on non-cooperative games. Game Theory, was initially introduced as a theory
related to social and economic disciplines, however, nowadays it has been widely
accepted and adopted as a fundamental, useful and powerful tool across various
areas including computer engineering, computer science, Internet of Things, Cyber
Physical Systems, Cyber Physical Social Systems, business, and wireless networking,
among others [50].
Game Theory is built upon the concept of a game, representing an interaction
between different rational entities, or players, whose individual decisions affect each
other’s payoff and actions, who aim to maximize their expected benefit based on their
current status of information. The games are modeled based on the players’ possible
and feasible strategies, representing the set of available options to the involved entities
under which they define their most beneficial decisions and are determined as pure
(if the decision environment is deterministic), or mixed if multiple options can be
probabilistically selected during the game. The decisions of the entities lead to a
corresponding outcome which provides a payoff or utility to the entities, representing

9

Chapter 1. Introduction

a quantification of the entities gains or losses from their corresponding actions.
Different variations of games exist referring to different conditions of interactions
among the entities, i.e., players based on the considered situation.
• Static and dynamic games: The first type of games refers to situations where
the involved entities have a certain amount of knowledge which remains the
same during the game, while dynamic games imply that users can gain information from their previous actions.
• Zero-sum and non zero-sum games: The first indicates a strictly competitive
situation where the benefit of one entity leads to an equivalent loss of the other
entities, while the second category refers to a situation where the cumulative
gains and losses of the entities are not complementary. The involved entities
can be either competitive or non-competitive among each other.
• Non stochastic and stochastic games: In stochastic games, the game is played
in stages with a certain state to evolve according to a probabilistic rule.
• Games with complete and incomplete information: Complete information games
consider that the information available among the involved entities is common
knowledge to everybody involved int he game, while incomplete information
games deal with situations where the involved entities are aware of only partial
information of the game’s characteristics.
• Non-cooperative and cooperative games: In cooperative games the involved
entities can form collaborations towards achieving optimal outcomes, while
in non-cooperative games the involved entities compete with each other often
having conflicting interests [51, 52, 53].
• Games with perfect or imperfect background knowledge: In the first type, the
involved entities are fully aware of the history of the game, while in the latter
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this does not hold true.

Integrating Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms and techniques can facilitate the interaction of humans with the CPSS in order to handle in real time aspects
like crowdsourcing, crowdsensing, coordination among them, navigation, and many
more. Reinforcement Learning can support the humans to learn from their environment and adjust the resource allocation of the system’s limited available resources to
the needs of its human by introducing intelligent resource management and decision
making tools related to the main goal of the CPSS, e.g., public safety, health monitoring, etc. Furthermore, Reinforcement Learning methodologies (e.g., Gradient
Ascent Learning, Log Linear Learning, Q-learning) can be applied to different scenarios and can play an important role for the CPSS to operate more autonomously
and automatically optimize many of its functions. In such a way, the CPSS can
organize itself and lead to decentralized structures, with the humans to become part
of the decision making process without pushing large volumes of data to the centralized entities, e.g., Cloud, developing a parallel processing capacity which accelerates
the communication and minimizes unnecessary coordination among the humans. It
should be noted that a centralized approach would not scale within a CPSS system
due to its increased heterogeneity, the dynamic manner that it evolves over time, the
plethora of diverse involved entities, and the threat of single point of failure.
Subsequently, the CPSS can optimize its resources by better understanding the
priorities of its involved entities, decrease the decision making time, and manage
congestion in order to deliver superior quality of services and an overall more holistic
experience. The above are already a reality in recent CPSS paradigms (mobile edge
caching, mobile edge computing etc.), hence it is of vital importance to invest more
in designing Reinforcement Learning techniques into CPSS operations within realistic smart applications, such as smart cities, smart health, and others. In this Ph.D.
dissertation, we have elaborated more on the Gradient Ascent Reinforcement Learn-
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ing algorithms and their applicability in real time decision making in CPSS. The
introduced algorithms are coupled either with contract-theoretic or game-theoretic
approaches, which jointly enable the involved entities to perform the real decision
making by sensing and accounting for the dynamic change of the surrounding environment. The main parameters that have been used in order to evaluate the
performance of these algorithms are their execution time and the efficiency of the
solutions that they converge based on the main goal of the CPSS at each of the
examined research problems.

1.3
1.3.1

Contributions, Publications, and Organization
Contributions

The accelerated evolution towards jointly considering the physical, cyber, and social
space is expected to dramatically increased the interest of the research and industrial
community to build efficient, resilient, and secure Cyber Physical Social Systems. In
this dissertation, we focus our research activities on devising decentralized intelligent decision making models, frameworks, and algorithms to support the smooth
operation of Cyber Physical Social Systems. The proposed decentralized intelligent
decision making models are jointly exploiting theories from the field of Economics,
such as Game Theory and Contract Theory, and from the field of Computer Science, such as Reinforcement Learning concepts. Reinforcement learning is applied
to allow for humans to make informed decisions in the considered Cyber Physical
Social Systems based off of the environment around them. Additionally, contract
theoretic and game theoretic models allow for us to accurately depict the relationships between the different involved entities in the examined system. Several research
problems have been examined which can be summarized as follows: (i) socio-physical
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human orchestration in smart cities, (ii) socio-aware public safety framework design,
(iii) unmanned aerial vehicle or UAV-enabled dynamic multi-target tracking and
sensing framework, (iv) resource orchestration in wireless powered communication
public safety systems, and (v) health data acquisition from wearable devices during
a pandemic by following a techno-economics approach, (vi) museum and visitor interaction and feedback orchestration, (vii) prosumer-centric self-sustained smart grid
systems. Finally, all the above problems are thoroughly evaluated and tested via a
series of simulations and emulations with regards to the main characteristics of their
operation, as well as against other approaches from the literature.

1.3.2

Publications

All of the research work presented in this Ph.D. thesis is published or submitted
for publication in peer-reviewed journals and conferences. At the beginning of the
following list, we present the peer-reviewed and published research papers, while at
the end of the list we present separately the research work being submitted and under
review.

1. N. Patrizi, E.E. Tsiropoulou, and S. Papavassiliou, ”Health Data Acquisition
from Wearable Devices during a Pandemic: A Techno-Economics Approach,”
in IEEE ICC, 2021. pp. 1-6, 2021
2. N. Patrizi, G. Fragkos, E.E. Tsiropoulou, and S. Papavassiliou, ”Contract Theoretic Resource Control in Wireless Powered Communication Public Safety
Systems,” in IEEE GLOBECOM, pp. 1-6, 2020.
3. N. Patrizi, G. Fragkos, K. Ortiz, M. Oishi, and E.E. Tsiropoulou, ”A UAVenabled Dynamic Multi-Target Tracking and Sensing Framework,” in IEEE
GLOBECOM, pp. 1-6, 2020.
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4. G. Fragkos, N. Patrizi, E. E. Tsiropoulou, and S. Papavassiliou, ”Socio-aware
Public Safety Framework Design: A Contract Theory based Approach,” ICC
2020 - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), Dublin,
Ireland, pp. 1-7, 2020.
5. N. Patrizi, P.A. Apostolopoulos, K. Rael, and E.E. Tsiropoulou, ”Sociophysical Human Orchestration in Smart Cities,” in IEEE International Conference on Smart Computing (SMARTCOMP), pp. 115-120, 2019.
6. N. Patrizi, S.K. LaTouf, E.E. Tsiropoulou, and S. Papavassiliou, ”Prosumercentric Self-sustained Smart Grid Systems” in IEEE Systems Journal (to appear)

The research work under review are listed below:

1. N. Patrizi, S.K. LaTouf, E.E. Tsiropoulou, and S. Papavassiliou, ”Museum
and Visitor Interaction & Feedback Orchestration Enabled by Labor Economics,” in IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems. (major
revision)

1.3.3

Organization

This section summarizes the main structure and organization of the rest of the document.
Chapter 2 presents a socio-physical human orchestration framework in smart cities
based on game theory and reinforcement learning. The efficient management of a
smart city and the improvement of the quality of humans’ every-day life are becoming
challenging problems due to smart cities’ increased heterogeneity and complexity. In
this chapter, we present a novel socio-physical human orchestration framework to
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deal with the aforementioned issues, by capitalizing on recent advances in game
theory and reinforcement learning. Initially, each human selects, in a distributed
manner, a Point of Interest (PoI) that it wants to visit, by acting as stochastic
learning automaton, exploiting the socio-physical conditions of the environment while
learning from its previous experiences. As a result, those humans that have selected
a specific PoI to visit, ”compete” with each other in order to finally perform their
visit. The humans’ behavior is studied as a non-cooperative game among them, via
adopting the theory of minority games, while the concluding Nash equilibrium point
identifies the humans that will finally visit each PoI. A low complexity algorithm is
introduced to realize the overall framework, while the performance of the proposed
approach is evaluated through modeling and simulation under several scenarios, and
its superiority is demonstrated.
Chapter 3 proposes a socio-aware public safety framework design based on a contracttheoretic approach. Given the substantial penetration of social networks in citizens’
everyday life activities, the success of a public safety system depends on the citizens’ incentivization by the Emergency Control Center (ECC), and their effective
effort contribution in the overall disaster management operation. In this chapter, we
introduce a formal method based on the principles of Contract Theory, to identify
the optimal rewards to the citizens from the ECC’s perspective, and the optimal invested effort from the citizens’ side, referred to as contract pairs. The identification
of these contract pairs (i.e., rewards and respective efforts) between the ECC and
each citizen, depend on each citizen’s social and communication characteristics that
are used to define their specific type and profile, while they are properly reflected
in the corresponding designed utility functions to be optimized. The problem under
consideration is treated for both cases of complete (ideal) and incomplete (realistic)
information availability, with respect to the level of knowledge of the ECC about the
exact type of each citizen. The overall framework was evaluated via modeling and
simulation, in terms of its efficiency and effectiveness, by studying multiple operation
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approaches and scenarios.
Chapter 4 introduces a Unmanned Aerial Vehicle or UAV-enabled dynamic multitarget tracking and sensing framework. In this chapter, initially, a holistic reputation
model is introduced to evaluate the targets’ potential in offloading useful data to the
UAVs. Based on this model, and taking into account UAVs and targets tracking
and sensing characteristics, a dynamic intelligent matching between the UAVs and
the targets is performed. In such a setting, the incentivization of the targets to perform the data offloading is based on an effort-based pricing that the UAVs offer to
the targets. The emerging optimization problem towards determining each target’s
optimal amount of offloaded data and the corresponding effort-based price that the
UAV offers to the target, is treated as a Stackelberg game between each target and
the associated UAV. The properties of existence, uniqueness and convergence to the
Stackelberg Equilibrium are proven. Detailed numerical results are presented highlighting the key operational features and the performance benefits of the proposed
framework.
Chapter 5 presents a contract-theoretic resource control in wireless powered communication public safety systems. Recent technological advances in the use of UAVs
and Wireless Powered Communications (WPC) have enabled the energy efficient operation of the Public Safety Networks (PSN) during disaster scenarios. In this chapter, an energy efficient information flow and energy harvesting framework capturing
users’ risk-aware characteristics is introduced based on the principles of Contract
Theory. To better support the operational effectiveness of the proposed framework,
users are clustered in rescue groups following a socio-physical-aware group formation
mechanism, while rescue leaders for each group are selected. A reinforcement learning approach is applied to enable the optimal matching between the UAVs and the
rescue leaders in a distributed and efficient manner. The proposed contract-theoretic
framework models the UAVs-victims relation based on a labor market setting via of-
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fering rewards to the users (incentives) in order to compensate them for their invested
labor (reporting information). Detailed numerical results demonstrate the benefits
and superiority of the proposed framework under different settings.
Chapter 6 studies the health data acquisition from wearable devices during a pandemic by following a techno-economics approach. In this chapter, we introduce a
behavioral and labor economics based approach to address the challenge of citizens’
health data acquisition during a pandemic, in a smart city scenario consisting of the
healthcare operator, multiple businesses, and citizens with wearable devices. Initially, a reinforcement learning approach is adopted in order for the citizens to select
the business to visit, exploiting both social and physical characteristics of all involved
entities. Subsequently, following the principles of behavioral economics, the problem
of the citizens’ incentivization by the businesses to provide their health data via offering personalized rewards is studied. The solution of the corresponding optimization
problem concludes to a contract between the business and each citizen associated
with this business, containing the optimal reward and optimal portion of reported
data. The process is completed by introducing an optimization framework, where
the healthcare operator incentivizes the businesses to provide the collected health
data to it, by providing them tailored rewards. This is founded on the principles
of Contract Theory, where the health-care operator aims at maximizing its benefit
from the data acquisition process, while guaranteeing that the optimal determined
contracts are acceptable by the respective businesses. Finally, through modeling and
simulation, the performance, effectiveness, and robustness of the overall proposed
framework is demonstrated, under various realistic scenarios.
Chapter 7 evaluates a contract-theoretic model to enable visitors of museum to
provide feedback to the museum in a fairly-incentivized manner. In this chapter,
we address the problem of modeling and orchestrating the interactions between a
museum and its visitors, viewing the system as a CPSS. In particular, the museum
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operator provides monetary rewards to the visitors in exchange for their contributions, which are expressed as their total number of provided feedback evaluations of
visited exhibits over their touring time. The interactions among the museum operator and visitors are captured in appropriately designed utility functions following
the principles of labor economics, while the visitors’ behavioral characteristics are
utilized to define their unique types. Under such a setting and formulation, the goal
of the museum operator is to optimize their profit and benefits, while jointly satisfying the visitors’ quality of experience prerequisites, as reflected via their utility
functions. The corresponding optimization problem is treated and solved under the
general and realistic case of incomplete information, wherein the museum operator
estimates the visitors’ types probabilistically. The resulting outcome, referred to as
”optimal contract” jointly determines the visitors’ optimal contributions, as well as
the museum operator’s optimal amount of personalized rewards provided to each visitor. The performance of the proposed approach is evaluated through modeling and
simulation, and detailed numerical results are presented to demonstrate the key benefits of the proposed optimization approach, versus either type-agnostic or heuristic
alternatives.
Chapter 8 presents a prosumer-centric self-sustained Smart Grid system. Modern
Smart Grid systems exploit a two-way interaction paradigm between the utility and
the electricity user and promote the role of prosumer, as a new user type, able to
generate and sell energy, or consume energy. Within such a setting, the prosumers
and their interactions with the microgrid system become of high significance for its
efficient operation. In this chapter, to model the corresponding interactions, we introduce a labor economics-based framework by exploiting the principles of Contract
Theory, that jointly achieves the satisfaction of the various interacting system entities, that is the Microgid Operator (MGO) and the prosumers. The MGO offers personalized rewards to the sellers and buyers, to incentivize them to sell and purchase
energy, respectively. To provide a stable and efficient operation point, while aiming
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at jointly satisfying the profit and requirements of the involved competing parties,
optimal personalized contracts, i.e., rewards and amount of sold/purchased energy,
are determined, by formulating and solving contract-theoretic optimization problems
between the MGO and the sellers or byers. The analysis is provided for both cases
of complete and incomplete information availability regarding the prosumers’ types.
Detailed numerical results are presented to demonstrate the operation characteristics
of the proposed framework under diverse scenarios.
Lastly, Chapter 9 concludes the Ph.D. dissertation with an overall summary of the
content and a review of its contributions. Additionally, a segment is devoted to the
presentation of potential future research directions stemming from this work.
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Chapter 2
Human Orchestration in Smart
cities

2.1

Introduction

Recent years have witnessed the rapid growth of smart cities which, among other
benefits, provide smart service systems to enrich and support people’s lives and entertainment options. [54]. People can join different social events (e.g., dining out,
playing sports) by visiting different Points of Interest (PoIs), e.g., restaurants, stadiums, tax offices, in their daily life and decide which places to go to according to some
social and physical parameters (e.g., location preferences, geographical proximity).
The efficient orchestration of humans within a smart city can result in many fold
benefits and catalyze the sustained economic growth of the smart city. However, the
tremendous increase in available information for decision-making, the large number
of possible PoIs within a smart city along with specific social and physical characteristics and constraints, makes the problem of selecting the most interesting PoI and
deciding whether to visit it, extremely challenging.
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2.1.1

Human Orchestration in Smart cities

Related Work & Motivation

Recently, a number of research works have been proposed in the context of planning
PoI visits, mainly exploiting the information extracted from the event-based social
networks (EBSN) such as Foursquare, Meetup, and Twitter. In [55], the authors
analyze the humans’ behavior in EBSNs by exploiting their social activities and
interactions towards explaining their attendance in PoIs and identifying the most
influential factors on the humans’ decisions. This study has been extended in [56],
where the authors provide a similar analysis, regarding groups of humans who belong to common social groups, by utilizing a Mixed Markov Model to identify the
groups’ behavioral patterns. In [57], the authors introduce various recommendation
algorithms of PoIs to be visited by the humans based on their past visited PoIs, the
physical location of the available PoIs, the social interaction among the humans and
their similarity among each other. A traveling recommender system is proposed in
[58], by jointly considering the PoIs popularity, the similarity of the humans that
visit the same PoI, and the similarity of the available PoIs towards recommending
PoIs.
Furthermore, in [59], the authors study the problem of real-time PoI and event
recommendations to the humans by introducing the event-participant arrangement
strategy. Following this concept, the humans’ satisfaction scores, regarding an arrangement of visiting a PoI, are updated in real-time and the humans can accept
or reject the proposed arrangement. A human-centric approach is also followed in
[60], where the humans are assigned to PoIs and events aiming at maximizing the
humans’ perceived satisfaction. On the other hand, a system-centric approach is proposed in [61] to support the PoIs’ management towards maximizing their perceived
”satisfaction”, which is expressed in terms of revenue and publicity. A more holistic
approach is introduced in [62] by exploiting the whole set of EBSNs functionalities
to recommend PoIs to humans, social groups to humans, and tags to groups.
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As it becomes apparent from the above discussion, several studies have constructed models of recommending PoIs to the humans, either by following a humancentric or a system-centric approach. Furthermore, the literature is already mature
enough in exploiting the information available in EBSNs, such as humans’ interests
in PoIs, humans’ social interactions, geographical proximity to the PoIs, etc. However, to the best of our knowledge, no prior work has dealt with the problem of
socio-physical autonomous human orchestration in a smart city environment, where
humans can exploit their personal social and physical characteristics, as well as those
of the PoIs to make efficient distributed and autonomous decisions that improve their
personal reward from the visited PoIs.

2.1.2

Contributions & Outline

Our research work aims exactly at filling the aforementioned research gap and proposes a holistic human-centric distributed approach realizing (i) the PoI selection by
the humans, via a reinforcement learning technique, and (ii) the human’s decisionmaking process of visiting a PoI, by exploiting the theory of minority games. Our
proposed framework consists of two layers to treat the socio-physical autonomous
human orchestration in a smart city. At the first layer, the humans are considered
as stochastic learning automata who learn from their past choices of PoIs and the
reaction of the smart city environment towards selecting a PoI that will improve their
experienced reward. The humans make probabilistic choices of PoIs until they reach
a firm PoI selection by exploiting their social characteristics, e.g., interest to visit a
PoI, social interaction among the humans that visit the same PoI, and the physical
characteristics, e.g., cost of visit, physical proximity to the PoI, experienced Quality
of Service (QoS) from visiting the PoI, PoI’s capacity and availability.
Given the convergence of the humans’ PoI selection, the humans that selected the

22

Chapter 2.

Human Orchestration in Smart cities

same PoI and expressed their initial interest to visit it, ”compete” with each other
towards finally visiting the PoI and improving their experienced reward from their
visit. The latter humans’ behavior and interaction is modeled as a non-cooperative
game among the humans that selected the same PoI towards determining their final
attendance or not. Towards showing the existence of the game’s Nash equilibrium,
which identifies the specific humans who will visit the PoI, the theory of minority
games is adopted. A distributed and low-complexity algorithm is introduced, which
determines both the humans’ PoI selection and the humans who visit the PoIs.
Detailed numerical and comparative results demonstrate that the proposed holistic
framework concludes to a promising solution for realizing the autonomous human
orchestration in a smart city, that conforms with the needs and requirements of both
the humans and the smart city planning and management.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, the overall system
model is described, while in Section 2.3, our proposed human-centric reinforcement
learning-based PoI selection process is presented. Section 2.4 introduces the autonomous human orchestration to the PoIs based on the theory of minority games,
while in Section 2.5 the Smart Orchestration in Points of Interest (SmartPoI) algorithm is presented. Finally, a detailed numerical evaluation of our approach via
modeling and simulation is presented in Section 2.6, while Section 2.7 concludes the
chapter.

2.2

System Model

In this chapter, a smart city environment is considered, with humans interested in
visiting various PoIs inside of a smart city. These humans will decide which PoI they
are interested in visiting by taking into account the socio-physical characteristics of
each PoI and the overall system. Once they have a choice on which PoI they are
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?

?

?

Figure 2.1: Humans autonomous decision making regrading the Point of Interest
that they will visit.

interested in visiting they each play a minority game to determine which humans
will actually visit the PoI. The humans of the system are dentoted as |N |, with
the humans residing in the smart cities boundaries, with the set denoted as N =
{1, ..., n, ..., |N |}. These humans select from the various PoIs |S| (e.g., restaurants,
theaters, tax offices, police station, etc), with the corresponding set of PoIs being
denoted as S = {1, ..., s, ..., |S|}. Each human will make selection to as to which PoI
they have a desire to visit based on their own personal social characteristics, as well
as the physical conditions that are available in the smart city environment, as shown
in Figure 2.1.
The physical and social parameters considered in the system are designed to
provide a holistic view of what aspects matter and the importance thereof to each
human, with each human having personalized preferences. The first parameter considered is the interest of the human to visiting a specific PoI. For example, a human
might need to pickup groceries in order to make dinner and would thus have a high
interest in visiting a grocery store. Specifically, each human n, n ∈ N has a per-
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sonal interest in,s to visit a PoI s, s ∈ S. The interest degree in,s ranges from zero
to one, i.e, in,s ∈ [0, 1], with smaller values representing less interest to visit the
PoI and larger values meaning a greater interest to visit that PoI. This shows and
considers the unique preference of a human to a space based on their own personal
view of the space. Next, as many places that humans visit are based off of a social
element (e.g., restaurant, movie theater, etc.), the social aspect of a PoI should be
considered. Naturally, this social aspect is based upon personal preferences of one
human’s view towards other humans in the space. For instance, a human’s social
interest for visiting a PoI with humans that they enjoy interacting with will have a
higher social interest value compared to that of a PoI with humans they don’t like
interacting with or a PoI with no humans in it. Thus, the peers’ influence on visiting
a PoI is captured by the social interest SIn,j which expresses the level of willingness
of humans n, j to socially interact with each other. We set the range of SIn,j as
SIn,j ∈ [0, 1] and we assume that the level of social interaction among two humans
n, j ∈ N is directly proportional to the value of SIn,j .
The humans and the PoIs in a smart city are characterized by some physical
conditions and parameters. Each PoI s has an associated cost cs to serve the needs
of the humans. For example, there are restaurants that are more expensive compared
to others which has a drastic influence on a humans’ decisions to visit them. The PoI’s
cost cs of serving a human is normalized with respect to the maximum cost of a PoI
in the smart city, i.e., cs ∈ [0, 1], with values of cs closer to 1 being more expensive.
Naturally, each PoI has a limited amount of humans that can be accommodated at
any time, thus every PoI is characterized by a physical capacity Nsthres , s ∈ S of
humans that it represents the amount of people that can be served. For example,
restaurants will have a limited number of seats and other PoIs will have a limited
based off of fire safety laws as well. Furthermore, humans will tend to not want
to travel long distances to visit a PoI, consequently the distance dn,s of human n
from the PoI s also plays a role in the human’s personal physical factor that weighs
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on their corresponding decision with regard to which PoI they would like to visit.
In our analysis, the distance dn,s is also normalized with respect to the maximum,
thus, dn,s ∈ [0, 1] with values close to zero meaning that the human is close to
that respective PoI. Additionally, humans will prefer PoIs where they are efficiently
and effectively served. PoIs with more people in them are congested and will cause
humans to have a probability of not being served effectively. This shows that the
number of humans |N |Go
s , who decide to visit a PoI s is a critical factor in the humans’
decision to go to a PoI. This leads to the defined experienced Quality of Service (QoS)
of human n by visiting a PoI s which is denoted by QoSn,s , with QoSn,s ∈ [0, 1]. The
t
P
[k]
overall Quality of Service is directly proportional to the value of
QoSn,s , which
k=0

expresses the human’s cumulative experienced QoS over the time including all the
PoIs that the human has visited. If the humans that go to a PoI are more than the
PoI’s capacity, then their experienced QoS is zero (as no human would be served
thres
, while if the number of humans that
effectively), i.e., QoSn,s = 0, if |N |Go
s > Ns

visit the PoI is less than the capacity of the PoI, the normalized human’s QoS is
given by QoSn,s = 1 −

2.3

|N |Go
s
,
Nsthres

thres
.
if |N |Go
s ≤ Ns

Socio-physical Point of Interest selection

In this section, our goal is to devise a distributed and autonomous mechanism to
enable the humans to select which PoIs they are potentially interested in visiting
based on the socio-physical characteristics previously mentioned. To accomplish
this, we utilize a reinforcement learning technique, which allows for the humans to
learn from their prior choices and the effect that it produced on the overall smart city.
The humans are considered as stochastic learning automata [18] and at each time
slot t of the reinforcement learning loop, they select to visit a PoI from their available
set of actions an (t) = {a1 , ..., as , ..., a|S| }, which represents the available PoIs within

26

Chapter 2.

Human Orchestration in Smart cities

the smart city. The physical meaning of the time slot t can be defined based on the
specific smart city application. Towards selecting a PoI, the humans consider their
social and physical characteristics (Section 2.2): (i) Nsthres : the maximum number of
humans that the PoI s can accommodate, (ii) cs : the normalized cost associated with
visiting and being served at the PoI s, (iii) dn,s : the normalized physical distance of
[t]

human n from PoI s, (iv) in,s : the normalized interest of human n to visit the PoI
Go[t]

s at time slot t, (v) |N |s

: the number of humans that have selected to go to the
Go[t]
|NP
|s
[t]
PoI s at the time slot t, (vi)
SIn,j : the total social interest and interaction
j=1
Go[t]

of human n with all the other humans |N |s
that have selected to go to the PoI
t
P
[k]
s at time slot t, and (vii)
QoSn,s : the cumulative QoS that the human n has
k=0

experienced until the time slot t including all the PoIs that the human has visited.
By combining the above humans’ social characteristics and PoIs’ physical parameters, we define the reward function that a human n experiences by visiting a PoI s,
as follows.
Go[t]

Nsthres
[t+1]
rn,s
=

·

[t]
in,s

·

|NP
|s

j=1
Go[t]
|N |s

t
P

[t]

SIn,j ·

[k]

QoSn,s

k=0

(2.1)

· cs · dn,s

[t+1]

The reward function rn,s is dynamically determined by the human’s past experit
P
[k]
ence (e.g.,
QoSn,s ), as well as by the reaction of the smart city environment, meank=0

ing the choices of the rest of the humans residing in the smart city. Also, the reward
[t]

[t+1]

function rn,s of each human n per available PoI s is normalized as r̃n,s

[t+1]

=

rn,s
P [t+1]
rn,s
s∈S

[t+1]

[t+1]

to represent the reward probability r̃n,s , 0 ≤ r̃n,s
[t+1]

PoI s. In a nutshell, the reward probability r̃n,s

≤ 1 of the human n per each

reflects the potential satisfaction

that the human n may experience by visiting the PoI s at time slot t. A graphical
representation of the reward function and its individual components is presented in
Figure 2.2. The humans consider their reward probabilities in order to determine
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I really
want to go
there!

I don’t like
that place.

500 ft
5 mi.

Figure 2.2: Graphical representation of the reward function.

and update their action probabilities of selecting a PoI.
Each human acts as a stochastic learning automaton and updates its action prob[t]

[t]

[t]

[t]

[t]

ability vector Prn = [P rn,1 , ..., P rn,s , ..., P rn,S ], where P rn,s represents the probability that the human n will select the PoI s at time slot t. Based on the theory
of the stochastic learning automata [18, 63, 64], the humans update their action

b
b

Convergence Time

Reward

Convergence Time

Reward

Figure 2.3: Graphical representation of the dependence of the convergence time and
the corresponding achieved reward from the learning rate b.
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probabilities based on the following rule [65].
[t+1]
[t]
[t]
[t]
P rn,s
= P rn,s
+ b · r̃n,s
· (1 − P rn,s
), sn[t] = sn[t+1]

(2.2a)

[t+1]
[t]
[t]
[t]
P rn,s
= P rn,s
− b · r̃n,s
· P rn,s
, sn[t] ̸= sn[t+1]

(2.2b)

where 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 represents the humans’ learning rate in terms of exploiting the smart
city environment. The dependence of the convergence time and the corresponding
achieved reward from the learning rate b is presented in Figure 2.3. The human’s
probability to select the same PoI in the next time slot t + 1 is updated following
Eq. 2.2a, while the human’s probability to select a different PoI in the next time
slot t + 1 is calculated by Eq. 2.2b. Also, it is noted that the humans have initially
no prior knowledge regarding their action probabilities, thus the initial selection
[t=0]

of a PoI by the humans is made with equal probability, i.e., P rn,s

=

1
, ∀s
|S|

∈

S. The algorithmic description of the socio-physical PoI selection based on the
proposed reinforcement learning technique and the convergence of the humans’ action
probabilities are studied in Section 2.5.

2.4

Autonomous Human Orchestration based on
Minority Games

After the socio-physical PoI selection by the humans, a number of humans |N |s has
selected to potentially visit the PoI s at the next time slot, where Ns = {1, ..., |N |s }
denotes their corresponding set. The humans ”compete” with each other towards
finally visiting the PoI that they have initially selected. The interactions and behavior
of the humans, who through the reinforcement learning framework expressed interest
in visiting the same PoI, is further captured via a non-cooperative game among
them. Specifically, the theory of minority games is adopted, which proposes that a
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number of players (i.e., humans) repeatedly compete with each other to be in the
minority group via making an action of the two available ones, i.e., go or not to the
initially selected PoI. At each iteration ite of the game, the humans that belong to
the minority group perceive increased satisfaction and they promote their winning
strategy for the next iteration of the game. The main benefit of the minority games
is that they have a non-empty set of Pure Nash equilibria (PNE) [18].
Let us denote the minority game as GM G = [Ns , {An }, {fan (n)}], where Ns is
the set of humans that have selected to visit the PoI s following the reinforcement
learning framework (Section 2.3). At each iteration ite of the minority game, each
ite
human can decide to visit the PoI (aite
n = 1) or not (an = 0). The set of human’s
ite
strategies is denoted as An = {0, 1}, aite
n ∈ An . For each strategy an ∈ An , there is

: {1, ..., n, ..., |N |} → R, which represents the reward that the
a payoff function faite
n
human n experiences by making the action an at the iteration ite of the minority
game. The payoff function faite
is formulated as follows.
n

faite
=
n



1, if |N |an ≤ N thres
s
s

(2.3)


0, otherwise

where if the number of humans that select a strategy an (i.e., |N |as n ) is less than the
physical capacity Nsthres of the PoI s then they promote their action, i.e., faite
= 1.
n
To solve the minority game and determine its Pure Nash equilibrium, a distributed
learning algorithm is required. This goal can be achieved by multiple distributed
learning techniques, e.g., Q-learning, exponential learning, trial and error learning.
In this chapter, we have adopted an exponential learning technique to determine in
an autonomous and distributed manner the Pure Nash equilibrium of the minority
game GM G (see Section 2.5).

30

Chapter 2.

2.5

Human Orchestration in Smart cities

Smart Orchestration in Points of Interest
(SmartPoI) Algorithm

In this section, the distributed Smart Orchestration in PoIs (SmartPoI) algorithm is
presented. At each time slot t, each human n acts as a stochastic learning automaton
making its choice of the PoI that wants to visit, based on its action probabilities
[t]

[t]

[t]

Prn = [P rn,1 , . . . , P rn,|S| ]. After each human’s choice, a cluster of humans |N |s , ∀s ∈
S is constructed, and a minority game is played to determine the set of humans who
finally visit the PoI (NsGO ), and the corresponding set of humans who do not visit the
PoI (NsN GO ). For the minority game played for each PoI s, a distributed exponential
learning algorithm is adopted, which leads the humans to make smart choices by


Ns
Ns
considering only their past actions and converge to one of the N thres
+ N thres
−1
+1
s

s

PNE points [66]. For each cluster of humans |N |s that selected the PoI s, each
0
human n by starting with equal probabilities of going and not going, i.e., prn,a
=
n =0
0
0
0
= 0, at each iteration ite of
= πn,a
= 0.5, and zero scores, i.e., πn,a
prn,a
n =0
n =0
n =1

the minority game the human n determines its action aite
n and regarding its payoff
ite
.
(Eq. 2.3) and the winning action wite , it updates its chosen action’s score πn,a
faite
n
n

It is highlighted that the winning action wite is evaluated regarding the winning
minority group. Then, each human n evaluates its next time slots’ reward probability
[t+1]

[t+1]

r̃n,s , ∀s ∈ S, and updates its action probabilities P rn,s , ∀s ∈ S (Eq. 2.2a, 2.2b).
Regarding the SmartPoI algorithm’s complexity, at each time slot t of the stochastic learning automata, the minority games at all PoIs are played in parallel. Moreover, since the complexity of each minority game is O(|N |s ), by denoting as Ite
the number of iterations that are needed for the convergence of the minority game
that finishes last, the overall complexity of all the minority games is O(Ite · |N |).
Furthermore, since the evaluation of the reward probability and the update of the
action probabilities of each human n for each PoI s, is performed in a constant time,
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Initialization

For each Timeslot
Clustering

Each human selects which
PoI to visit based on
his/her selection
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Minority
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Decide for each Cluster
the “GO” and “NOT GO”
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&
Majority
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Reinforcement
Learning
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Each human updates
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of selection based on the
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values

End of Timeslots

Figure 2.4: Graphical representation of the overall proposed framework in this research work summarizing the flow of information, as well as of the control actions to
conclude to the autonomous decision making process.

the complexity of the rest part of the SmartPoI algorithm is O(|N | · |S|). Finally,
by denoting as T the numbers of time slots that are needed for the convergence of
the stochastic learning automata, the overal complexity of the SmartPoI algorithm
is O(T · (Ite · |N | + |N | · |S|)).

A graphical representation of the overall proposed framework in this research
work is presented in Figure 2.4, summarizing the flow of information, as well as of
the control actions to conclude to the autonomous decision making process.
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Algorithm 1 SmartPoI Algorithm
1: Function {Main}:
[0]

2: Input/Initialization: N, S, in,s , dn,s , SIn,j , cs , Nsthres
[0]

1
|S| , ∀n ∈ N, ∀s ∈ S
[Pr∗1 , . . . , Pr∗n , . . . , Pr∗|N| ]

t = 0, Conv = 0, P rn,s =
3: Output: Pr∗ =

4: while Conv == 0 do
5:

Ns = ∅, ∀s ∈ S

6:

Choose an (t) ∈ S, Nan (t) = Nan (t) ∪ {n}, ∀n ∈ N
[t]

based on Prn
7:

M inorityGame(Ns , Nsthres ), ∀s ∈ S

8:

Evaluate rn,s , r̃n,s , P rn,an (t) , P rn,s

9:
10:

[t+1]

[t+1]

[t+1]

Conv = 1, if ∀n ∈ N , ∃s ∈ S:

[t+1]

via Eq. 2.1, 2.2a, 2.2b ∀n ∈ N, ∀s ∈ S

[t+1]
|P rn,s

− 1| ≤ 0.99

t=t+1

11: end while
[t]

12: Pr∗n = Prn , ∀n ∈ N
13: EndFunction
14: Function {MinorityGame}:
ite
ite
= 0.5, πn,a
= 0, ite = 0, Conv = 0, ∀n ∈
15: Input/Initialization: Ns , Nsthres , prn,a
n
n

N, ∀an ∈ An
16: Output: NsGO , NsN GO
17: while Conv == 0 do
18:

NsGO = NsN GO = ∅

19:

ite
ite
ite
Choose aite
n , ∀n ∈ Ns based on prn = [prn,0 , prn,1 ]

20:

GO = N GO ∪ {n}
if aite
n = 1, then Ns
s

else NsN GO = NsN GO ∪ {n}
21:

if |NsGO | ≤ Nsthres , then wite = 1 else wite = 0

22:

ite+1 = π ite + f ite
πn,a
n,an
an
n

23:

ite+1 = exp (γ · π ite+1 )/
prn,a
n,an
n

24:

ite+1 − 1| ≤ 0.99
Conv = 1, if ∀n ∈ Ns , ∃an ∈ An : |prn,a
n

25:

ite = ite + 1

P

∀an ∈An

ite+1 ) ∀a ∈ A , ∀n ∈ N
exp (γ · πn,a
n
n
s
n

26: end while
27: EndFunction
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Experiments
Experiment Setup

In this section, a detailed numerical evaluation of the proposed approach is presented
in terms of the overall framework’s operation efficiency (Section 2.6.2) and superiority
compared to other alternatives (Section 2.6.3). For our simulations, that were carried
out using MATLAB software, we considered a smart city area that consists of |N | =
100 humans randomly distributed in the smart city setting and |S| = 6 PoIs. The
interest in,s as well as the social interest of interaction among the humans SIn,j are
randomly and uniformly assigned to the humans, while Nthres = [6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16]
and c = [0.166, 0.333, 0.5, 0.666, 0.833, .999]. A detailed Monte Carlo analysis has
been executed for all the presented numerical results considering averages over 10, 000
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Figure 2.5: (a) Average convergence time and average humans’ reward vs b and (b)
Action probabilities convergence
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SmartPoI Framework’s Operation

First, we evaluate the operation of the socio-physical PoI selection following the
proposed reinforcement learning technique. Figure 2.5a presents the impact of the
learning rate parameter b on the average convergence time of the PoI selection and
the corresponding average reward (Eq. 2.1). The results reveal that for small values
of the learning rate parameter, the humans exploit more thoroughly the available
PoIs, thus, they make a better choice of PoI, resulting in increased average reward.
However, the latter comes with the cost of increased convergence time to a PoI’s
selection. In the rest of our analysis, we consider b = 0.4. Additionally, in Figure
2.5b, the action probabilities convergence is presented for one representative human
in the smart city. The results illustrate that the execution time of the proposed
PoI selection mechanism is less than 1 sec, which makes it practical for real-life
applications.
In Figures 2.6a-2.6d, we present a detailed analysis of the internal operation of
the PoI selection reinforcement learning mechanism based on the proposed reward
function (Eq. 2.1), which captures humans’ and PoIs’ social and physical characteristics. Figure 2.6 illustrates the average cluster size of the humans that selected
each PoI based on: (a) the varying cost cs of the PoIs, (b) the varying distance
dn,s , n ∈ N, s ∈ S, (c) the varying PoIs’ capacity Nsthres , s ∈ S, (d) all the varying
factors of the reward function in Eq. 2.1. It is noted that in Figures 2.6(a)-2.6(c) only
one parameter is varying, while the rest of the factors are the same for all the users
for all the PoIs for fairness in the comparison. The results reveal that the humans
proportionally select the PoI with the lower cost cs (Figure 2.6a) and the higher capacity (Figure 2.6c). The results also illustrate that the humans select the PoI with
the closest physical proximity (Figure 2.6b). In Figure 2.6d a more complex case is
examined and presented, where multiple social and physical factors are varying. It
is observed that the cost cs becomes a dominant factor in humans’ PoI selection, i.e.,
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more humans select PoIs 1 and 2 which have the relatively lower cost. However, the
dominance of the PoIs’ cost in the PoI selection can be limited by other factors such
as the humans’ distance from the PoIs and the PoIs capacity. For example, even if
PoI 3 has lower cost compared to PoI 6, less humans select PoI 3, as it has a smaller
capacity than PoI 6, thus it can easily become congested and unable to efficiently
serve them.
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factors in Eq.2.1
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Therefore, we conclude that the holistic consideration of the humans’ and PoIs’
social and physical characteristics in the PoI selection process can better capture the
realistic environment of the smart city.
Next, we discuss the operation of the minority games approach which enables the
humans who initially selected a PoI to finally determine if they will visit it. The
convergence of the humans’ action probabilities is presented in Figure 2.7a for two
indicative subjects. Also, Figure 2.7b presents the humans’ attendance to one PoI,
thres
= 8. The results reveal that the proposed
which has a corresponding capacity Ns=2

decision-making approach of the minority games is of low time complexity (i.e., order
of msec) and the number of humans who go to a PoI, stays close to PoI’s capacity,
thus the PoI serves the humans in an efficient manner.
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Figure 2.7: Convergence of human’s (a) action probabilities and (b) attendance.
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Comparative Results

In this subsection, we provide a comparative analysis of our approach focusing on
the benefits of: (a) the holistic consideration of the humans’ and PoIs’ socio-physical
characteristics and (b) the stochastic learning automata technique to enable the
humans to learn the most beneficial selection of a PoI.
Initially, we consider a scenario, where the PoI selection by the humans and the
decision to go to a PoI is performed following the procedure presented in the SmartPoI algorithm, while six different alternatives are examined regarding the considered
reward function (Eq. 2.1). In particular, the different cases considered are as fol[t+1]

1
,
cs

[t+1]

(b) distance: rn,s =

1
,
dn,s

[t+1]

[t+1]

(c) interest: rn,s = in,s , (d)
t
P
[k]
[t+1]
QoSn,s
SmartPoI, i.e., the reward function is given by Eq. 2.1, (e) QoS: rn,s =
lows, (a) cost: rn,s =

k=0
Go[t]

[t+1]

(f) social interest: rn,s =

|NP
|s

[t]

SIn,j . For fairness in the comparison, we use the re-

j=1

ward function of Eq. 2.1 to capture the humans’ satisfaction (Figure 2.8a). Also the
average convergence time to the PoIs selection (Figure 2.8b) and the average cluster
size of humans per PoI (Figure 2.8c) are presented. The results reveal that the holistic consideration of the humans’ and PoIs’ characteristics, i.e., SmartPoI scenario,
conclude to improved humans’ satisfaction (Figure 2.8a), while allowing the humans
to quickly learn their desired PoI selection (Figure 2.8b) and not overcongest the
PoIs (Figure 2.8c).
Moreover, the linear relationship of the influential factor (i.e., interest case) with
the humans’ reward function concludes to a slow update rule of PoI selection and a
corresponding low achieved satisfaction compared to a convex relationship (i.e., distance case), which enables the humans to rapidly exploit the smart city environment
and make a better PoI selection. Moreover, if the PoI selection is based only on
the PoIs’ physical characteristics (e.g., cost case), the humans initially select the PoI
with the lowest cost (thus, they increase their perceived satisfaction), and when they
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exceed the PoIs’ capacity, they quickly learn that this PoI selection is not beneficial
anymore and they choose another PoI.
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Furthermore, if the humans’ personal characteristics are considered for the PoI
selection, i.e., QoS and social interest cases, the humans have a myopic view of the
smart city environment based only on their own perspective, thus they are not able to
efficiently and quickly exploit their choices and they achieve low levels of satisfaction.
Additionally, in Figure 2.8c it is observed that based on the performed Monte Carlo
analysis, the cost, distance, and interest cases conclude to equal human distributions
per PoI, while the SmartPoI and QoS cases that consider the PoIs’ capacity during
the PoI selection process do not overcongest the PoIs. Also, in the social interest
case, we observe that the humans tend to select the PoI with the highest capacity,
as in this case they have better chances to meet other humans with similar interests.
Next, we consider another comparative scenario, where the humans select to visit
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a PoI based on the following alternatives: (a) lowest cost, (b) lowest distance from
a PoI, (c) maximum interest for a PoI, and (d) randomly, instead of fully exploiting
the proposed SmartPoI framework. The results reveal that the PoI selection based
on the SmartPoI framework concludes to superior reward for the humans (Figure
2.9a), as they thoroughly exploit their available choices. The random PoI selection
gives the worst rewards to the humans, while it is observed that the humans become
more satisfied if they pay less to visit a PoI compared to the cases where they have
to travel a large distance for their visit or if they are highly interested in visiting the
PoI. Finally, following the performed Monte Carlo analysis, the results reveal that
the SmartPoI framework does not congest the PoIs, while all the other examined
comparative cases equally distribute the humans among the PoIs, thus, congesting
some PoIs with small capacity Nsthres .

2.7

Conclusions

In this chapter, the problem of the socio-physical human orchestration in smart
city environments is studied by exploiting reinforcement learning and game-theoretic
techniques. Initially, the humans act as stochastic learning automata probabilistically selecting to visit a Point of Interest based on the reward that they receive and
their past experience. The introduced humans’ reward captures their social characteristics, as well as the PoIs’ physical characteristics. At the second layer of the
proposed approach, the humans that have selected the same PoI ”compete” with
each other towards finally visiting it. The latter humans’ behavior is studied as a
non-cooperative minority game among the humans. The Nash equilibrium point of
the game is determined, which identifies the specific humans that will finally visit
each PoI. A distributed low-complexity algorithm is presented to realize the proposed framework, while the efficiency and superiority of the proposed framework is
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evaluated and demonstrated through modeling and simulation. Part of our current
and future work includes the testing of the proposed framework in the real smart
city environment of the City of Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA and based on the
realistic outcomes, and observations to fine tune the theoretical model.
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Chapter 3
Socio-aware Public Safety
Framework Design based on
Contract Theory

3.1

Introduction

In public safety events, either natural disasters or terrorists attacks, the engagement
of the citizens, the knowledge discovery, and the information dissemination play a
critical role throughout the overall disaster management operation [67]. Nowadays,
social networks have become of paramount importance in preparedness, emergency
control management, response, and recovery. Millions of citizens depend on and
exploit various social networks, such as Facebook, Weibo, Twitter, and others to
spread information about critical events. This process in turn helps the Emergency
Control Centers (ECC) to improve the disaster management operation. An indicative
example is the ”Boston Marathon” event in 2013, where the image of the suspect
was retrieved from the social networks [68]. However, rumors and false information
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can also be disseminated in social networks and harm the rescue process in a public
safety system [69]. Therefore, the classification, capabilities and interactions of the
involved actors in the socio-aware public safety systems are of high significance.
Motivated by the aforementioned observations, in this chapter, we introduce a
socio-aware public safety system, where the types of citizens offering information to
the ECC are identified based on their social and communication characteristics. The
ECC motivates the citizens to participate in the disaster management operation by
offering to them incentives (e.g., benefits, coupons) in accordance to their types under
information asymmetry or complete information, while the citizens contribute their
personal effort to the process in order to improve the disaster management operation.
To this end, we adopt Contract Theory, a powerful tool from microeconomics to
model the citizens’ incentive mechanism, through the use of contracts (agreements)
between the ECC and the citizens. The ultimate goal is to find the optimal contract
pair of ECC’s offered reward and each citizen’s provided effort based on its sociocommunication profile and type.

3.1.1

Related Work

The actual and potential exploitation and impact of social networks on emergency
disaster management and crisis situation has been studied in [70] to identify the
benefits, e.g., monitoring situations, extending emergency response and management, as well as the negative developments, such as disseminating rumors. In [71],
the authors introduce the concept of People as Sensors, where people contribute information through the social networks and their provided information is integrated
within the location-based services, data analysis, and visualization systems. This
concept is further extended in [72], where a tutorial of models and algorithms is
presented for interactive sensing in social networks, where the users’ provided infor-
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mation is exploited to optimize sensing, decision-making, and operations in dynamic
environments, such as the public safety systems. Furthermore, a multimedia content
analysis of the available information in social networks is introduced in [73] in order to detect events, e.g., natural disasters and terrorists’ attacks, and manage the
corresponding rescue operations.
Based on the above, it is evident that a great part of the available literature deals
with the exploitation of the already available information in the social networks in
order to detect public safety events and provide input to the disaster management
operations. However, limited research has been performed in the area of properly
modeling and exploiting the incentivization of the citizens in order to provide valuable
information in the social networks that will support the ECC’s operations. Towards
this direction, some initial efforts have been devoted to encouraging citizens to report
public safety problems, by capitalizing on the concepts of crowdsourcing, incentivization and volunteer computing [74, 75]. Nevertheless, the majority of them have been
relatively primitive focusing primarily on finding ways of simply engaging citizens,
being either heuristic or crude in their nature, without attempting to quantify the
contribution of each citizen in a formal manner.
In this chapter, we adopt concepts and principles of Contract Theory, which provides the mathematical foundations to design formal and informal agreements to
motivate people with potentially conflicting interests to take mutually beneficial actions, which otherwise would be counter-productive. Under this concept, an employer
provides contracts to the employees based on their profiles, i.e., types, to motivate
them to provide back their effort, which is crucial for the employer’s operational
processes.
Contract theory has been already applied in several communication-related applications, including device-to-device (D2D) communications [76] and cooperative
spectrum sharing [77, 78]. In particular, in [79], the authors introduce a contract-
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theoretic relay selection framework, where the employer is the transmitter and the
employees are the relay nodes. The transmitter offers rewards, i.e., payments, to the
employees, while the latter guarantee a signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio at the
destination. Contract theory has been also used to incentivize the users, i.e., employees, to establish device-to-device communication pairs to de-congest their communication with the base station (i.e., employer) [80]. Also, contract theory is used
in cooperative spectrum sharing [81], and in cognitive networks allowing the primary
spectrum owner (i.e., employer) to incentivize the secondary users (i.e., employees)
to efficiently share the available bandwidth [82].

3.1.2

Contributions & Outline

This chapter aims exactly at filling the aforementioned research gap, by introducing
formal methods - based on the Contract Theory - in order for the ECC to incentivize
the citizens to participate in the disaster management operations and offer their valuable effort and information in an optimal manner. The key scientific contributions of
our work that differentiate it from the rest of the existing literature, are summarized
as follows.
1. The different types of the citizens are identified by the ECC via exploiting their
social and communication characteristics, and identify a socio-communication type
for each citizen. Based on the citizen’s type, a corresponding utility is formulated
reflecting its perceived satisfaction from the received reward for its invested effort.
Also, the ECC’s utility is defined to capture the overall benefit of using the citizens’
efforts, while considering the corresponding cost of providing incentives to the citizens
through the rewards. A contract pair between the ECC and each citizen is considered
to be established consisting of the ECC’s reward and the citizen’s effort (Section 3.2).
2. The problem of determining the optimal rewards from the ECC’s perspective and
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the optimal invested effort from the citizens’ side is formulated and solved initially
considering that the ECC has complete information about the types of the citizens
(Section 3.3). Furthermore, the aforementioned problem is addressed and thoroughly
analyzed, under the most challenging and realistic assumption of ECC’s incomplete
information knowledge about the citizens’ types (Section 3.4). In both scenarios, the
outcome of the proposed framework is the optimal contract pairs.
3. A series of simulation experiments are realized to evaluate the performance and
inherent attributes of the proposed socio-aware public safety framework (Section
3.5). Finally, Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.

3.2

System Model

We consider a public safety system consisting of an Emergency Control Center (ECC)
that is responsible to coordinate the disaster management operations and a set of
citizens C = {1, . . . , c, . . . , |C|}. The ECC rewards the citizens through personalized
rewards rc (e.g., benefits, coupons, money) in order to incentivize them to provide
their valuable effort in the disaster management operations. The citizen’s effort qc
can capture various types of effort: (a) social related effort, such as data quality
(e.g., sensing data, closed cameras TV data), information shared in social networks,
influential posts on Twitter, shelters’ announcements on Facebook, and others, and
(b) communication related effort, such as coverage area of the citizen’s mobile device,
which can potentially act as a relay node, CPU capability provided by the citizen’s
devices to process data in a fog computing setup and others. We consider the normalized values of the ECC’s rewards, i.e., rc ∈ [0, 1], and the citizen’s effort, i.e.,
qc ∈ [0, 1]. Also, the ECC acts in a fair manner and rewards more the citizens that
provide more effort in the disaster management operation, thus the reward rc is a
strictly increasing function with respect to the citizen’s effort qc .
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Citizen’s Social and Communication Type

Each citizen is characterized by a socio-communication type tc which captures its
social and communication characteristics in terms of providing information to the
ECC. Regarding the communication characteristics, each citizen achieves a data rate
Rc = W log(1 +

P

Pc gc
)
Pi gi +I0

to directly report information to the ECC’s receiver,

i̸=c

where W is the system’s bandwidth, Pc and gc are the citizen’s transmission power
P
and channel gain, respectively, i̸=c Pi gi is the overall sensed interference, and I0 is
the background noise [83]. It is evident that the greater the citizen’s achievable data
rate is, the more valuable it becomes for the ECC’s operation as more information
can be collected by the ECC.
Moreover, the citizen’s socio-communication type is also dependent on its social
characteristics. Each citizen is characterized by its reputation score µc , µc ∈ [0, 1],
based on its activity in the social networks, i.e., information spread. The citizen’s
information spread is modeled in the literature by the diffusion model and the influence maximization algorithms can be used to determine the reputation score µc
(i.e., identify the influential citizens) [84]. A citizen’s contribution to the information spread process, is characterized by a corresponding social impact SIc (µc ) to
the community, which is assumed a strictly increasing function with respect to the
citizen’s reputation score. Furthermore, to also capture the importance of the citizen’s information contribution for the disaster management operation of the ECC,
we introduce the concept of knowledge discovery KDc , KDc ∈ [0, 1], referring to the
unique content that the citizen shares to the social network or offers directly to the
ECC compared to a bulk amount of data.
Based on the aforementioned citizen’s social and communication characteristics,
the socio-communication type tc , tc ∈ [0, 1] of the citizen is defined as follows.
tc = P

Rc
∀i∈C

Ri

SIc (µc )
· KDc
∀i∈C SIi (µi )

·P
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For demonstration purposes, we also consider a strictly increasing function rc (qc ) =
tc qc regarding the ECC’s reward for citizen c. Also, in the following analysis, we
consider |C| different types of citizens, that is each citizen has a unique sociocommunication type, while a citizen of higher type, i.e., t1 < · · · < tc < · · · < t|C| ,
provides more effort qc , i.e., q1 < · · · < qc < · · · < q|C| .

3.2.2

Emergency Control Center’s and Citizens’ Utilities

The ECC offers a personalized contract pair {rc (qc ), qc } to the citizen c for its provided effort qc by providing a corresponding reward rc . Each citizen is characterized
by a utility function Uc (qc ) expressing the perceived satisfaction from the ECC’s provided reward based on its socio-communication type, as well as its cost to provide
its effort that the citizen has invested in the disaster management operation. The
citizen’s utility is defined as follows.

Uc (qc ) = tc · e(rc ) − qc

(3.2)

where e(rc ) is the evaluation function of the citizen c regarding the received reward rc .
The evaluation function e(rc ) is a strictly increasing, concave function with respect
to the citizen’s effort qc , with e(rc = 0) = 0 and expresses the citizen’s satisfaction
with respect to the reward that it received. For demonstration purposes and without
√
loss of generality, in the following we consider e(rc ) = rc .
c
The ECC also experiences a utility UECC
= qc − κ · rc by each citizen’s provided

effort, while taking into account the corresponding cost of the reward rc (κ is the
ECC’s pricing factor). In the general case, the ECC may not be aware of the citizen’s
P|C|
types, thus the ECC estimates them with probability pc , where c=1
pc = 1. Thus,
the ECC’s overall perceived utility (accounting for all citizens) is defined as follows.
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UECC (q) =

|C|
X

[pc (qc − κ · rc )]

(3.3)

c=1

where q = (q1 , . . . , q|C| ) is the vector of the citizens’ effort.
Considering the overall socio-aware public safety system, its social welfare, including both the ECC and all the citizens, is defined as follows.

SW (q) = UECC (q) +

|C|
X

Uc (qc )

(3.4)

c=1

3.2.3

Contract Theory Perspective and Methodology

Based on the aforementioned utilities, rewards and other related parameters, in general the solution we seek is a set of contract pairs between the ECC and the citizens
(employer and employees under Contract Theory terminology [39]) with reference to
the citizen’s effort qc and the corresponding provided reward rc , with the objective
being maximizing the employer’s utility. The problem is typically formulated as maximizing an objective function that represents the employer’s utility, subject to the
incentive compatibility constraint that the employee’s expected utility is maximized
when accepting the personalized contract, and the individual rationality constraint
that the employee’s utility under this contract is larger than or equal to its counterpart when not participating.
Contract theory is used to study the interaction between employer(s) and employees, and treats real world problems with either complete or even incomplete
(often referred to as asymmetric information), by formally designing the contract
between employer and employee, while implicitly introducing cooperation. The information asymmetry mainly refers to the fact that the employer does not know
exactly the types and therefore the characteristics of the employees, and has only
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knowledge about the probability distribution of the types of employees. Contracttheoretic models allow the alleviation of this problem, and accordingly the employer
can overcome this asymmetricity and efficiently still incentivize its employees. In the
following sections we address the identification of optimal contract pairs between the
ECC and citizens, for both cases of complete and incomplete information availability.

3.3

Citizens’ Contracts under Complete Information

In this section, the ideal case where the ECC knows a priori the type of each citizen
is considered. In this scenario which can be mainly used for benchmarking purposes,
the ECC can fully exploit the citizens’ efforts and make the best out of them regarding the disaster management operation. Thus, the ECC aims at maximizing its
perceived utility by the effort of each citizen, while guaranteeing that the latter will
accept the offered contract, i.e., the ECC has to ensure that the individual rationality condition of each citizen is satisfied. Therefore, the problem of determining
the optimal contracts, under the assumption of complete information of the citizens’
socio-communication types, can be written as follows.

max

{rc (qc ),qc }∀c∈C

s.t.

c
UECC
= qc − κ · rc ,

∀c ∈ C

tc · e(rc ) − qc ≥ 0

(3.5a)

(3.5b)

The ECC will target at providing the minimum acceptable utility to the citizens
towards maximizing its own utility. Thus, the constraint (3.5b) can be considered
alternatively as equality in this case. Accordingly the solution of the optimization
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problem (3.5a)-(3.5b) is obtained by initially solving the equality (3.5b) with respect
to rc , and subsequently performing basic mathematical treatment and manipulations
(i.e., substituting in (3.5a), differentiating Eq. (3.5a) with respect to qc , and equating
the outcome to zero). Consequently, under the assumption of complete information
availability at the ECC, with respect to the exact type of each citizen and therefore
its characteristics, the optimal contract pair is given by the following closed form
2

tc 2 tc
) , 2κ }.
solution: {rc (qc ), qc } = {( 2κ

3.4

Contract Theoretic Public Safety Systems under Incomplete Information

In this section, we extend our study in determining the optimal contract pairs
{rc (qc ), qc } between the ECC and the citizens, under the realistic scenario of incomplete information availability, that is the ECC is not aware of the exact type of
each citizen (i.e., information asymmetry). Nevertheless, the ECC should ensure two
conditions for the citizens, i.e., individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility
(IC), in order to guarantee their participation in the disaster management operation.
The IR constraint refers to guaranteeing that the citizens will receive a non-negative
utility by accepting the contract, thus, they will be at least willing to participate in
the disaster management operation, while the IC constraint ensures that each citizen
will receive the contract that better matches its type. The aforementioned conditions
can be formally stated as follows.
Definition 1. (Individual Rationality (IR)) A contract pair {rc (qc ), qc } should guarantee that each citizen’s utility is non-negative, i.e., Uc (qc ) = tc ·e(rc )−qc ≥ 0, ∀c ∈ C.
Definition 2. (Incentive Compatibility (IC)) Each citizen must select the contract
pair {rc (qc ), qc } designed for its type, i.e., tc · e(rc ) − qc ≥ tc · e(rc′ ) − qc′ , ∀c, c′ ∈ C, c ̸=
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c′ .
The IR and IC constraints are necessary, but not sufficient in order the ECC
to determine the optimal contract pairs. Additionally, the following conditions and
properties must hold true in order the contract pairs to be feasible.
Proposition 1. For any feasible contract pair {rc (qc ), qc }, the following property
must hold true: rc > rc′ ⇔ tc > tc′ and rc = rc′ ⇔ tc = tc′ .
Proof. Initially, we prove the sufficiency of the above property by using the IC constraint, i.e., tc · e(rc ) − qc ≥ tc · e(rc′ ) − qc′ , ∀c, c′ ∈ C, c ̸= c′ . Thus, we want to show
tc > tc′ ⇒ rc > rc′ . Based on the IC constraint, we have:
tc · e(rc ) − qc ≥ tc · e(rc′ ) − qc′

(3.6)

tc′ · e(rc′ ) − qc′ ≥ tc′ · e(rc ) − qc

(3.7)

By adding the inequalities (3.6) and (3.7), we have:
tc e(rc ) + tc′ e(rc′ ) ≥ tc e(rc′ ) + tc′ e(rc )

(3.8)

By continuing the derivations in inequality (3.8) and given that tc > tc′ and
e(rc ) is a strictly increasing function with respect to rc , we conclude that rc > rc′ .
Continuing our analysis, we prove the necessity of the examined property, i.e., rc >
rc′ ⇒ tc > tc′ . We have rc > rc′ , and given that e(rc ) is a strictly increasing function,
we conclude that e(rc ) − e(rc′ ) > 0. Based on Eq. 3.8, we have tc [e(rc ) − e(rc′ )] ≥
tc′ [e(rc ) − e(rc′ )] ⇔ [tc − tc′ ][e(rc ) − e(rc′ )] ≥ 0, thus tc > tc′ . Similar analysis can be
followed for the property rc = rc′ ⇔ tc = tc′ .
The physical meaning of Proposition 1 is that a citizen of higher type tc will
receive a higher reward rc compared to a citizen of lower type tc′ , who will receive
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lower reward rc′ . Proposition 1 guarantees the fairness in the rewards allocation from
the ECC to the citizens.
Proposition 2. (Monotonicity) A citizen of higher type, i.e., t1 < · · · < tc < · · · <
t|C| , will receive a greater reward from the ECC, i.e., r1 < · · · < rc < · · · < r|C| , as it
will contribute a greater effort, i.e., q1 < · · · < qc < · · · < q|C| .
Proof. The proof of this proposition intuitively stems from Proposition 1, given that
t1 < ... < tc < ... < t|C| .
In the following proposition, we examine the perceived utility of the citizens that
have different socio-communication types.
Proposition 3. A citizen of higher type, i.e., t1 < · · · < tc < · · · < t|C| , will receive
a higher utility, i.e., U1 < · · · < Uc < · · · < U|C| .
Proof. We examine two citizens c, c′ ∈ C of types tc > tc′ , c ̸= c′ . Based on the IC
tc >t

′

c
constraint, we have tc · e(rc ) − qc ≥ tc · e(rc′ ) − qc′ ====
⇒ Uc (qc ) = tc · e(rc ) − qc >

tc′ · e(rc′ ) − qc′ = Uc′ (qc′ ). Thus, for t1 < · · · < tc < · · · < t|C| , we conclude that
U1 < · · · < Uc < · · · < U|C| .
Based on the above introduced models, constraints, and the application of the
key principles of Contract Theory, the ECC aims at maximizing its utility, while
the citizens should satisfy all their personal constraints in order to be willing to
participate in the socio-aware public safety system. Thus, optimization problem to
determine the optimal contract pairs {rc (qc ), qc }, ∀c ∈ C between the ECC and the
citizens is formulated as follows.

max

{rc (qc ),qc }∀c∈C

UECC (q) =

|C|
X

[pc (qc − κ · rc )]

c=1
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tc · e(rc ) − qc ≥ 0, ∀c ∈ C

(3.9b)

tc · e(rc ) − qc ≥ tc · e(rc′ ) − qc′ , ∀c, c′ ∈ C, c ̸= c′

(3.9c)

0 ≤ r1 < · · · < rc < · · · < r|C|

(3.9d)

Given that the above optimization problem is non-convex, in the following we
reduce its constraints in order to solve it in a tractable manner. Based on Proposition
2, we have t1 < · · · < tc < · · · < t|C| and considering the IC constraint, we have
tc · e(rc ) − qc ≥ tc · e(rc′ ) − qc′ ≥ tc · e(r1 ) − q1 . Given that tc > t1 , we have:
tc · e(rc ) − qc ≥ tc · e(r1 ) − q1 ≥ t1 · e(r1 ) − q1 ≥ 0. The last step of the latter inequality
stems from the IR constraint (3.9b). Thus, if t1 · e(r1 ) − q1 ≥ 0 holds true, then
tc · e(rc ) − qc ≥ 0 holds true for each citizen c ∈ C. The above analysis concludes
to the observation that if the IR constraint holds true for the citizen with the lower
type, i.e., t1 , then it will hold true for any other citizen of higher type, thus, the IR
constraints are reduced to t1 · e(r1 ) − q1 = 0. The latter IR constraint is considered
as equality in order to the ECC to collect the maximum benefit from the citizen’s
effort.
In the following analysis, we target at reducing the IC constraints. The terminology that we use about the IC constraints between citizens: (a) c, c′ , c′ ∈ {1, . . . c − 1}
is downward IC constraints, (b) c, c′ , c′ ∈ {c + 1, . . . |C|} is upward IC constraints, (c)
c, c − 1, ∀c, c − 1 ∈ C is local downward IC constraints, and (d) c, c + 1, ∀c, c + 1 ∈ C
is local upward IC constraints.
Proposition 4. All the downward IC constraints can be represented by the local
downward IC constraints.
Proof. Considering three types of citizens: tc−1 < tc < tc+1 , the local downward IC
constraints can be written as:
tc+1 · e(rc+1 ) − qc+1 ≥ tc+1 · e(rc ) − qc
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tc · e(rc ) − qc ≥ tc · e(rc−1 ) − qc−1

(3.11)
e↗

Based on Proposition 1, we have rc > rc′ ⇔ tc > tc′ . For rc > rc−1 ⇐=⇒e(rc ) >
e(rc−1 ) ⇔ e(rc ) − e(rc−1 ) > 0. Thus, for tc+1 > tc ⇔ tc+1 [e(rc ) − e(rc−1 )] > tc [e(rc ) −
e(rc−1 )] ≥(11) qc − qc−1 . Therefore, we have recursively: tc+1 · e(rc+1 ) − qc+1 ≥
tc+1 · e(rc−1 ) − qc−1 ≥ tc+1 · e(rc−2 ) − qc−2 ≥ · · · ≥ tc+1 · e(r1 ) − q1 . Thus, all the
downward IC constraints can be equivalently captured by the local downward IC
constraints:

tc · e(rc ) − qc ≥ tc · e(rc−1 ) − qc−1

(3.12)

Proposition 5. All the upward IC constraints can be represented by the local downward IC constraints.
Proof. Based on the IC constraint, we have:
tc−1 · e(rc−1 ) − qc−1 ≥ tc−1 · e(rc ) − qc

(3.13)

tc · e(rc ) − qc ≥ tc · e(rc+1 ) − qc+1

(3.14)

Based on Proposition 1, we have rc > rc′ ⇔ tc > tc′ . Thus, based on Eq. 3.14,
we have:

qc+1 − qc ≥ tc [e(rc+1 ) − e(rc )] ≥ tc−1 [e(rc+1 ) − e(rc )]

(3.15)

given that tc > tc−1 . Based on Eq. 3.13, 3.15, we have: tc−1 e(rc−1 )−qc−1 ≥ tc−1 e(rc )−
qc ≥ tc−1 e(rc+1 ) − qc+1 . Thus, we have: tc−1 e(rc−1 ) − qc−1 ≥ tc−1 e(rc+1 ) − qc+1 . Thus,
if the IC constraint holds true for the citizen of type tc−1 , then all the upward
IC constraints hold true. Therefore, we have recursively: tc−1 · e(rc−1 ) − qc−1 ≥
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tc−1 · e(rc+1 ) − qc+1 ≥ · · · ≥ tc−1 · e(r|C| ) − q|C| . Based on the above analysis, we
conclude that the local upward IC constraints and all the upward IC constraints can
be reduced to the local downward IC constraints.

Based on the reduced IR constraints, and Propositions 4 and 5, the optimization
problem (3.9a)-(3.9d) can be rewritten to the following convex optimization problem.

max

{rc (qc ),qc }∀c∈C

UECC (q) =

|C|
X

[pc (qc − κ · rc )]

(3.16a)

c=1

t1 · e(r1 ) − q1 = 0, ∀c ∈ C

(3.16b)

tc · e(rc ) − qc = tc · e(rc−1 ) − qc−1

(3.16c)

s.t.

0 ≤ r1 < · · · < rc < · · · < r|C|

(3.16d)

The optimization problem (3.16a)-(3.16d) is solved using standard methods of
convex optimization due to the convexity of the objective function and the constraints
[85], and the optimal contract pairs {rc (qc ), qc } are determined.

3.5

Numerical Results

In this section, a detailed numerical evaluation of the proposed contract-theoretic
socio-aware public safety approach is conducted, via modeling and simulation. The
performance evaluation initially focuses on the pure operation of the proposed framework in terms of determining the optimal contract pairs, the citizens’ and the ECC’s
utilities, as well as the overall social welfare of the system, for both cases of complete
and incomplete information availability (Section 3.5.1). Then, a comparative study
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of the proposed contract-theoretic framework against different alternative scenarios of determining the amount of effort offered by the citizens is presented (Section
3.5.2).
In the rest, we consider κ = 0.999, and that the probabilities of the citizens’ types
follow a uniform distribution. Moreover, the achievable data rate Rc is determined
for each citizen considering a constant data transmission power Pc = 2W atts, the
channel gain is gc = 1/d2c , where dc ∈ [10, 400]m is the distance of the citizen c from
the ECC’s receiver, the system’s bandwidth is W = 5M Hz [86], and the background
noise is I0 = 10−13 . The reputation score µc , µc ∈ [0, 1] is appropriately calculated
following the influence maximization algorithm [84, 87]. The social impact function
is SI(µc ) = log(µc ), and the knowledge discovery factor KDc takes random values
in the interval [0, 1], where values closer to one indicate that the citizen has provided
unique and valuable content to the ECC.

3.5.1

Pure Framework Operation Evaluation

Fig. 3.1.a presents the citizens’ type values as a function of their index. We considered |C| = 10 indicative citizens, where the greater the citizen’s index is the higher
its type, i.e., t1 < · · · < tc < · · · < t10 . Fig. 3.1.b-3.1.d present the citizens’ efforts,
their offered rewards by the ECC and their achieved utilities as a function of the
citizen’s index, respectively, considering the scenarios of complete and incomplete
information. Similarly, Fig. 3.1.e-3.1.f demonstrates the system’s point of view, by
presenting the ECC’s utility and the system’s social welfare, in a cumulative manner
as the number of contributing citizens increases (each time inserting one additional
citizen type indicated by the increased indices in the horizontal axis).
The results reveal that under the scenario of complete information (i.e., ideal scenario), the ECC knows a priori the socio-communication type of each citizen, thus,
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Figure 3.1: Pure Framework Evaluation - Complete and Incomplete (Asymmetric)
Information Scenarios
it fully exploits the citizens’ effort (Fig. 3.1.b) by providing increased rewards to
them (Fig. 3.1.c), and achieving high ECC utility due to the increased citizens’ participation (Fig. 3.1.e). Given that the ECC knows the citizens’ types, it offers them
the minimum possible reward based on their invested efforts in order to marginally
satisfy their rationality constraints, thus Uc = 0, ∀c ∈ C (Fig. 3.1.d).
On the other hand, under the incomplete information scenario, the ECC is not
aware of the citizens’ actual types, but it rather estimates them based on the knowledge about their probability distribution. In this case, the citizens by not disclosing
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their actual type to the ECC are able to achieve a higher utility compared to the complete information scenario (Fig. 3.1.d), i.e., tradeoff between their invested efforts
(Fig. 3.1.b) and their rewards from the ECC (Fig. 3.1.c). Consequently, the ECC
achieves lower utility compared to the complete information scenario (Fig. 3.1.e).
The sub-graph in Fig. 3.1.d shows that citizens’ of higher type receive higher utility and the contract that matches the citizen’s type concludes to the best achieved
utility.
In a nutshell, based on Fig. 3.1.a-3.1.d, it is confirmed that a citizen of higher
type, invests more effort, receives more reward from the ECC, and consequently
achieves greater utility, eeeeeas also stated in Proposition 2. Moreover, in Fig. 3.1.f,
we observe that despite the fact that under the incomplete information scenario
the ECC is not aware of the exact type of each citizen, the achieved overall public
safety system’s social welfare is reduced only by approximately 15% for the case of
|C| = 10 citizens (this value becomes even smaller for larger populations), which
indicates that the proposed framework behaves very well under the challenging and
realistic asymmetric scenario.

3.5.2

Comparative Evaluation

Fig. 3.2.a-3.2.c compares the proposed incomplete information realistic contacttheoretic framework’s achieved ECC’s utility, citizens’ utilities, and overall system’s
social welfare, respectively, against three alternative strategies with respect to the
citizen’s effort investment, as follows: (i) minimum effort, (ii) maximum effort, and
(iii) a random amount of effort. The results reveal that under the proposed framework the citizens are able to achieve high utility, similar to the one achieved by
their minimum personal effort strategy (Fig. 3.2.b). Also, as expected, the ECC
achieves the maximum utility if all the citizens invest their maximum effort (Fig.
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3.2.a). However, despite the fact that ECC achieves low utility under the proposed
contract-theoretic approach due to the cost of increased provided rewards to the
citizens (owing to the information incompleteness assumption), the system’s social
welfare is the highest among all scenarios (Fig. 3.2.c). The latter shows that the
proposed framework enables the smooth collaboration between the ECC and the citizens, concluding to improved social welfare. Finally, the scenario where the citizens
invest a random effort presents an intermediate trend regarding all the examined
metrics, between the minimum and the maximum invested efforts scenarios.
In the following we compare the strategy where the ECC offers personalized
rewards to the citizens (according to their type as realized in the proposed framework,
i.e., rc = tc · qc ), against an alternative still linear but type agnostic reward approach,
offering common reward to all the citizens, i.e., rc =

P|C|

c=1 tc

|C|

· qc . We observe that

the citizens benefit in terms of their achieved utility under the contract-theoretic
(CT) framework, while the ECC achieves lower utility compared to the linear reward
scenario, as in the latter case it tends to over-reward the citizens without adopting
to their socio-communication type (Fig.3.3.a). We also observe that the contracttheoretic framework achieves higher system’s social welfare (Fig. 3.3.b), exceeding
by approximately 25% the corresponding values under the linear reward framework.

3.6

Conclusions

In this chapter, a socio-aware public safety framework founded on the properties of
contract theory is proposed, in order to determine the optimal contract pairs between the ECC and the citizens, towards incentivizing the latter to participate in
the disaster management operation. The citizens are characterized by their sociocommunication type, capturing both their activity in the social networks and their
communication characteristics. The citizens provide their efforts to the ECC, which
in return rewards them. The identification of the optimal contract pairs, i.e., ECC’s
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rewards and citizens’ efforts, have been provided under the scenarios of both complete and incomplete information, with respect to the ECC knowledge about the
actual type of each citizen.The overall framework was evaluated via modeling and
simulation, in terms of its efficiency and effectiveness, by studying multiple operation approaches and scenarios. Part of our current and future work contains the
extension of this model under the principles of Prospect Theory, towards capturing
the citizens’ behavioral characteristics in their utilities under risks and uncertainty,
and their corresponding impact on the optimal contract pairing.
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Chapter 4
UAV-enabled Dynamic
Multi-Target Tracking and Sensing
Framework

4.1

Introduction

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have attracted the interest of the research community due to their salient attributes, such as strong line-of-sight connection links,
fast and flexible deployment and mobility. Their vital features have enabled them
to support various civil Internet of Things (IoT) applications, such as surveillance
systems [88]. UAVs have also been used for data collection from critical areas in
crowdsourcing applications [89]. Motivated by these applications, in this chapter
we propose a UAV-enabled multi-target tracking and sensing framework, where the
UAVs are matched to the targets based on a reputation model, and the optimal data
collection is determined in a distributed manner by a game-theoretic approach.
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4.1.1

Related Work & Motivation

Computer vision-based target tracking is proposed in the literature using the sparse
representation theory to model the target’s appearance [90]. In [91], the target
tracking problem is formulated based on the partially observable Markov decision
process framework, where input is provided by an on board camera. The joint
problem of target tracking and UAV path planning is studied in [92], by using vision
sensors, a laser scanner, and an on board embedded computer. A deep reinforcement
learning (DRL) approach is proposed in [93] to deal with the target tracking problem,
under the challenge of frequent changes of the target’s aspect ratio. In [94], the
authors determine the minimum number of UAVs that are needed to detect a set of
targets by formulating a network flow-based problem and solving it with heuristic
algorithms.
UAVs have also been used to support crowdsourcing IoT applications enabling
the data collection from targets residing in critical areas, e.g., public safety scenarios.
In [95], a UAV-assisted crowd surveillance use case is studied, where the UAVs collect
videos from cameras on the ground and they process them either on board or at the
ground servers. In [96], the UAV’s flight time is minimized by optimizing its altitude,
while jointly maximizing the number of offloaded bits by the ground devices. In [97],
the joint optimization problem of the UAV’s trajectory and radio resource allocation
is studied via a successive convex approximation framework, to maximize the number
of served devices in terms of achievable uplink data rate.
However, despite the significant advances achieved by these efforts, they either
neglect or partially consider, the problem of stable matching among the UAVs and
the targets, as well as the incentivization of the targets to provide their data to the
UAVs. In this chapter, we aim to address this research gap by introducing (i) a
holistic reputation model to evaluate the targets’ potential to provide useful data,
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(ii) an intelligent matching framework between the UAVs and the targets, and (iii)
a game-theoretic approach to determine the targets’ optimal amount of offloaded
data to the UAVs, while following a pricing-based approach to incentivize them to
perform the data offloading.

4.1.2

Contributions & Outline

The key technical contributions of this research work are summarized as follows.

• A reputation model is introduced to quantify the targets’ reputation in terms
of valuable offloaded data to the UAVs. It consists of (i) the UAV-agnostic
reputation, where the targets’ reputation is determined by all the UAVs, and
(ii) the trustworthy reputation, where the evaluation of a trusted set of UAVs
regarding the targets’ reputation weighs more (Section 4.2).
• Representative preference matching functions are formulated for the UAVs and
the targets to capture their preferences in terms of pairing among each other.
An intelligent matching algorithm is realized to decide the targets to be tracked
by the UAVs (Section 4.3).
• The targets and the UAVs utility from offloading and collecting data, respectively, is captured in utility functions. A Stackelberg game is formulated among
each target and the associated UAV to determine each target’s optimal amount
of offloaded data and the effort-based price that the UAV offers to the target
to incentivize it to offload its data. The properties of existence, uniqueness and
convergence to the Stackelberg Equilibrium are proven (Section 4.4).
• A set of detailed numerical results is presented to evaluate the performance of
the proposed framework, while a comparative study demonstrates its superiority in terms of successful target tracking and data collection (Section 4.5).
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4.2

4.2.1

Models & Assumptions

System Model

We consider a snapshot of a smart city environment consisting of a set of targets
I = {1, . . . , i, . . . , |I|} (e.g., ambulances, firetrucks, mobile IoT sensors), and a set
of UAVs N = {1, . . . , n, . . . , |N |}. The position of each UAV at the time t is pnt =
(xnt , ytn , ztn ). The target’s position qti = (xit , yti , 0m) at time t is stochastic following
a bivariate Gaussian distribution. Thus, the UAVs know the likelihood ϕi (qti ) :
Q → R>0 that the target i is at a location qti at time t. We obtain the highest
likely probabilistic position q̂ti = (x̂it , ŷti , 0m) by employing the mean of the target’s
Gaussian distribution. Each UAV n is characterized by its normalized flying time
Fn ∈ [0, 1], which depends on its energy availability, where a value closer to one
indicates a greater flying time. Each target i has a personal normalized cost ci ∈ (0, 1]
(e.g., consumed energy) to collect the data di,n that will be offloaded to a UAV n,
thus, it charges the UAV with an effort-based price Pi,n in order to obtain its data.
For generalization purposes, we consider that the targets’ data collection personal
cost ci and the effort-based price Pi,n are unitless. Each target has a criticality
factor ii ∈ (0, 1] based on the events in the surrounding environment. For example,
an ambulance close to an area that a shooting occurred has greater criticality of
data compared to a police car patrolling a neighborhood. The targets collect D =
{1, . . . , d, . . . , |D|} different types of data, e.g., videos, alerts, where d ∈ (0, 1]. A
greater value of d represents an enhanced type of data, e.g., video, compared to
a smaller value of d, which indicates a lower type of data, e.g., speed alert. The
popularity of each type of data is captured by the Zipf distribution Zipf (d) =
z1 > 0, 0 < z2 < 1.
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4.2.2

UAV-agnostic Reputation Model

The UAVs track the targets and collect data from them in order to report them to
a central entity, e.g., the Emergency Control Center (ECC) in a smart city. Each
target is characterized by a reputation based on how helpful or not was the provided information. In the UAV-agnostic reputation model, all the UAVs evaluate the
targets’ reputation that they interact with, each one with equal weight. Towards
the UAV n evaluating how helpful is the information collected by the target i, the
following metric is introduced: Hi,n =

di,n
Pi,n

· Zipf (d). Its physical notion is that a

UAV considers the provided data from target i helpful if the data collection process
is cost-efficient (i.e.,

di,n
)
Pi,n

and the type of the collected data is of high popularity

(i.e., Zipf (d)). Thus, a binary parameter represents if the collected data are helpful
(cλi,n = 1, if Hi,n ≥ Hthr ) or not (cλi,n = 0, if Hi,n < Hthr ) for the UAV n in the λ-th
P
interaction with the target i, where Hthr = ∀i∀n Hi,n /|I|.
The reputation of a target i, as it is evaluated by a UAV n, decreases as the most
recent interaction time among them elapses, given that the UAV has not a recent
evaluation regarding the target’s data. A reputation decay function log2 ( T −tb λ + 1)
i,n

is introduced, where

tλi,n

is the time instance of the λ-th interaction among the UAV

n and the target i, T is the time duration that we study the sytem, and b > 0 is
the decay factor. After each UAV is associated with a target (Section 4.3), the UAV
λP
i,n
n provides a good GRi,n =
cλi,n · log2 ( T −tb λ + 1) or a bad reputation BRi,n =
i,n

λ=1

λP
i,n

(1 − cλi,n ) · log2 ( T −tb λ + 1) for the target i that is associated with, where λi,n is the

λ=1

i,n

number of interactions among the target i and the UAV n in the examined duration
T . Thus, the overall UAV-agnostic reputation that target i receives from UAV n,
considering both its good and bad reputation, is derived as U ARi,n = E(beta(GRi,n +
1, BRi,n + 1)) =

GRi,n +1
.
GRi,n +BRi,n +2
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4.2.3

Trustworthy Reputation Model

In contrast to the UAV-agnostic reputation, there may be UAVs that their evaluation
weighs more, e.g., UAVs belonging to the ECC, in the reputation score of a target.
P
Thus, we determine the most trusted UAV n̂ = argmin[ n∈N |U ARi,n′ − U ARi,n |] as
n′ ∈N

n′ ̸=n

the one that has the smallest difference from all the other UAVs for a specific target i.
A UAV belongs to the set of trusted UAVs Ntr.,i for a target i, if |U ARi,n̂ −U ARi,n | ≤
T rthr , where T rthr > 0 is a trust threshold defined by the central entity.
The overall reputation of a target i combines the UAV-agnostic reputation and
the trustworthy reputation. Thus, the overall good (Eq. 4.1) and the overall bad
reputation (Eq. 4.2) of the target i is determined as follows.
|Ntr.,i |

OGRi,n = w1 · GRi,n + w2 ·

X

GRi,n′

(4.1)

BRi,n′

(4.2)

n′ =1

|Ntr.,i |

OBRi,n = w1 · BRi,n + w2 ·

X
n′ =1

where w1 , w2 ≥ 0 are the weighting factors of the UAV-agnostic and trustworthy
reputation.
Thus, the overall reputation of the target i based on the evaluation of the UAV
n is determined below.
Ri,n = E(beta(OGRi,n + 1, OBRi,n + 1)) =

4.3

OGRi,n + 1
OGRi,n + OBRi,n + 2

(4.3)

Intelligent Multi-Target Tracking

In this section, an intelligent matching mechanism is introduced to pair each UAV
with a corresponding target, while considering their tracking and sensing character-
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t
istics. Each UAV n has a preference function Mn,i
that captures its priority to track

a target i in time t.
t
Mn,i
=

|q̂ti

ii
Ri,n
1
·
·P
n
− pt | Pi,n
Ri,n

(4.4)

i∈I

The physical notion of Eq. 4.4 is that a UAV prefers to track a target that is
in its close proximity, has high criticality of collected data, provides its data in a
competitive effort-based price, and it has a good reputation.
Each target i has a preference function T Mi,n that captures its priority to offload
data to a UAV n at time t.
t
T Mi,n
=

|q̂ti

Fn
Ri,n
1
·
·
n
− pt | ci |U ARi,n̂ − U ARi,n |

(4.5)

The physical notion of Eq. 4.5 is that a target i prefers to offload its data to
a UAV n that (i) is in its close proximity, thus the target will spend less energy to
offload the data; (ii) has a long flying time, thus the target has sufficient time to
transmit its data; (iii) the target’s data collection cost for the requested amount of
data by the UAV n is low; and (iv) is trustworthy and has provided an overall high
reputation for the target i.
Based on the above, we build the UAVs’ and the targets’ matching tables at time t,
t
t
as M t = (Mi,n
)|I|×|I| and T M t = (T Mi,n
)|N |×|N | , respectively. We consider |N | = |I|,

and we are searching for a stable matching among the UAVs and the targets by
examining the problem from the UAVs’ perspective. Following the matching theory,
we adopt the Gale-Shapley algorithm [98] to enable the UAVs to select the targets
that will track at every examined time t. The main steps of the proposed multi-target
multi-UAV matching algorithm are as follows.
1. At each time t, the UAVs and the targets have ranked the members of the opposite
set based on their own preference function, i.e., Eq. 4.4 and Eq. 4.5, respectively.
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2. Each UAV, which is not already paired with a target, will be randomly chosen
to propose to its most preferable target (as indicated by the UAV’s matching table
M t ), which has not already rejected this UAV.
3. The target being proposed will: (i) accept the UAV’s proposal, if this is the
target’s first received proposal; (ii) reject if this proposal is worse (in terms of the
target’s preference order of UAVs) than its current proposal; and (iii) accept if this
proposal is better than its current one.
4. If all the UAVs are paired, the matching algorithm stops, otherwise returns to
step 2.
The outcome of the multi-target multi-UAV matching algorithm is the stable
pairs (i∗ , n∗ ) of targets and UAVs.

4.4

Optimal Sensing

In this section, the problem of optimal sensing, i.e., data collection from the smart
city’s field, is addressed. Given the pairs of UAVs and targets, the target’s i utility
by offloading di,n data to the UAV n, is given as follows.
Ui,n (Pi,n , di,n ) = Pi,n · di,n − ci · di,n

where ci =

ki
, ki
Zipf (d)

(4.6)

> 0 is a personalized cost (e.g., energy cost) of the target i

to collect the data of type d. The target’s utility represents the revenue (Pi,n · di,n )
that the target gains by offloading its data, while considering its corresponding cost
(ci · di,n ) to collect the data.
The experienced utility of a UAV n by tracking a target i and collecting data
from it, is formulated as follows.
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Un,i (Pi,n , di,n ) = µn · log2 (1 +

X

Ri,n di,n ) −

i∈I

X

Pi,n di,n

(4.7)

i∈I

where µn > 0 is the UAV’s n operation factor, i.e., level of contribution to the smart
city’s proper operation. It is noted that the UAVs belong to a central entity of
the smart city, that controls the data collection operation. The first term of Eq.
4.7 represents the perceived utility of the UAV n by the available information in the
smart city field that is collected by the targets. The second term of Eq. 4.7 represents
the smart city central entity’s total cost (charged by the targets) to collect the data.
Each target aims at maximizing its utility during the data collection process by
∗
determining the optimal effort-based price Pi,n
that will charge the UAV in order to

provide its data di,n . Each target’s utility maximization problem is formulated as
follows.
max Ui,n (Pi,n , di,n )

(4.8)

Pi,n

Similarly, each UAV aims at maximizing its own utility during the data sensing
operation. Each UAV determines the optimal amount of data d∗i,n that it can receive
from the target that is paired with, while providing the corresponding effort-based
price. Each UAV’s utility maximization problem is formulated as follows.
max Un,i (Pi,n , di,n )

(4.9)

di,n

The two utility maximization problems of the target (Eq. 4.8) and the UAV (Eq. 4.9)
are coupled together through the variables Pi,n and di,n . Thus, we follow a two-step
Stackelberg game-theoretic approach, where the target i is the leader and the UAV
n is the follower. The Stackelberg game is played between a UAV n and a target i,
thus, |I| Stackelberg games are played in parallel at time t. Towards determining
the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) of each game, we perform a backward induction.
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The UAV determines its optimal sensing demand of data d∗i,n requested from
the target towards maximizing its utility, as follows:

∂Un,i
∂di,n

=

1+

µ R
Pn i,n
Ri,n di,n

− Pi,n and

i∈I

∂ 2 Un,i
∂d2i,n

µn R 2

i,n
= − (1+ P Ri,n
< 0. We observe that Un,i is strictly concave with respect
di,n )2
i∈I

to the requested amount of data di,n . Thus, it has a unique optimal amount of data
d∗i,n determined as follows.

d∗i,n

µn
−
=[
Pi,n

P

1+

Ri′ ,n di′ ,n

i′ ∈I,i′ ̸=i

]+

Ri,n

(4.10)

where [x]+ , x ≥ 0. Based on Eq. 4.10, we derive the following observations: (i) the
sensing demand of data di,n of the UAV n is proportional to the target’s i overall
reputation and inversely proportional to the target’s i effort-based price that charges
the UAV; (ii) the targets compete with each other to gain a higher reputation by
reducing the effort-based price, thus, reducing their personal cost.
The target’s
utility function (Eq. 4.6) can be rewritten as Ui,n (Pi,n , d∗i,n ) = (Pi,n −
P
1+

i′ ∈I,i′ ̸=i

n
−
ci )·[ Pµi,n

Ri′ ,n di′ ,n

], based on Eq. 4.10. It is noted that if the effort-based price

Ri,n

Pi,n that a target i charges a UAV n is high, this will impact the UAV’s tracking decision (Section 4.3), and the UAV may select another target to track. Thus, the target’s
∗
optimal effort-based price Pi,n
is the Best Response to the other targets announced
∗
prices, i.e., Pi,n
= BR(P−i,n ), where P−i,n = (P1,n , . . . , Pi−1,n , . . . , Pi+1,n , . . . , P|I|,n ).

Towards proving the existence and uniqueness of an SE, we show that the target’s
utility function is strictly concave
with respect to the effort-based price Pi,n , as folP
1+

lows:

∂Un,i
∂di,n

=

µn ci
2
Pi,n

−

i′ ∈I,i′ ̸=i

Ri′ ,n di′ ,n

and

Ri,n

∂ 2 Un,i
∂d2i,n

2µn ci
= − (P
Thus, the best
3 < 0.
i,n )

response strategy of the target i is:
∗
Pi,n

v
u
= BR(P−i,n ) = u
t

Ri,n µn ci
P
1+
Ri′ ,n di′ ,n

(4.11)

i′ ∈I,i′ ̸=i

∗
Based on Eq. 4.10, 4.11, the SE is (Pi,n
, d∗i,n ) for the Stackelberg game played among
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the UAV n and the target i. In order to prove the convergence of the target’s i best
∗
= BR(P−i,n ) is a standard
response strategy to the SE, it suffices to prove that Pi,n

function [99, 100].
Theorem 1. Each target’s i, i ∈ I, best response strategy BR(P−i,n ) is a standard
function.

Proof. Towards proving Theorem 1, the properties of positivity, monotonicity, and
scalability should hold true.
1. Positivity: Based on Eq. 4.11, we have BR(P−i,n ) > 0.
2.

Monotonicity:
v
u
BR(P−i,n ) = u
t
P
1+

i′ ∈I,i′ ̸=i

Base

on

Eq.

Ri,n µn ci
P
1+
R ′′ d ′′
′′
′′ ̸=i i ,n i ,n
i
∈I,i
Ri′ ,n [ Pµn −
]
Ri′ ,n
i′ ,n

4.10,

4.11,

we

have

. Thus, we observe that Pi′ ,n

is proportional to BR(P−i,n ). Therefore, the property of monotonicity is satisfied.
3. Scalability: The following property should
−i,n ) > BR(a ·
v hold true: a · BR(P
P
1+
R ′′ d ′′
u
′′
′′ ̸=i i ,n i ,n
P
i
∈I,i
u a2 +
]
aRi′ ,n [ Pµn −
R
u
i′ ,n
i′ ,n
a·BR(P−i,n )
u i′ ∈I,i′ ̸=i
P
P−i,n ), a > 1. We have: BR(a·P−i,n
=
.
1+
Ri′′ ,n di′′ ,n
t
)
′′
′′
P
i′ ∈I,i′ ̸=i

Given that a > 1, we have

a·BR(P−i,n )
BR(a·P−i,n )

Ri′ ,n [ Pµn −
i′ ,n

i ∈I,i =
̸ i
Ri′ ,n

]

> 1 ⇐⇒ a · BR(P−i,n ) > BR(a · P−i,n ).

∗
Thus, we conclude that Pi,n
= BR(P−i,n ) is a standard function with respect to

P−i,n .

4.5

Numerical Results

In this section, a detailed numerical evaluation is presented in terms of (i) the proposed reputation model’s success to capture the system’s conditions (Section 4.5.1);
(ii) the performance of the intelligent matching algorithm (Section 4.5.2); (iii) the
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Figure 4.1: Targets reputation model – Targets perspective
operation of the game-theoretic sensing framework (Section 4.5.3); and (iv) the benefits of the overall framework compared to other alternatives (Section 4.5.4). For the
purposes of the evaluation, the values of the considered key parameters are as follows:
∗
|N | = |I| = 4, b = 0.5, T rthr = 0.1, w1 = 0.6, w2 = 0.4, z1 = d∗i,n , z2 = 1/Pi,n
, an area

of 100m × 100m, ztn = 121m, T = 100, µn = [1.115, 1.355, 1.675, 1.789], while Fn , ii
randomly distributed in (0, 1]. The proposed framework’s evaluation was conducted
in a HP Laptop, 1.8GHz Intel Core i7, with 16GB LPDDR3 available RAM.

4.5.1

Operation of Targets Reputation Model

In the following we examine the operation of the reputation model, both from the
targets and the UAVs perspective. In particular, initially Fig. 4.1a presents the
targets’ average overall good (Eq. 4.1), overall bad (Eq. 4.2), and overall (combined)
reputation (Eq. 4.3), over the time period of T = 100 time instances, while Fig. 4.1b
depicts the number of times that the targets were providing helpful data to their
associated UAVs. The results confirm that the targets with the highest average
overall good reputation and the smallest average overall bad reputation conclude to
better average overall reputation (Fig. 4.1a). Accordingly, as shown in Fig. 4.1b
their provided data to the UAVs are evaluated as helpful more times.
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Figure 4.2: Targets reputation model – UAVs perspective

Towards examining the operation of the proposed reputation model from the
UAVs’ perspective, Fig. 4.2a-4.2d present the UAVs’ agnostic reputation deviation
from the most trusted UAV, i.e., |U ARi,n̂ − U ARi,n |, the number of times that each
UAV belongs to the set of trusted UAVs Ntr.,i of its associated target, the average
normalized effort-based price that it experiences and the average normalized amount
of data that it collects, respectively. We observe that the UAVs with the smallest
deviation (Fig. 4.2a) are trusted more times (Fig. 4.2b). Thus, based on the outcome
of the SE of each game among each UAV and its associated target, they collect more
data (Fig. 4.2d) by investing a smaller effort-based price (Fig. 4.2c), thus collectively
concluding to more cost-efficient data sensing.
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Figure 4.3: UAVs – Targets intelligent matching

4.5.2

UAVs – Targets Intelligent Matching Framework

The following results in Fig. 4.3a-4.3c demonstrate the operation and effectiveness of
the introduced UAVs-targets matching framework, in terms of the UAVs’ preferences
(Eq. 4.4), the targets’ preferences (Eq. 4.5), and the actual number of targets’
selections by the UAVs for a time duration T = 100 time instances, respectively.
Specifically, based on the results illustrated in Fig. 4.3a, it is observed that UAV 1
prefers to track target 1, UAV 2 prefers to track target 2, etc. The exact symmetric
observation holds true regarding the targets’ preferences to offload their data to the
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Figure 4.4: Optimal sensing – Convergence to the SE
corresponding UAVs (Fig. 4.3b). It is noted that the proposed matching framework
captures in a holistic manner both the UAVs and the targets matching preferences
through the proposed preference functions, i.e., Eq. 4.4, 4.5, thus concluding to an
overall successful matching outcome (Fig. 4.3c).

4.5.3

Optimal Sensing Framework Operation Evaluation

In the following, the operation of the optimal sensing framework (Section 4.4) is
evaluated, and the convergence of the corresponding game to the unique SE is shown.
The Stackelberg game between one UAV and the target that is associated with, is
examined for one time instance t. Fig. 4.4a present the target’s normalized offloaded
data di,n and the corresponding effort-based price Pi,n , as a function of the game’s
iterations. The enclosed subfigure presents the respective target’s revenue and cost.
Fig. 4.4b presents the target’s utility Ui,n , and the UAV’s utility Un,i as a function
of the number of iterations. The results reveal that the target’s offloaded amount of
data and the corresponding price (Fig. 4.4a) converge monotonically to the SE in few
iterations (less than 8 iterations equivalent to 7msec). Following the outcome of the
Stackelberg game, the target’s and the UAV’s utility (Fig. 4.4b) also monotonically
converge to the optimal outcome given the uniqueness of the SE. Also, during the
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Figure 4.5: Comparative Evaluation
Stackleberg game’s iterations, the target increases its revenue and decreases its cost
by strategically deciding its offloaded data, while considering the effort-based pricing
limitations (Fig. 4.4a).

4.5.4

Comparative Evaluation

In this section, initially we compare the proposed intelligent matching framework
with the following three alternative matching approaches. (1) Ratio Approach: The
UAVs select the targets that have high criticality of collected data and provide their
t
data in a competitive effort-based price, i.e., Mn,i
=

ii
.
Pi,n

The targets select the

UAVs that have long flying time and its personal cost to collect the data is low,
t
i.e., T Mi,n
=

Fn
.
ci

(2) Reputation Approach: The UAVs and the targets define their
R

t P i,n
t
preferences based on the reputation model, i.e., Mn,i
, T Mi,n
=
Ri,n
i∈I
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(3) Min Distance Approach: The UAVs’ and the targets’ preferences are defined
t
t
=
= T Mi,n
based on the minimum distance between them, i.e., Mn,i

1
.
|q̂ti −pn
t|

Fig. 4.5a and Fig. 4.5b present the actual standard deviation of the number
of selections of each UAV from the most selected target and the corresponding average standard deviation over all the targets in the system for all the comparative
approaches, respectively. Furthermore, Fig. 4.5c presents the corresponding average
number of rejections, i.e., two UAVs preferred the same target and due to conflict one
UAV’s preference was rejected. The results reveal that under the proposed matching
framework, the UAVs experience few conflicts among each other (Fig. 4.5c), while
they tend to select their most preferable target, and therefore the actual (Fig. 4.5a)
and average (Fig. 4.5b) standard deviation of the number of selections from their
most preferable selection is high. The Ratio approach presents also small number
of conflicts among the UAVs (Fig. 4.5c) compared to the Reputation and the Min
Distance approaches, due to the great variation of the UAVs’ preference function
given the personalized price Pi,n that target i charges UAV n. In the Reputation
approach, all the UAVs tend to select the most reputable targets, while in the Min
Distance approach, the closest targets. Thus, in those two approaches, the number
of rejections is high (Fig. 4.5c) and the actual (Fig. 4.5a) and average (Fig. 4.5b)
standard deviation of the number of selections from their most preferable selection
are consequently low.
Additionally, we compare the proposed optimal sensing framework against the
following three alternatives: (1) Max Data Scenario: All targets offload their total
amount of collected data. (2) Max Price Scenario: The targets charge the UAVs
with a fixed (maximum) price. (3) Random Scenario: The targets decide randomly
the amount of data to offload and the price to charge. For fairness purposes, in
all comparative approaches, the intelligent matching algorithm introduced in this
chapter, is adopted. The social welfare of the system, i.e., the summation of the
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targets’ (Eq. 4.6) and the UAVs’ utilities (Eq. 4.7), is presented in Fig. 4.5d for
all the considered comparative scenarios for T = 100 time instances. The results
clearly reveal the superiority of the proposed optimal sensing framework, while the
Max Data and the Max Price scenarios both present similar low social welfare levels,
and the Random approach provides the worst outcome.

4.6

Conclusions

In this chapter, a novel holistic UAV-enabled multi-target tracking and sensing framework is introduced. Initially, each target’s reputation is defined, consisting of both
UAV-agnostic and trustworthy reputation models. Based on that, the intelligent
pairing of the UAVs with the targets towards enabling the multi-target tracking by
the UAVs, is performed. The targets’ optimal data offloading strategies along with
the optimal effort-based price that the UAVs are charged with in order to collect
the targets’ data, are determined based on a Stackelberg game-theoretic approach.
Detailed numerical results were presented highlighting the key operational features
and the performance benefits of our proposed approach. Part of our current and
future work focuses on treating the examined problem based on a labor economics
approach under the principles of Contract Theory, towards incentivizing the targets
to offload their data to the UAVs [101].
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Chapter 5
Contract-Theoretic Resource
Control in Public Safety Systems

5.1

Introduction

Public Safety Networks (PSNs) have been introduced to provide reliable exchange
of data during catastrophic events (e.g., natural disasters, terrorist attacks). The
persistent and robust information flow in disaster-struck areas has been enabled by
the usage of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). UAV-enabled wireless communications have attracted great research and commercial interest due to their salient
attributes, i.e., controllable mobility, line-of-sight communication with the transmitters, and low-cost, fast, and flexible deployment [102]. Moreover, the Wireless
Powered Communications (WPC) networking paradigm enables the mobile devices
to harvest energy from the radio frequency signals of the transmitter [103, 104].
Capitalizing on the advances achieved by these technologies, in this chapter, we consider a UAV-assisted WPC network that enables the efficient data collection from a
disaster-struck area, following a contract-theoretic approach.
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5.1.1

Related Work & Motivation

The problem of maximizing the system’s energy efficiency in a three layer UAVassisted network architecture (space-air-ground) is studied in [105] considering an
Internet of Remote Things network, where the UAVs act as relays. The authors
formulate and solve an optimization problem to determine the devices’ subchannel
selection, their optimal transmission power, and the UAVs’ deployment. In [106], a
UAV performs the data collection from an Internet of Things (IoT) field. The authors
jointly optimize the UAV’s flying speed, altitude, and the IoT devices’ frame length
at the MAC layer, to maximize the ground sensors energy efficiency. In [107], an ant
colony optimization algorithm is presented that enables the collaboration between
the UAVs and the ground devices, in order to prolong the lifetime of the network,
by reducing the devices’ energy consumption to report their data to the UAVs.
The concept of UAV-enabled WPC system has been introduced in [108], where
UAV-mounted energy transmitters, transmit radio frequency signals and the ground
devices harvest energy from them. In [109], the UAV’s trajectory is obtained to
maximize the harvested energy by the ground devices under the UAV’s flying speed
and altitude constraints. In [110], the authors aim at maximizing the minimum
achievable throughput of the ground devices, by jointly optimizing the UAVs’ trajectories, the users’ transmission power, and the decision between the devices’ energy
harvesting and information transmission phases.
However, all these research efforts have been conducted in isolation focusing on
only one of the following related problems, that is: the energy efficient information
acquisition from the ground nodes, the energy harvesting from the UAVs’ radio frequency signals, and/or the optimal UAVs’ deployment. This fragmentation has not
yet allowed the exploitation of the corresponding achievements in their full capacity.
Accordingly, in this chapter, we aim to address this research gap by introducing an
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Figure 5.1: UAV-assisted WPCN topology and framework’s architecture
energy efficient information flow and energy harvesting framework capturing users’
risk-aware characteristics, based on the principles of Contract Theory, and the support of Reinforcement Learning.

5.1.2

Contributions & Outline

The main contributions of this research work are summarized as follows.

• A wireless powered communication network (WPCN) assisted by UAVs [111]
charging the victims’ devices is considered in a public safety scenario [112]. The
victims’ risk-aware characteristics to provide their information to the UAVs
are captured in representative utility functions [113]. An optimization problem
determining each victim’s optimal amount of provided information to the UAV
and each UAV’s optimal charging power, is formulated and solved following
the principles of Contract Theory, by introducing a labor market relationship
among the UAVs and the users (Section 5.2).
• The victims are organized in rescue groups and the rescue leaders are determined for each group through a socio-physical groups formation mechanism
(Section 5.3.1). A reinforcement learning framework, based on the theory of
Stochastic Learning Automata, is introduced to enable the optimal matching
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between the UAVs and the rescue leaders of each group, in a distributed and
efficient manner (Section 5.3.2).
• A set of simulation experiments are performed demonstrating the basic characteristics of the proposed contract-theoretic framework, while considering users’
risk-aware behavior. The benefits of the proposed framework are highlighted in
terms of energy-efficiency, information acquisition from the disaster area, and
intelligent users’ incentivization to support the rescue operation (Section 5.4).

5.2

Contract-theoretic Control of Resources

A UAV-assisted WPCN is considered within a public safety system consisting of
a set of victims V = {1, . . . , v, . . . , |V |}, a set of UAVs U = {1, . . . , u, . . . , |U |},
and the Emergency Control Center (ECC). The channel gain between two victims
v, v ′ is defined as Gv,v′ =

λ
,
d2v,v′

where λ > 0 represents the channel fading and dv,v′

[m] is the distance among the victims v and v ′ [114, 115]. Let Ev [J] denote the
energy availability of each victim’s v device and dv [m] represent the distance of the
victim from the source of the disaster (e.g., epicenter of an earthquake). The victims
are organized in rescue groups. Each rescue group rg determines its rescue leader
rlrg following a socio-physical rescue groups formation mechanism (Section 5.3.1).
Each rescue leader selects in a distributed manner to which UAV it will offload its
data based on a reinforcement learning approach (Section 5.3.2). The considered
system’s topology is presented in Fig. 5.1. Initially, we assume that the rescue
groups formation and the rescue leaders association to the UAVs have already been
performed and we focus on the contract-theoretic control of the resources.
During a catastrophic event, the ECC needs to collect information from the victims in order to plan the rescue operation [116]. Thus, incentives should be offered
to them in order to provide information to the UAVs and correspondingly to the
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ECC. At the same time, the victims’ behavioral characteristics, i.e., risk-aware behavior in terms of providing information, should be considered, while designing their
incentives. To achieve this goal, the principles of Contract Theory are adopted [39].
Contract Theory is a powerful tool to design effective incentives by modeling the
UAVs-victims relation based on a labor market setup. Specifically, the victims of a
rescue group report their information to the corresponding rescue leader. Then, a
UAV, which collects information from the rescue leader, considers the rescue leader’s
risk averse characteristics and offers rewards (i.e., incentives) in order to compensate
it for its invested labor (i.e., reporting information).
Each victim transmits with power proportional to the normalized distance from
its rescue leader, i.e., Pv =

dv,rlrg
max dv,rlrg

· Pvmax , where Pvmax is the victim’s maximum

v∈Vrg

transmission power and Vrg is the set of victims belonging to the rescue group rg. The
corresponding achievable transmission data rate is Rv = W ·log(1+

Gv,rlrg Pv
′
|V
P|
v ′ ≥v+1

)

Gv′ ,rlrg Pv′ +I0

[117], where I0 represents the Additive White Gaussian Noise and W [Hz] is the
system’s bandwidth, while non-orthogonal multiple access has been considered, and
the successive interference cancellation technique is implemented at the receiver, i.e.,
rescue leader. Thus, during a timeslot t [sec], the total amount of data that the
P
Rv )t [bits].
rescue leader collects is: Drlrg = (
v∈Vrg

Each UAV offers a contract to each rescue leader that is associated with. The contract is defined as (wrlrg ·Pumax , T Drlrg ), where Pumax is the UAV’s maximum charging
power and T Drlrg are the collected data from its rescue group, where T Drlrg ≤ Drlrg .
We consider the UAV’s provided reward as wrlrg ∈ [0, 1], thus, the corresponding
charging power is wrlrg · Pumax . Each rescue leader invests an effort (i.e., labor)
arlrg ∈ [0, 1] and transmits T Drlrg = arlrg · Drlrg data to the UAV. The rescue leader’s
performance, as it is evaluated by the UAV, is defined as qrlrg = arlrg + ϵ, where ϵ
represents some noisy data. The parameter ϵ follows a normal distribution with zero
mean and variance σ 2 . Towards capturing the rescue leader’s risk aware characteris-
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tics in terms of reporting information to the UAV, as well as its perceived satisfaction
from its action and the harvested energy from the UAV, the rescue leader’s risk aware
utility function is defined as follows [39].
Urlrg (wrlrg , arlrg ) = −e−nrlrg [wrlrg −ψ(arlrg )]

(5.1)

where nrlrg ∈ (0, 1] is the rescue leader’s risk aversion parameter. The greater the
value of nrlrg is, the more conservative the rescue leader becomes in terms of uploading
information to the UAV in order to save its own energy. The function ψ(arlrg ) is the
cost function of the rescue leader capturing its personal cost (energy consumption) to
report the collected information from the disaster area to the UAV. The cost function
is concave with respect to the rescue leader’s invested effort, e.g., ψ(arlrg ) =

ca2rlrg
2

,

where c > 0 is a constant cost factor. The reward percentage wrlrg offered by the
UAV is defined as wrlrg = µ + srlrg · qrlrg , where µ is a fixed compensation level,
i.e., µ · Pumax , to reward the rescue leaders for even participating in the information
flow process, and srlrg is the variable compensation related to the rescue leader’s
performance component. The contract-theoretic control problem of the UAVs (i.e.,
charging power) and the rescue leaders (i.e., transmitted data) resources is formulated
as a maximization problem of the UAV’s expected profit.
max E(qrlrg − wrlrg )

(5.2a)

arlrg ,srlrg

E(−e−nrlrg [wrlrg −ψ(arlrg )] ) ≥ Urlrg |min

(5.2b)

arlrg ∈ argmax E(−e−nrlrg [wrlrg −ψ(arlrg )] )

(5.2c)

arlrg

where Urlrg |min is the minimum acceptable utility by the rescue leader in order to be
motivated to send the collected data. The constraint (5.2b) represents the individual
rationality constraint of the rescue leader. If this inequality does not hold true,
then, the rescue leader has no incentive to report the collected data to the UAV.
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The constraint (5.2c) captures the incentive compatibility for each victim, i.e., each
victim will put an effort to report the collected data in order to maximize its own
perceived utility.
The rescue leader’s expected utility can be written as E(−e−nrlrg [wrlrg −ψ(arlrg )]) =
−e−nrlrg [µ+srlrg arlrg −
e

nrl s2
σ2
rg rlrg
2

ca2
rl
2

rg

−

nrl

s2
σ2
rg rlrg
])
2

given that we can show that E(−e−nrlrg srlrg ϵ ) =

from the theory of the normal distribution. Thus, by solving the con-

straint (5.2c), we can determine the rescue leader’s optimal amount of transmitted
data to the UAV.
∗
= a∗rlrg · Drlrg =
T Drl
rg

srlrg
· Drlrg
c

(5.3)

We can eliminate the constraint (5.2c) by substituting Eq. 5.3 to Eq. 5.2a and
rewrite the optimization problem.
s2rl
srlrg
− (µ + rg )]
arlrg ,srlrg
c
c
2
2
srl
nrl
c srlrg
s.t. µ + rg −
− rg σ 2 s2rlrg = wrlrg
c
2 c
2
max [

(5.4a)
(5.4b)

The solution of the optimization problem (5.4a, 5.4b) yields to the optimal UAV’s
reward, i.e., charging power.
∗
wrl
· Pumax = [µ +
rg

srl
1
( rg + ϵ)]Pumax
2
1 + nrlrg cσ
c

(5.5)

Thus, the optimal contract among a UAV and rescue leader is determined to be
∗
∗
(wrl
·Pumax , T Drl
). The operational timeslot of the system is splitted into the wirerg
rg

less energy transfer (WET) phase with duration τh [sec] and the wireless information
transmission (WIT) phase with duration τt [sec]. During the WET phase, the UAVs
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transfer directed energy to the rescue leaders that they are associated with, by unicasting a radio frequency signal via directional antennas [118]. The rescue leader’s
device’s harvested energy from the UAV that it is associated with is given as follows.
HErlrg = Ef frlrg · τh · wrlrg ∗ ·Pumax · Grlrg ,u

(5.6)

where Ef frlrg ∈ (0, 1] is the energy conversion efficiency factor, which depends on
the rescue leader’s device.
∗
to the UAV, assuming
During the WIT phase, each rescue leader reports T Drl
rg

that its available energy, i.e., Erlrg + HErlrg , is sufficient to report the contract
theoretic optimal amount of data. Each rescue leader reports its optimal amount of
∗
data T Drl
through a dedicated subchannel with bandwidth W [Hz] to the UAV via
rg

adopting the single carrier frequency division multiple access (SC-FDMA) technique
[119, 120, 121, 122]. Thus, its available data rate is W · log(1 +

tr
Grlrg ,U AV Prl
rg

I0

), where

Prltrrg is the rescue leader’s transmission power. Thus, the rescue leader’s consumed
∗
data is Erltrrg = Prltrrg · τt , and its remaining energy for
energy to transmit the T Drl
rg
(t+1)

(t)

the next timeslot is Erlrg = Erlrg + HErlrg − Erltrrg .

5.3
5.3.1

Groups Formation and UAV Associations
Socio-physical Rescue Groups Formation

In this section, a socio-physical-aware rescue groups formation mechanism is presented, in order to enable the victims to create rescue groups and support the energy
efficient information flow from the victims to the UAVs. In each rescue group, the
victims transmit their information to the rescue leader of the group, who forwards
it along with its own information to a UAV.
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(1) Physical Ties: To support the victims’ energy efficient communication, the victims tend to participate in rescue groups, where their communication distance among
each other is small and their channel gain conditions are good. Thus, we define a
symmetric matrix G = {gv,v′ }|V |×|V | , where gv,v′ =

Gv,v′
max {Gv,v′ }

∈ [0, 1], which rep-

∀v,v ′ ∈V

resents the normalized channel gain conditions of a pair of victims v, v ′ . Also, the
victim’s normalized energy availability EAv =

Ev
max {Ev′ }

∈ [0, 1] is critical in order to

∀v ′ ∈V

identify whether it could act as a rescue leader. The rescue leaders collect, process,
and transmit the rest of the rescue group’s victims’ information, thus, they spend
an increased amount of energy. Moreover, the victim’s normalized distance from the
source of the disaster Dv =

dv
max {dv′ }

∈ [0, 1] is considered, as this victim can provide

∀v ′ ∈V

more accurate information to the UAV.
(2) Social Ties: The victims have interest to communicate with specific people, e.g.,
family members. The symmetric matrix CI = {civ,v′ }|V |×|V | , civ,v′ ∈ [0, 1] captures
the victims’ communication interest. A lower value of civ,v′ represents less communication interest among the victims.
By combining the victims’ social and physical ties, we define a metric that captures the rescue and communication capability (RCC) of each victim, as follows.
X

RCCv = EAv · Dv ·

(civ,v′ · gv,v′ )

(5.7)

v,v ′ ∈V,v̸=v ′

The socio-physical rescue groups formation mechanism is executed at the ECC,
which informs the victims through broadcasted messages, and consists of the following steps.
(1) Initially, all the victims |V | create a rescue group rg, whose set of victims is
V′ =V.
(2) For this rescue group rg with set of victims V ′ , the rescue leader rlrg is determined
as rlrg = argmax{RCCv }.
v∈V ′
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(3) For the victims that belong to the rescue group rg with set of victims V ′ , the
following condition must hold true:
(V ′ )

gv,rlrg · civ,rlrg · Dv ≥ RGthres
P

where

(V ′ )
RGthres

v∈V ′

=

P

gv,rlrg

|V

·

′|

v∈V ′

(5.8)
P

civ,rlrg

|V

·

′|

Dv

v∈V ′

|V

′|

is a threshold value to create homo-

geneous rescue groups in terms of consisting of victims with close distance, good
channel conditions, high communication interest among each other, as well as contributing valuable information due to their proximity to the source of the disaster.
The victims, who do not satisfy the condition (5.8), they form a new rescue group,
with set of victims V ′′ ⊆ V ′ .
(4) Set V ′ = V ′ − V ′′ and if |V ′ | > 1, return to step 2, otherwise stop.

5.3.2

Reinforcement Learning-enabled Matching

In this section, a reinforcement learning-based framework is introduced to enable
the optimal matching among the UAVs and the rescue leaders in a distributed and
computationally efficient manner. Each leader acts as a stochastic learning automaton (SLA) making decisions of selecting a UAV to offload its data. Each UAV is
characterized by a reputation, which depends on the physical and communication
characteristics of the overall examined public safety system, and it is given as follows.
∗(ite−1)

P
rlrg ∈Vu

P

Ru =

∀rlrg

wrlrg

∗(ite−1)

wrlrg

Pumax

Pumax

P
∀rlrg

drlrg ,u

P
rlrg ∈Vu

∗(ite−1)

P
rlrg ∈Vu

drlrg ,u

P
∀rlrg

(ite−1) 3
|

|Vu

T Drlrg

∗(ite−1)

T Drlrg

F Tu Ru

P
∀u

Ru

(5.9)

where F Tu ∈ (0, 1) and Ru are the normalized flying time and the communications
coverage radius of the UAV u, respectively, and Vu is the set of rescue leaders being
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served by the UAV u. The physical notion of Eq. 5.9 is that a rescue leader prefers to
∗
to a UAV u that (a) collectively charges with high transmission
offload its data T Drl
rg

power the rescue leaders that are connected to it; (b) is in close proximity; (c) has
a long flying time and large communications coverage radius; (d) it tends to collect
large amount of data; and (e) is not overcongested by other rescue leaders trying to
simultaneously offload their data.
The probability of a rescue leader selecting the same UAV u to offload its data
∗
T Drl
in the next iteration of the SLA algorithm is given by Eq. 5.10a and the
rg

probability of selecting a different UAV is given by Eq. 5.10b [123].
(ite+1)

(ite)

(ite+1)

(ite)

(ite)

(ite+1)

P rrlrg ,u = P rrlrg ,u + bR(ite)
(1 − P rrlrg ,u ), urlrg
u
(ite)

(ite+1)

P rrlrg ,u = P rrlrg ,u − bR(ite)
P rrlrg ,u , urlrg
u

(ite)

= urlrg

(ite)

̸= urlrg

(5.10a)
(5.10b)

(ite)

where urlrg is the selected UAV u by the rescue leader rlrg in the iteration ite of
the SLA algorithm and 0 < b < 1 is the learning parameter that controls how
fast the rescue leaders learn their optimal UAV matching. It is noted that the
UAVs’ reputation values are broadcasted by them to the rescue leaders to enable the
latter execute the SLA algorithm in a distributed manner and eliminate the signaling
(ite)

overhead. The SLA algorithm converges when P rrlrg ,u ≥ P rthr , ∀rlrg where P rthr is
a threshold value, which for the evaluation purposes in this chapter is P rthr = 0.95.
∗
Then, each rescue leader offloads its data T Drl
to the selected UAV, as shown in
rg

Fig. 5.1.

5.4

Numerical Results

A detailed numerical evaluation illustrates the performance of the proposed framework in terms of the: impact of socio-physical parameters (Section 5.4.1), contract-
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Figure 5.2: Impact of socio-physical parameters under different comparative scenarios
theoretic and behavioral-aware resource control (Section 5.4.2), and benefits of reinforcement learning to implement the optimal matching of the UAVs with the rescue leaders (Section 5.4.3). We consider τh = 0.985 sec, τt = 0.015 sec, t = 1
sec, Pumax = 85W, dv,v′ ∈ [30, 350]m, λ = 1, Ev ∈ [100, 400] J, Dv ∈ [30, 350]m,
W = 5 · 106 Hz, c = 1, b = 0.7, µ = 0.5, F Tu ∈ (0, 1], and Ru ∈ [30, 350]m. We
consider |V | = 100 victims, unless otherwise stated. The proposed framework’s
evaluation was conducted in a HP Laptop, 1.8GHz Intel Core i7, 16GB LPDDR3
RAM.

5.4.1

Impact of Socio-Physical Parameters

Three comparative scenarios regarding the victims’ socio-physical characteristics are
evaluated: (i) Best: victims with high communication interest reside close to each
other; (ii) Worst: victims with high communication interest reside far away from
each other; and (iii) Random: victims have random communication interest and
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Figure 5.3: (a) Rescue leaders’ total amount of offloaded data, (b) UAVs’ total
charging power, and (c) Rescue leaders’ total consumed energy w.r.t. risk averse
degree for various comparative scenario

distance among each other. Fig. 5.2a-5.2d present the victims’ data offloaded to their
rescue leaders, their corresponding total consumed energy, the number of created
rescue groups, and their corresponding average size, respectively, as a function of
the number of victims for the three considered comparative scenarios. The results
reveal that under the best case scenario, few homogeneous (in terms of the victims’
socio-physical characteristics) rescue groups are created (Fig. 5.2c) of large average
size (Fig. 5.2d), while the victims achieve to offload a large amount of data (Fig.
5.2a) with small consumed energy (Fig. 5.2b), due to their close proximity and good
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channel conditions among each other. The exact opposite holds true in the worst
case scenario, while the random scenario presents an intermediate behavior between
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the best and worst case scenarios.
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Figure 5.4: (a) Energy Efficiency of the PSS, (b) Ratio of the rescue leaders total
offloaded data over the total consumed energy, and (c) Total rescue leaders utility
w.r.t. risk averse degree for various comparative scenario
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5.4.2

The Benefits of Contract Theory

We also present the impact of the victims’ risk-aware behavior on the resource management and the benefits of adopting contract theory to model the interactions among
the UAVs and the rescue leaders. Six comparative scenarios are considered; three
based on the proposed contract-theoretic resource control approach while assuming
the best, worst, and random scenarios (Section 5.4.1), and the corresponding three
scenarios that conclude by assuming that the UAVs charge the rescue leaders’ devices with their maximum available power (referred to as Best Max, Worst Max,
and Random Max respectively). Fig. 5.3a-5.3c present the rescue leaders’ total
amount of offloaded data, the UAVs’ total charging power, and the rescue leaders’
corresponding consumed energy to offload their data to the UAVs, respectively, as
a function of the rescue leaders’ risk averse degree, for all the considered comparative scenarios. It is observed that, with reference to the contract-theoretic based
scenarios, as the rescue leaders become more risk averse (i.e., high value of the risk
averse degree n), they tend to invest less effort in terms of offloading their data to
the UAVs (Fig. 5.3a), thus, they consume less energy in their data transmission
(Fig. 5.3c) and enjoy less rewards (i.e., charging power) from the UAVs (Fig. 5.3b).
Also, in the comparative scenario, where the UAVs provide their maximum available
charging power (Fig. 5.3b) to incentivize the rescue leaders to offload more data
(Fig. 5.3a), this goal is achieved by immensely sacrificing the energy efficiency of the
public safety system (PSS), as shown in Fig. 5.4a.
Specifically, Fig. 5.4a depicts the PSS’s energy efficiency defined as the total
amount of offloaded data by the rescue leaders over the corresponding spent charging
power by the UAVs as a function of the rescue leaders’ risk averse degree n. The
results reveal that the UAVs’ charging power is not well-spent, when they charge the
rescue leaders with their maximum available charging power, and the UAVs’ energy
cost for every unit of collected information is higher for any examined topology
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of the PSS and the victims’ socio-physical characteristics. This, demonstrates the
benefit of the contract-theoretic control of the resources from the PSS’s point of
view. Moreover, the proposed framework is also valuable for the rescue leaders, as it
enables them to achieve greater utility (Eq. 5.1) compared to the scenario of having
their devices charged with the UAVs’ maximum charging power (Fig. 5.4c).
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Figure 5.5: Reinforcement learning-based matching between the UAVs and the rescue
leaders – A comparative evaluation
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5.4.3

Intelligent Matching between UAVs & Rescue Leaders

In this subsection, we highlight the benefits of adopting a reinforcement learning
mechanism to enable the rescue leaders to optimally select a UAV to offload their
data, while considering the characteristics of the PSS. Two indicative alternative approaches are also considered for comparison purposes: (a) Min Distance: the rescue
leaders offload their data to the closest UAV; and (b) Random: the rescue leaders
randomly select a UAV to offload their data. Fig. 5.5a-5.5c illustrate the rescue
leaders’ total consumed energy, their corresponding total amount of offloaded data,
and the UAVs’ total charging power, respectively, for the considered comparative
scenarios. The results reveal that the reinforcement learning approach enables the
rescue leaders to thoroughly learn their surrounding environment and make a sophisticated choice of a UAV, as indicated by the holistic reputation function (Eq.
5.9). Thus, the rescue leaders achieve to report a larger amount of data (Fig. 5.5b),
compared to the other comparative scenarios, while consuming the lowest amount of
energy (Fig. 5.5a), and enjoying greater charging power from the UAVs (Fig. 5.5c).

5.5

Conclusions

In this chapter, a resource orchestration framework is introduced in a UAV-assisted
WPCN within a public safety system, based on the principles of contract theory
and reinforcement learning. The key objective and novelty of this framework is
that it enables the energy efficient information acquisition from the victims, while
considering their risk-aware behavior. Detailed numerical results, obtained through
modeling and simulation, demonstrate the benefits and superiority of the proposed
framework in terms of energy-efficiency, information acquisition from the disaster
area, and intelligent users’ incentivization to support the rescue operation. Our
future research plans include the extension of the proposed framework to consider
the backhaul connection between the UAVs and the emergency control center, thus
offering an energy efficient end-to-end data acquisition and transmission solution.
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Chapter 6
Health Data Acquisition from
Wearable Devices during a
Pandemic

6.1

Introduction

The last century has seen a plethora of pandemics, such as the Spanish flu (1918), the
Hong Kong flu (1968) and the Swine flu (2009) [124]. Towards controlling the spread
of a pandemic, the collection of citizens’ health data, such as heart rate, body temperature, arterial oxygen saturation, from everyday wearable devices (e.g., smart phones,
fitness trackers, etc.) is critical for a large number of applications. Some indicative
applications include contact tracing, rapid diagnosis, patients’ remote monitoring,
and reducing the workload of the medical industry [125]. Furthermore, during a
pandemic outbreak, except for the impact on humans’ health, the global economy is
also heavily impacted, while the non-essential services are forced to shut down. The
recent pandemic of COVID-19 is expected to create a loss of 5.5 trillion US dollars
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in the next two years [126]. This chapter aims at jointly tackling the problem of citizens’ health data acquisition from wearable devices and the economic survival of the
businesses during a pandemic, by introducing a novel techno-economics approach.

6.1.1

Related Work

The collection of health data during pandemics, is crucial regarding both the healthcare planning, as well as towards strategizing for the sustainability of the economy
[127]. Due to the recent COVID-19 outbreak, several wearables have been designed
and exploited to gather citizens’ health data. WHOOP Strap 3.0 is a wrist-mounted
wearable measuring cardiorespiratory variations and reporting them via Bluetooth to
the citizen’s smart phone [128]. Estimote’s wearable devices enable the wearer to update its health status and share it along with its location to a centralized entity, e.g.,
employer [129]. Biosensor Patch 1AX measures the body temperature, respiration
rate, electrocardiogram trace, and heart rate and report them to the person’s smartphone over Bluetooth [130]. All those sensors, along with other wearables, have been
recently employed to deal with the COVID-19 outbreak. However, humans are hesitant in providing their health data, thus, sophisticatedly designed extrinsic and/or
intrinsic incentive mechanisms should be designed [131].
In addition to the healthcare planning during pandemics, the economic impact
and the change of the citizens’ consumption culture play a key role on the sustainability of the economy [132]. McKinsey & Co. released a study showing that more than
70% of the US population has reduced its purchases in personal care services, hotel
stays, out of home entertainment, restaurants, and others, during the COVID-19 era
[133]. A pandemic has a devastating economic impact on the automotive, aviation,
tourism, oil, construction, food, healthcare and medical industries [134]. Thus, creating the proper conditions to enable the citizens to keep their consumption culture,
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while respecting all the health protection rules, is important to move the economy
during and past the pandemic.

6.1.2

Contributions & Outline

Despite the efforts made in previous works, in regards to the data acquisition from
wearable devices during a pandemic and the economy’s sustainability, the solution
of those two problems still remains highly fragmented. Moreover, the incentivization
of the citizens to provide their health data to the healthcare operator, e.g., operating
at a district level, is even more challenging. In this work, we strive to tackle exactly
these issues, by introducing a behavioral and labor economics based approach. The
main contributions of this research work are summarized below.
1. A smart city scenario consisting of the healthcare operator, multiple businesses,
and citizens with wearable devices is considered (Section 6.2). The citizens select to
visit the businesses and perform purchases by exploiting the physical and social characteristics of both themselves and the businesses, based on a reinforcement learning
approach (Section 6.3).
2. A behavioral economics approach is introduced to incentivize the citizens to
provide the wearable devices’ data to the businesses, while the latter provide extrinsic
motivation to the citizens to facilitate their engagement in performing purchases. An
optimization problem is formulated and solved to determine each citizen’s optimal
amount of reported data and the corresponding received rewards by the selected
business (Section 6.4).
3. Given the overall data collected at each business, a labor economics-based approach is proposed to enable the healthcare operator at the district level to incentivize the businesses with monetary rewards to report the citizens’ collected data to
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it for further exploitation regarding the healthcare planning. The healthcare operator’s optimal provided monetary rewards to the businesses, and the optimal amount
of reported data by the latter ones are determined via formulating the problem as a
contract-theoretic optimization problem (Section 6.5). Creating the aforementioned
three layers approach, the joint goal of data acquisition and economy’s sustainability
is achieved.
4. A series of simulation experiments demonstrate the performance, effectiveness,
and robustness of the overall proposed framework under various realistic scenarios
(Section 6.6).
Finally, Section 6.7 concludes the chapter.

6.2

System Model

A smart city environment is considered consisting of the sets of citizens denoted
as C = {1, . . . , c, . . . , |C|}, businesses (e.g., restaurants, hotels, bookstores) S =
{1, . . . , s, . . . , |S|}, and the city’s healthcare operator. The citizens equipped with
wearable devices, can collect and provide personal health data. Those data are
private, thus, the citizens should be incentivized to provide them, if they choose so.
The healthcare operator is interested in collecting those data to facilitate the smart
city’s health protection planning during a pandemic. The businesses suffer from
economic losses during such a pandemic, thus, they are interested in incentivizing
the citizens to visit them, while respecting the announced health protection rules.
The businesses act as a liaison between the citizens and the healthcare operator, in
order to collect the citizens’ health data from the wearable devices, while at the same
time guaranteeing their own economic sustainability. In particular, the businesses
offer personalized rewards to the citizens (e.g., coupons, discounts), and the citizens
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provide as an exchange their health data. Then, the healthcare operator provides
personalized rewards (e.g., tax reduction) to the businesses, while the latter provide
the collected health data from the citizens that visited them.

6.3

Reinforcement Learning-based Selection

A socio-physical based approach is introduced to enable the citizens to select the
business that they will visit via exploiting the principles of reinforcement learning
(RL). Each business is characterized by its reputation Rs ∈ (0, 1]. Moreover, let us
denote by phs ∈ (0, 1] the popularity phs ∈ (0, 1] of each business at an examined
time slot (the latter can be easily retrieved from its Google reviews’ profile, in terms
of how busy is the business with customers). Each citizen c has a social interest
SIc,s ∈ (0, 1] to visit a business s. We denote by |C|s the number of citizens selecting
to visit a business s at a time slot (e.g., one hour) that the system is examined.
A citizen c receives a reward (i.e., personal satisfaction) defined as: rc,s =

SIc,s Rs
|C|s phs

by visiting a business s, taking into account that a citizen wants to visit a reputable
business of high personal interest, which however is not very crowded in order to
easily respect the health protection rules. The corresponding normalized reward
|S|
P
is r̂c,s = rc,s /
rc,s . The citizens can act as stochastic learning automata (SLA)
s=1

making distributed decisions about themselves aiming to optimize their long-term
reward by visiting a business. Based on the iterative SLA reinforcement learning
algorithm, each citizen selects to visit the same (Eq. 6.1a) or a different business
(Eq. 6.1b) based on the following probabilistic rule [135]:
(ite+1)
(ite)
(ite)
Pc,s
= Pc,s
+ br̂c,s (1 − Pc,s
), s(ite+1)
= s(ite)
c
c

(6.1a)

(ite+1)
(ite)
(ite) (ite+1)
− br̂c,s Pc,s
, sc
̸= s(ite)
Pc,s
= Pc,s
c

(6.1b)

105

Chapter 6. Health Data Acquisition from Wearable Devices during a Pandemic

where 0 < b < 1 is the learning rate. For large values of b, the citizens do not
thoroughly explore their available options, thus, the algorithm converges fast, while
the opposite holds true for small values of b. The SLA algorithm converges when
for each citizen there is a selection to visit a business with probability close to one
(ite)

(Pc,s

→ 1). The SLA algorithm can be implemented in a mobile application and

help the citizens making personal decisions regarding the businesses that they will
visit during a pandemic.

6.4

Contract-theoretic Data Collection

The problem of the citizens’ incentivization by the businesses to provide their health
data via offering personalized rewards is studied based on the principles of behavioral
economics. Each business may provide Ms [$] maximum rewards to a citizen, while
xc ∈ [0, 1] denotes the actual portion of Ms to be offered to the citizen as an exchange
to the actual reported health data. Each citizen can provide dc [bits] total amount
of data captured by its wearable devices, while yc ∈ [0, 1] denotes the percentage of
them reported to the business. Naturally, each citizen has some personal behavioral
characteristics in terms of how hesitant it is to report its personal health data. The
citizen’s risk aversion behavior to provide its data is captured through the parameter
nc ∈ (0, 1]. The greater the citizen’s risk aversion nc is, the more conservative is the
citizen in reporting its data.
Following the principles of behavioral economics [39], the citizen’s utility is represented, as follows:
Uc (xc , yc ) = −e−nc [xc −ψ(yc )]

(6.2)

where ψ(yc ) is the citizen’s cost function to report its data to the business capturing
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for example its personal wearable devices’ energy consumption, data usage, etc. The
cost function is strictly increasing with respect to the percentage yc of the reported
data, e.g., ψ(yc ) =

cyc2
,
2

where c > 0 is a constant cost factor.

It is noted that when a citizen provides yc dc data, not all of its data are useful for
the healthcare operator, thus, we consider the citizen’s contribution in terms of data
as qc = yc + ϵ, where ϵ represents some noisy data. The variable ϵ follows a normal
distribution with zero mean and variance σ 2 . Also, each business is considered to
provide a percentage reward xc = fs + vc qc , where fs is a fixed reward and vc is a
variable compensation related to the citizen’s provided data.
Towards determining the pair of optimal reward and optimal portion of reported
data, i.e., {x∗c Ms , yc∗ dc }, the following optimization problem is formulated aiming at:
(1) maximizing each business’s expected benefit/profit (Eq. 6.3a), (ii) guaranteeing a
minimum satisfaction Uc,min for each citizen (Eq. 6.3b), thus capturing its individual
rationality (IR), and (iii) maximizing the citizen’s achieved satisfaction (Eq. 6.3c)
to be incentive compatible (IC) to participate in the data reporting process.

max

{xc ,yc }∀c∈C

E(qc − xc )

s.t. E(−e−nc [xc −ψ(yc )] ) ≥ Uc,min

(6.3a)
(IR)

(6.3b)

yc ∈ argmax E(−e−nc [xc −ψ(yc )] ) (IC)

(6.3c)

yc

The citizen’s expected utility can be rewritten when given that E(e−nc vc ϵ ) =
e

2 σ2
nc vc
2

as E(−e−nc [xc −ψ(yc )] ) = −e−nc [fs +vc yc −

2
cyc
n v2 σ2
− c 2c ])
2

. Thus, by solving (6.3c), we

have:
yc∗ dc = vc dc /c, and, we can rewrite the problem (6.3a)-(6.3c).
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v2
vc
− (fs + c )]
{xc ,yc }∀c∈C c
c
2
2
vc
vc
nc vc2 σ 2
s.t. fs +
−
−
= xc
c
2c
2
max

(6.4a)

[

(6.4b)

The solution of the problem (6.4a)-(6.4b) can be easily determined as x∗c Ms =
[fs +

1
( vc
1+nc cσ 2 c

+ ϵ)]Ms . Thus, the contract of optimal reward and optimal portion

of reported data, i.e., {x∗c Ms , yc∗ dc }, is determined.

6.5

Healthcare Operator’s Data Acquisition

In this section, a contract-theoretic framework is introduced in order the healthcare
operator to incentivize the businesses to provide the collected health data to it by
providing tailored rewards to them. Each business has collected in a time slot (e.g.,
|C|
Ps ∗
one hour) a total amount of data
yc dc [bits]. Thus, we define the business’s type
c=1
|C|
Ps

as, ts =

yc∗ dc

c=1
|C|
Ps

max {

∀s∈S c=1

∈ [0, 1], reflecting the value of each business to the healthcare

yc∗ dc }

operator in terms of its ability to provide data. Each business performs an effort qs ∈
|C|
Ps ∗
[0, 1] in terms of reporting the portion of data qs
yc dc to the healthcare operator,
c=1

and receives a personalized reward rs (qs ) = ts qs from the operator, accounting for
both the business’s amount of reported data, as well as its potential to report a large
amount of data captured by its type.
Each business’s utility presents its profit/benefit from reporting the collected
data and is given as Us (qs ) = ts e(rs ) − qs , where e(rs ) is the evaluation function.
The latter function is a strictly increasing and concave function with respect to the
√
business’s received reward, e.g., e(rs ) = rs , and captures the way the business
evaluates the received monetary rewards. The healthcare operator is unaware of the
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amount of data that each business may have collected, thus, it estimates the type of
each business with probability P rs , which in this chapter, without loss of generality,
is assumed to follow a uniform distribution. The profit/benefit of the healthcare
operator from collecting the data, while providing tailored rewards to the businesses
|S|
P
is given as Uo (q) =
P rs (qs − λrs ), where q = {q1 , . . . , q|S| }. The social welfare of
s=1

the overall system is SW (q) = Uo (q) +

|S|
P

Us (qs ).

s=1

Following the principles of Contract Theory, the healthcare operator aims at maximizing its benefit from the data acquisition process (Eq. 6.5a), while guaranteeing
that the optimal contracts, i.e., {rs∗ , qs∗ }, are acceptable by the businesses. Towards
achieving the latter goal, each business’s profit should be non-negative to satisfy
its personal individual rationality (Eq. 6.5b), the reward provided to each business
should be tailored to its type in order to be incentive compatible for the business
(Eq. 6.5c), and fairness should be guaranteed in the overall rewarding process. The
latter means that a business of higher type, i.e., t1 < · · · < t|S| , will provide more
data, i.e., q1 < · · · < q|S| , thus, it will receive a greater reward (Eq. 6.5d). The
businesses are sorted with respect to their type for simplicity in the presentation.
The corresponding contract-theoretic optimization problem is defined as follows.

max

{rs ,qs }∀s∈S

Uo (q) =

|S|
X

P rs (qs − λrs )

(6.5a)

s=1

s.t. ts e(rs ) − qs ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S

(IR)

ts e(rs ) − qs ≥ ts e(rs′ ) − qs′ , s ̸= s′ , ∀s, s′ ∈ S
0 ≤ r1 < · · · < rs < · · · < r|S|

(6.5b)
(IC)

(6.5c)
(6.5d)

The above optimization problem is non-convex, thus, towards solving it, we will
reduce its constraints. Initially, focusing on the IR constraints in Eq. 6.5b, and based
on the IC constraint we have that ts e(rs ) − qs ≥ ts e(rs′ ) − qs′ ≥ ts e(r1 ) − q1 , while

109

Chapter 6. Health Data Acquisition from Wearable Devices during a Pandemic

the last inequality holds true given that the evaluation function is strictly increasing
with respect to rs , and r1 < · · · < r|S| and q1 < · · · < q|S| . Also, given that t1 <
· · · < t|S| , we have ts e(r1 ) − q1 ≥ t1 e(r1 ) − q1 ≥ 0. Moreover, the healthcare operator
will provide the sufficient reward to just incentivize the businesses to participate in
the data acquisition process, thus, Eq. 6.5b can be equivalently substituted with
t1 e(r1 ) − q1 = 0.
Towards reducing the IC constraints presented in Eq. 6.5c, we adopt the following
terminology: (i) s, s′ , s′ ∈ {1, . . . , s−1} downward IC (DIC), (ii) s, s−1, ∀s, s−1 ∈ S
local downward IC (LDIC), (iii) s, s′ , s′ ∈ {s + 1, . . . , |S|} upward IC (UIC), and (iv)
s, s + 1, ∀s, s + 1 ∈ S local upward IC (LUIC) constraints [39].
Proposition 1. All the DIC constraints can be captured by the LDIC constraints.
Proposition 2. All the UIC constraints can be captured by the LDIC constraints.

Based on the above analysis of the reduction of the IR and IC constraints, we
can rewrite the optimization problem present it in (6.5a)-(6.5d), as follows.

max

{rs ,qs }∀s∈S

Uo (q) =

|S|
X

P rs (qs − λrs )

(6.6a)

s=1

s.t. t1 e(r1 ) − q1 = 0, ∀s ∈ S

(IR)

ts e(rs ) − qs = ts e(rs−1 ) − qs−1 , ∀s, s − 1 ∈ S
0 ≤ r1 < · · · < rs < · · · < r|S|

(6.6b)
(IC)

(6.6c)
(6.6d)

The resulting optimization problem in (6.6a)-(6.6d) can be easily solved using
standard tools of convex optimization and determine the optimal contracts {rs∗ , qs∗ }.
Consequently, the total amount of data collected by the healthcare operator is:
|S|
|C|
P
P
qs∗
yc∗ dc .
s=1

c=1

110

Chapter 6. Health Data Acquisition from Wearable Devices during a Pandemic

6.6

Numerical Results

In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed economic-driven health
data acquisition framework via numerical simulations and detailed comparative analysis. Initially, the impact of the socio-physical parameters in the citizens’ business
selection and data acquisition is presented under different comparative scenarios
(Section 6.6.1). The risk-aware citizens’ behavior is analyzed under different cost
parameters to show their correlation in the data collection process and the critical role of the citizens involvement during a pandemic (Section 6.6.2). Finally, a
detailed comparative evaluation is performed to illustrate the businesses’ and healthcare operator’s interactions to jointly achieve the economic survival of the first and
the data collection of the latter towards performing the healthcare planning in the
smart city (Section 6.6.3). In the rest of the analysis, we consider |C| = 500 citizens,
Ms ∈ [2, 4]$, dc ∈ [2, 3.5] Mbits, |S| = 15 businesses, Rs ∈ [0, 1], and SIc,s ∈ [0, 1] and
phs ∈ [0, 1] with increasing values with respect to the business’s ID and c = 2, unless
otherwise explicitly stated. The proposed framework’s evaluation was conducted in
a HP Laptop, 1.8GHz Intel Core i7, 16GB LPDDR3 RAM.

6.6.1

Socio-physical-based Business Selection

In this subsection, the performance of the reinforcement learning-based business selection by the citizens in an autonomous manner via considering their social-physical
characteristics (Section 6.3) is studied. In particular, the proposed SLA distributed
decision-making under various learning rate values, i.e, b = {0.1, 0.4, 0.7, 0.9}, is
compared against (a) Random Scenario: the citizens select randomly which business
to visit; and (b) Congestion Scenario: the citizens act as SLA with reward function
rc,s = 1/|C|s aiming to visit the less congested business without exploiting their
social-physical preferences. For fairness in the comparison, for all examined alterna-

111

Chapter 6. Health Data Acquisition from Wearable Devices during a Pandemic
SLA-b = 0.1
SLA-b = 0.4
SLA-b = 0.7

Number of Citizens

150

SLA-b = 0.9
Random Scenario
Congestion Scenario

a)

100

50

0

5

Collected Data [Mbits]

80

10

15

Business ID

SLA-b = 0.1
SLA-b = 0.4
SLA-b = 0.7

SLA-b = 0.9
Random Scenario
Congestion Scenario

b)

60
40
20

5

10

Business ID

Citizens' Business
Selection Change (%)

60

15

c) 200
150

40
100
20
50
0

0.1

0.4

0.7

0.9

Execution Time [sec]

0

0

Learning Rate b

Figure 6.1: Reinforcement Learning-based Business Selection – A Comparative Evaluation
tives, we apply the behavioral contract-theoretic data collection approach (Section
6.4). Fig. 6.1a and Fig. 6.1b present the number of citizens that visited each business and the amount of data collected by the latter. The results reveal that under
the SLA approach, the citizens successfully select the business that provides them
higher reward (rc,s =

SIc,s Rs
)
|C|s phs

given the superior social-physical characteristics. Also,

the corresponding businesses that better satisfy the citizens’ social-physical needs,
achieve to collect more data that can be exploited for making further profit by reporting them to the healthcare operator. Thus, the businesses that offer better rewards
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Figure 6.2: Behavioral and Cost-based Data Collection
rc,s to the citizens have dual economic benefit, as they attract more customers and
collect more data from them that can exchange with the healthcare operator for
additional monetary rewards. On the other hand, the random selection allocates
the citizens to the businesses in a non-sophisticated manner. The latter has a result the heterogeneous congestion of the businesses (Fig. 6.1a) and the unbalanced
data collection (Fig. 6.1b). Also, the Congestion Scenario tends to blindly balance
the number of citizens allocated to the businesses, without accounting for any social parameters, thus, resulting in lower rewards rc,s =
approach.
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Focusing on the pure operation of the SLA approach, Fig. 6.1c presents the
percentage of changes of the citizens’ selections to visit a business compared to their
selection for learning rate b = 0.1. The latter is considered as the ground-truth given
that the citizens exploit thoroughly their choices for small values of the learning rate
concluding to higher values of reward by their decision to visit a business. Also, Fig.
6.1c shows the real execution time of the SLA approach until it converges to a stable
decision. The results show that as the value of the learning parameter increases, the
citizens make faster decisions, however, they deviate more from the ground-truth,
consequently receiving smaller rewards.

6.6.2

Behavioral and Cost-based Data Collection

Subsequently, we turn our attention to the quantification of the impact of the citizens’
risk-aware behavior and their experienced cost to report their data to the business
that they select to visit, on their final decisions regarding the amount of data that
they report.
Specifically, Fig. 6.2a-6.2c present the average values of the citizen’s reported
health data, their received reward from the businesses, and their achieved utility
(Eq. 6.2) as a function of the citizen’s risk aversion parameter nc . Three comparative
scenarios are considered regarding the cost that the citizens experience to report their
data: (a) High Cost: ψ(yc ) =
(c) Low Cost: ψ(yc ) =

cyc4
4

cyc2
,c
2

= 3, (b) Medium Cost: ψ(yc ) =

cyc2
,c
2

= 2, and

, c = 2, where yc ∈ [0, 1]. The results reveal that as the

citizens become more risk averse (i.e., increasing value of the risk aversion parameter
nc ) in terms of reporting their health data, they tend to actually report a smaller
amount of data (Fig. 6.2a), thus, they receive a smaller reward from the businesses
(Fig. 6.2b), resulting finally in a decreased enjoyed utility (Fig. 6.2c). In other
words, the more hesitant the citizens become with sharing their wearable devices’
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Figure 6.3: Impact of socio-physical parameters under different comparative scenarios
health data, the less rewards they experience from the businesses.
Focusing on the impact of the cost that the citizens experience to report their
data to the businesses, as expected the results show that the higher the cost, the
less data the citizens report to the businesses that they visit (Fig. 6.2a). Thus, the
businesses offer lower rewards to the citizens (Fig. 6.2b), and the latter achieve less
satisfaction (Fig. 6.2c). Based on the overall above behavioral and cost analysis, we
conclude that a citizen who is less hesitant to report its data, and experiences low
cost, has the potential to contribute more in the data acquisition process and the
businesses’ economic sustainability.

6.6.3

Businesses and Healthcare Operator Interactions

We further explore the interactions among the businesses and the healthcare operator
under the case of complete and incomplete information availability, i.e., the healthcare operator knows the businesses types in a deterministic and probabilistic manner,
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Figure 6.4: System’s Operation - A Comparative Analysis
respectively. Moreover, a comparative evaluation of our proposed contract-theoretic
framework against other approaches is performed, to reveal our framework’s benefits.
In particular, Fig. 6.3a presents the businesses’ type ts as a function of their
ID. Fig. 6.3b-6.3d illustrate the businesses’ normalized effort qs , their normalized
received reward rs from the healthcare operator and their achieved utility Us as a
function of the business ID, respectively, for the complete and incomplete information
scenarios. The results reveal that as the business’s type increases (i.e., the business
has collected more data from the citizens), the greater effort it invests to report the
data to the healthcare operator (Fig. 6.3b). This results in the business receiving a
larger reward (Fig. 6.3c) and consequently a higher utility (Fig. 6.3d). Moreover,
it is shown that higher reward and corresponding higher effort is observed under
the complete information scenario, as the healthcare operator knows the businesses’
types, thus, it provides just sufficient rewards to collect all their available data. For
that reason, the businesses’ utility is zero, as the healthcare operator offers that level
of rewards to the businesses, in order the latter to just balance the cost to report
their data with the received monetary rewards from the healthcare operator.
Subsequently, in Fig. 6.4a and Fig. 6.4b, a comparative evaluation of the healthcare operator’s cumulative utility and the overall social welfare are presented, respec-

116

Chapter 6. Health Data Acquisition from Wearable Devices during a Pandemic

tively, under the complete and incomplete information scenarios, and the Random
and Congestion Scenarios (described in Section 6.6.1). The results reveal that the
complete information scenario achieves the best results as the healthcare operator
has full knowledge about the businesses’ types and can more accurately plan the data
acquisition process (Fig. 6.4a), while guaranteeing the high levels of satisfaction of all
the involved entities (Fig. 6.4b). The incomplete information scenario, which corresponds to a more realistic implementation, achieves the second best results, achieving
approximately 22% worse social welfare compared to the (ideal) complete information scenario. This observation indicates that the proposed framework behaves very
well under the challenging scenario, where the healthcare operator is unaware of the
businesses’ characteristics. Finally, the non-sophisticated random scenario results in
the worst results, while the congestion scenario results in unsatisfied citizens visiting
businesses that they have low social interest to visit. Accordingly, in this case the
citizens are not motivated to report a large amount of their data and the system
performs poorly.

6.7

Conclusions

In this chapter, a techno-economics based approach is introduced to deal with the
joint problem of health data acquisition from the citizens and economic sustainability
of the businesses in a smart city. A reinforcement learning approach is proposed to
enable the citizens to choose the most preferable business to visit by exploiting their
socio-physical characteristics. A novel incentivization model is introduced in order
for the citizens to provide their health data to the businesses that they visit, based on
the behavioral economics, while improving the businesses’ economic sustainability.
Moreover, a contract-theoretic data acquisition framework is proposed enabling the
healthcare operator to acquire the citizens’ health data, towards facilitating the smart
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city’s healthcare planning. Part of our current and future work involves the extension
and realization of this model, by implementing the proposed frameworks in mobile
Android and IOS applications, and test them in realistic environments under different
scenarios of incomplete information.
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Chapter 7
Museum and Visitors Interactions
Enabled by Labor Economics
7.1

Introduction

Over the last decade, the world has witnessed a rapid growth of services and applications provided to citizens in order to improve and facilitate their everyday life
activities. Indicative application domains include smart homes, transportation systems, education, smart cities, and cultural spaces, to name a few. To improve the
Quality of Service (QoS) provided to the end-users, humans have become an integral
part of the overall system design and the human factors are naturally taken into
account during the system operation. Following this human-in-the-loop (HITL) approach, cyber-physical-social systems (CPSSs) have emerged combining the aspects
of communications, computing, control, and human resources and attributes [136].
In this chapter, we focus our study on the cyber-physical-social system of a museum,
instrumenting the interactions among the museum operator and the visitors, and incentivizing the latter to provide feedback to the former via a labor economics-based
approach.
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7.1.1

Related Work

In CPSSs, the participatory sensing, i.e., data collection from humans in order to
analyze them and extract their characteristics and behaviors, is critical in designing
and optimizing the CPSS to meet the humans’ QoS and Quality of Experience (QoE)
requirements. Various incentives have been introduced in recent literature in order to
incentivize humans’ participatory sensing [137]. Such incentives can be organized into
two main classes: (a) monetary and (b) non-monetary incentives, enabling extrinsic
and intrinsic human motivation, respectively [138]. The monetary incentives can be
static, i.e., predetermined based on some criteria and unaffected by the changes in
the CPSS, or dynamic, i.e., dependent on the real-time conditions of the CPSS. The
non-monetary incentives can be: (i) collective, i.e., the humans are encouraged to
work together for a common good; (ii) social, i.e., the humans are encouraged to
achieve a social status; and (iii) socially interactive, i.e., the CPSS provides to the
humans a feeling of social presence and belonging, such as in social networks and
blogs [139].
In [140], a behavioral model is presented in order to categorize the humans into
three types with respect to the participatory sensing process: malicious, speculative,
and honest. An incentive mechanism is also introduced, which provides benefits to
the humans in proportion to their reputation with respect to the collected information. In [141], a contract-theoretic participatory sensing mechanism is proposed. A
participatory sensing platform announces various data acquisition tasks and provides
benefits to humans based on their invested effort to collect and report the data. The
ultimate goal of the participatory sensing in CPSSs is to improve their operation as
dynamic and complex systems and, in parallel, to enhance the experienced QoE by
the humans which play an active role therein [142].
Considering the cultural heritage space use case of CPSSs, such as museums, lim-
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ited quantitative models have been introduced in the literature to jointly optimize
the museum’s operation and the visitors’ QoE, while exploiting their interactions.
In [143], the visitor’s experience in a museum is studied via analyzing the information shared by the visitor to the social networks following the participatory sensing
paradigm. The authors’ goal is to exploit the collected information in order to
identify the visitors’ interests, and thus improve the exhibition’s planning. The importance of participatory sensing and the corresponding generated big data has been
highlighted in [144]. Specifically, an exploratory study was conducted with a participating group of museum professionals who identified the critical role of participatory
sensing and big data in improvements to museum operations.
Furthermore, focusing on the visitors’ QoE improvement, an empirical study was
performed in [145] to identify the most influential parameters of visitors’ QoE, while
considering the visitors’ style and characteristics. This work has been extended in
[26], where a routing mechanism is introduced in order to recommend a museum tour
to the visitors for the purpose of optimizing their QoE. In [146], the authors have
implemented a light detection and ranging (LIDAR) system to detect and track the
visitors’ positions and mobility patterns in the museum. Based on the latter collected
information, the visitors’ behavior during the museum touring is inferred and used
in designing the museum exhibition to improve visitor QoE. This research has been
extended in [147], where the authors have performed a real experiment in the art
gallery of the Ohara Museum of Arts in Japan to extract the visitors’ behavioral
characteristics during the museum visit.
Focusing on exploiting the visitors’ behavioral patterns in order to improve their
achieved QoE, Prospect Theory has been adopted in [148] to determine the optimal time that each visitor should spend per exhibit in order to optimize their QoE.
This research work has been extended in [149] to accommodate the museum operator’s goal of mitigating visitor congestion in the museum, while accounting for
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the visitors’ goal to optimize their QoE. In the proposed model, sophisticated pricing mechanisms have been designed to enable the museum operator to incentivize
the visitors to invest their visiting time appropriately, thereby jointly optimizing
both the museum operator’s and the visitors’ aforementioned objectives. In [150],
the authors focus on designing a mechanism of smart routing and recommendation
provision for the visitors, while accounting for their behavioral and visiting styles.
Also, in [151], a reinforcement learning approach is introduced in order to enable the
visitors to perform a recommendation selection regarding their visiting style (e.g.,
map, facilitator, audiovisual equipment) in an autonomous manner. Moreover, a
game-theoretic framework is proposed to determine their optimal visiting time in a
distributed manner, so as to maximize their perceived QoE.

7.1.2

Contributions & Outline

In a nutshell, the existing research has focused on participatory sensing to infer the
visitors’ behavior in order to either optimize their QoE or enable the museum operator to perform optimal museum planning, such as with strategic exhibit deployment
and congestion mitigation. However, very limited attention has been given to the
joint accommodation of both the museum operator’s and the visitors’ goals, which
still remains an open issue of high research and practical importance. In particular,
the problem of orchestrating the museum operator’s and the visitors’ interactions
while accounting for the visitors’ behavioral characteristics, in an effort to jointly
optimize the benefits of two entities with different and possibly diverse interests, is
even more challenging. In this research work, we particularly strive to tackle these
issues. The main contributions of this study that differentiate it from other literature
are presented below.

1. The characteristics of the museum considered as a cyber-physical-social system
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are identified. The visitors’ characteristics and their visiting styles are studied
in order to define the visitors’ types. Each visitor is characterized by a unique
type stemming from their level of knowledge with respect to the exhibition,
their mobility pattern, their visiting style, and the time that they are willing
to invest in the museum touring (Section 7.2).
2. A labor economics-based framework is introduced to capture the museum operator’s and the visitors’ benefits from the collected information, via the participatory sensing and the monetary incentives, respectively. Specifically, the
museum operator provides monetary rewards to the visitors so that they will
provide evaluations about the exhibits, while simultaneously accounting for
the sensible spending of their time in the museum. The interactions among the
museum operator and visitors are captured in appropriately designed utility
functions following the principles of labor economics (Section 7.3).
3. A labor economics-based optimization problem is formulated to jointly consider and treat the museum operator’s and the visitors’ utilities. The problem
is studied and solved under the scenarios of complete information (Section
7.4), wherein the museum operator knows the visitors’ types deterministically,
and incomplete information (Section 7.5), wherein the museum operator estimates the visitors’ types probabilistically. The outcome jointly determines
the visitors’ optimal contributions, expressed in terms of their total provided
evaluations of visited exhibits over their touring time, as well as the museum
operator’s optimal amount of rewards provided to each visitor.
4. With a detailed set of experiments, we show that the proposed approach based
on principles of labor economics, outperforms a type-agnostic scenario which
is unaware of the visitors’ unique characteristics, with a 25% improvement
upon the visitors’ QoE. Our findings also show that the labor economics-based
incentivization framework can provide a five-fold improvement of the social
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welfare of the museum CPSS, when compared to the scenario in which the
visitors provide the maximum possible number of evaluations and invest the
minimum acceptable time for their tour (Section 7.6).

7.2

Museum: A Cyber-physical-social System

The cyber-physical-social system of a museum is considered consisting of the museum
operator, who is responsible for the museum planning and management, and the set
ax
of visitors N = {1, . . . , n, . . . , |N |}. Each visitor has a maximum available time tM
n

[min] that they are willing to invest in touring the museum. Also, the museum operator aims to collect feedback and evaluations from the visitors regarding their interest
in the exhibits included in the exhibition. The number of evaluations provided by
the visitor n is denoted as En , En ∈ N. Furthermore, each visitor is characterized by
their level of knowledge kn ∈ [0, 1] regarding the content of the exhibition. Based on
their level of knowledge, the visitor’s provided exhibit evaluations weigh accordingly.
Based on the seminal research work of Véron and Levasseur [152], the visitors
are categorized in the visiting styles of ants, butterflies, grasshoppers, and fish, on
the basis of their mobility pattern in the museum and time spent per exhibit. The
ants visit all of the exhibits sequentially, spending similar time at each one. The
butterflies visit almost all of the exhibits and spend varying times at each one.
The grasshoppers spend a long time at each of a select few exhibits. Finally, the
fish stand in the center of the room observing the majority of the exhibits without
having any specific interest. Based on that animal metaphor of the visitor styles,
we define the visitor’s persona pn , pn ∈ [0, 1], which expresses how trusted each
visitor’s evaluations are. The ant-persona more closely and carefully observes all
of the exhibits, as compared to the butterfly-persona. The butterfly-persona is not
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biased to visit specific exhibits, as compared to the grasshopper-persona. The fishpersona can be thought of as the less-interested visitor at the exhibition, who may
visit the museum chiefly to accompany their friends or family. Thus, the visitors’
personas are ranked as pf ish < pgrasshopper < pbutterf ly < pant , capturing the quality
of evaluation that each visitor can provide.
Considering the visitors’ characteristics, we define the visitor’s type τn =

pn k n
ax
tM
n

∈

[0, 1], which jointly reflects the visitors’ personas, their levels of knowledge, and their
willingness to invest time in touring the museum. It is noted that the maximum
ax
is measured in minutes, and for all practical scenarios we consider
visiting time tM
n
ax
≥ 1min.
tM
n

7.3

Utility Functions: A Labor Economics Modeling

The principles of labor economics are adopted in order to model interactions among
the museum operator and the visitors, as well as their respective benefits from museum planning and touring. Following the philosophy of labor economics, an ”employer” provides personalized rewards to the ”employees” in order to incentivize them
to perform an action for the common good. The provided rewards are personalized
based on the employee’s contribution to the overall system’s wellness. Usually, the
employer is unaware of the employees’ types (i.e., incomplete information scenario),
which reflect their capability to provide contribution to the system. Thus, the rewards are provided to the employees in a probabilistic manner. On the other hand,
the ideal scenario in which the employer knows the employees’ types deterministically
(e.g., from historical data) is used for benchmarking purposes. The latter scenario
acts as the ground truth to evaluate the success of the devised model under incom-
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plete information regarding the employees’ types. The theory of labor economics
aims to jointly optimize the employer’s profit and benefits, while still satisfying the
employees’ QoE prerequisites, thereby concluding to a stable and rewarding equilibrium for the overall system.
Focusing on the museum CPSS use case scenario, the museum operator and the
visitors act as the employer and the employees, respectively. The goal of the museum
operator is to collect meaningful evaluations from the visitors to efficiently plan the
exhibition, as well as to motivate the visitors to spend their time wisely during
their tour. This goal is achieved by adopting an extrinsic motivation strategy and
providing personalized monetary rewards to the visitors, such as ticket discounts and
coupons for the museum’s store. On the other hand, the visitors aim to satisfy their
QoE prerequisites by enjoying the provided monetary rewards and investing their
time meaningfully during their tour.
To begin capturing the above analysis, the visitor’s contribution in the museum
CPSS operation is defined as xn =

En
tn

and, for clarity in the analysis and without

loss of generality, is mapped to the interval x̂n ∈ [0, 1]. The museum CPSS benefits from an increased number of provided evaluations, En , in a considerate time, tn
[min], spent by the visitor for their tour. The museum operator provides personalized rewards, rn (x̂n ) = τn x̂n , rn ∈ [0, 1], to the visitors which are dependent on
their provided contribution, x̂n , and the quality of the information provided by their
evaluation, as captured by their type, τn . Each visitor evaluates their personalized
reward in terms of improving their perceived QoE via the evaluation function e(rn ).
The evaluation function is strictly increasing and concave with respect to the received
√
rewards, e.g., e(rn ) = rn . The diminishing rate of return in reward perception is
due to the fact that, especially after some point, visitors are constrained by their
physical capability to further decrease their tour time and/or increase their number
of provided evaluations.
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Each visitor aims to improve their QoE, which consists of the visitor’s evaluation
of their personalized rewards based on their particular visiting type (first term of Eq.
7.1), while also considering the cost of providing their personal contribution to the
smooth operation of the museum CPSS (second term of Eq. 7.1). Thus, the visitor’s
utility is formulated as follows:
Un (x̂n ) = τn e(rn ) − kx̂n

(7.1)

where k ∈ R+ is the visitor’s personal cost to provide their contribution, e.g., their
smartphone’s battery level expended to provide evaluations via the museum’s mobile
application.
On the other hand, as mentioned before, the museum operator benefits from collecting the visitors’ contributions. Nevertheless, the museum operator is burdened
with the cost of providing monetary rewards to the visitors in this attempt to extrinsically motivate them. Also, the visiting types τn , ∀n ∈ N of the visitors are
unknown by the museum operator in the general case, so the latter one estimates the
|N |
P
visitors’ types with probability Pn , where
Pn = 1. Thus, the museum operator’s
n=1

utility is formulated as:
|N |
X
[Pn (x̂n − crn )]
UM (x̂) =

(7.2)

n=1

where c ∈ R+ is the museum operator’s cost to provide the rewards and x̂ =
(x̂1 , . . . , x̂n , . . . , x̂|N | ) is the visitor contribution vector.
Combining Eq. 7.1 and Eq. 7.2, the social welfare of the overall museum CPSS,
consisting of the museum operator and the visitors, is given collectively as:

SW (x̂) = UM (x̂) +

|N |
X

Un (x̂n )

(7.3)

n=1
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Figure 7.1: Museum and visitors interaction and feedback orchestration model.
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A graphical representation of the analysis provided in Sections 7.2 and 7.3, reflecting the museum and visitors interaction and feedback orchestration model, is
provided in Fig. 7.1.

7.4

Optimal Contracts under Complete Information

In this section, we examine the museum operator’s and the visitors’ interactions under
the ideal case, with the museum operator knowing the visitors’ types deterministically
(i.e., complete information). This scenario is mainly used for benchmarking purposes.
The goal of the museum operator is to optimize its profit and benefits, while jointly
satisfying the visitors’ QoE prerequisites, as they are captured by and reflected via
their utility functions. This optimization problem, given the complete information
of the visitors’ types, can be formulated as:

max

{rn ,x̂n }∀n∈N

n
[UM
(x̂n ) = x̂n − crn ], ∀n ∈ N

s.t. τn e(rn ) − kx̂n ≥ 0 (IR)

(7.4a)

(7.4b)

n
where UM
(x̂n ) is the museum operator’s utility due to each visitor of known type

τn . The condition (7.4b) expresses the visitor’s individual rationality (IR), which
dictates that the visitor should experience at least a positive utility in order to be
incentivized to interact with the museum operator.
The solution of the optimization problem (7.4a)-(7.4b) concludes to the optimal
reward rn∗ and optimal contribution x̂∗n for each visitor. The pair {rn∗ , x̂∗n } is referred
to as optimal ”contract” in the remainder of our analysis.
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Theorem 1. (Optimal Contract under Complete Information): Under the
complete information scenario, the optimal contract among the museum operator and
2

τn 2 τn
) , 2ck2 }.
each visitor n, n ∈ N is {rn∗ , x̂∗n } = {( 2ck

n 2
) , given that
Proof. The IR constraint in Eq. 7.4b can be reduced to rn = ( kx̂
τn

the museum operator will provide just-sufficient rewards to incentivize the visitors
to participate in the smooth operation of the museum CPSS. Thus, by substituting
the latter expression in Eq. 7.4a, taking the first order derivative with respect to x̂n ,
setting it to equal to zero, and solving with respect to x̂n , we have x̂∗n =

τn 2
.
2ck2

Thus,

τn 2
we can easily derive that rn∗ = ( 2ck
).

Figure 7.2: Optimal contracts under complete and incomplete information scenarios.

The physical meaning of Theorem 1 is that the museum operator and the visitors
provide rewards and contribution, respectively, in proportion to the visitors’ types.
The analysis presented in this section is graphically captured in Fig. 7.2.

130

Chapter 7. Museum and Visitors Interactions Enabled by Labor Economics

7.5

Museum Congestion & Feedback Management
Under Incomplete Information

In this section, we examine the general case, where the museum operator is unaware
of the visitors’ types τn , ∀n ∈ N , and estimates them in a probabilistic manner.

7.5.1

Problem Formulation

Similarly as before, our goal is to determine the optimal contracts {rn∗ , x̂∗n }, ∀n ∈ N
between the museum operator and the visitors such that the museum operator optimizes its profit and benefits, while jointly satisfying the visitors’ QoE prerequisites.
To guarantee feasibility of the contracts, the following rational and necessary conditions should hold true: individual rationality (IR), incentive compatibility (IC),
fairness, monotonicity, and rationality.
Definition 1. (Individual Rationality (IR)) Each visitor, n, must experience a nonnegative utility, i.e., Un (x̂n ) = τn e(rn ) − kx̂n ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N , in the optimal contract,
{rn∗ , x̂∗n }, in order to be incentivized to participate in the operation of the museum
CPSS.
Definition 2. (Incentive Compatibility (IC)) An optimal personalized contract, {rn∗ , x̂∗n },
designed for a visitor of type τn should provide higher utility to the visitor compared
to any other contract that is not aligned to the visitor’s personal characteristics, i.e.,
′

′

τn e(rn∗ ) − kx̂∗n ≥ τn e(rn′ ) − kx̂n′ , ∀n ̸= n , n, n ∈ N .

The physical meaning of the IR and IC conditions is that the contracts should be
wisely designed to incentivize the visitors’ participation in the museum’s operation
and should be personalized to each visitor’s unique characteristics.
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Theorem 2. (Fairness) The optimal contract should be fair by assigning higher (or
equal) reward to a visitor of higher (or equal) type, i.e., rn > rn′ ⇔ τn > τn′ (rn =
rn′ ⇔ τn = τn′ ).
′

′

Proof. Initially, we consider τn > τn′ , ∀n, n ∈ N , with n ̸= n . Based on the IC
condition, we have:

τn e(rn ) − kx̂n ≥ τn e(rn′ ) − kx̂n′

(7.5)

τn e(rn′ ) − kx̂n′ ≥ τn′ e(rn ) − kx̂n

(7.6)

By adding the inequalities (7.5) and (7.6), we have:

(τn − τn′ )e(rn ) > (τn − τn′ )e(rn′ )

(7.7)

We know that τn > τn′ , thus, we have e(rn ) > e(rn′ ). Given that the evaluation
function is strictly increasing with respect to rn , we conclude that rn > rn′ . We
′

′

then consider rn > rn′ , ∀n, n ∈ N , with n ̸= n . Given the monotonicity of the
evaluation function, we have e(rn ) − e(rn′ ) > 0. Thus, based on Eq. 7.7, we have
(τn − τn′ )(e(rn ) − e(rn′ )) > 0. Therefore, we conclude that τn > τn′ .

The physical meaning of the fairness condition is that a visitor of higher type,
who has the potential to contribute more in the museum’s operation, should receive
greater reward.
Theorem 3. (Monotonicity) A visitor of higher type, i.e., τ1 < · · · < τn < · · · < τ|N |
receives greater reward, i.e., r1 < · · · < rn < · · · < r|N | , thus, they are expected to
provide greater contribution, i.e., x̂1 < · · · < x̂n < · · · < x̂|N | .
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Proof. Without loss of generality and for convenience in the notation, we consider
that the visitors’ types are sorted as τ1 < · · · < τn < · · · < τ|N | . Then, based on
Theorem 2, we can also show that r1 < · · · < rn < · · · < r|N | . Thus, given that
rn (x̂n ) = τn x̂n , we can easily conclude that x̂1 < · · · < x̂n < · · · < x̂|N | .

The physical meaning of Theorem 3 is that a visitor with higher type is capable of
providing greater contribution and thus receives a greater reward from the museum
operator.
Theorem 4. (Rationality) Visitors of higher types, i.e., τ1 < · · · < τn < · · · < τ|N | ,
eventually achieve higher utilities, i.e., U1 < · · · < Un < · · · < U|N | .

′

′

Proof. Based on the IC condition for two indicative visitors, n, n ∈ N, n ̸= n ,
with τn > τn′ , we have τn e(rn ) − kx̂n ≥ τn e(rn′ ) − kx̂n′ . Because τn > τn′ , we have
τn e(rn )−kx̂n ≥ τn′ e(rn′ )−kx̂n′ . Generalizing the latter outcome for the visitors with
types τ1 < · · · < τn < · · · < τ|N | , we conclude that U1 < · · · < Un < · · · < U|N | .

The physical meaning of Theorem 4 is that a visitor of higher type, who provides
greater contribution to the museum operation (Theorem 3), will receive greater reward (Theorem 2) and will thus eventually enjoy greater utility.
It should be highlighted that the above five conditions, as presented in Definitions
1, 2, and Theorems 2-4, are necessary but not sufficient in order to conclude to the
optimal contract under the incomplete information scenario. Consequentially, we
formulate the optimization problem to capture the interactions among the museum
operator and the visitors as a maximization problem of the museum operator’s utility
(Eq. 7.8a) under the IR (Eq. 7.8b), IC (Eq. 7.8c), fairness, monotonicity, and
rationality constraints, which can be jointly expressed in Eq. 7.8d, considering that
τ1 < · · · < τn < · · · < τ|N | . Therefore, the optimization problem of determining
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the optimal contracts under incomplete information of the visitors’ types can be
expressed as follows:

max

{rn ,x̂n }∀n∈N

UM (x̂) =

|N |
X

[Pn (x̂n − crn )]

(7.8a)

n=1

s.t. τn e(rn ) − kx̂n ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N

(IR)

τn e(rn ) − kx̂n ≥ τn e(rn′ ) − kx̂n′ , ∀n ̸= n′ , ∈ N

(7.8b)
(IC)

0 ≤ r1 < r2 < · · · < rn < · · · < r|N |

(7.8c)
(7.8d)

The optimization problem (7.8a)-(7.8d) is non-convex.

7.5.2

Problem Solution

To solve the optimization problem (7.8a)-(7.8d) and determine the optimal contracts,
we reduce its constraints, as shown in the following analysis. Initially, we focus on
the IR constraint (Eq. 7.8b). Based on Theorem 4 and the IC condition, we have
that τn e(rn ) − kx̂n ≥ τn e(rn−1 ) − kx̂n−1 ≥ · · · ≥ τn e(r1 ) − kx̂1 . We observe that if
the IR condition holds true for the visitor of the lowest type, i.e., τn e(r1 ) − kx̂1 ≥ 0,
then it will hold true for any visitor of higher type. Furthermore, given that the
museum operator will provide the just-sufficient reward to incentivize the visitors,
we conclude that the constraint (7.8b) can be replaced by τn e(r1 ) − kx̂1 = 0.
We then analyze the IC constraint in Eq. 7.8c using the following terminology
about the IC constraints of visitors with different types: (i) Downward IC (DIC)
constraints for n, n′ , n′ ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}; (ii) Local DIC (LDIC) constraint for n, n −
1 ∈ N ; (iii) Upward IC (UIC) constraint for n, n′ , n′ ∈ {n + 1, . . . , |N |}, and (iv)
Local UIC (LUIC) constraint for n, n + 1 ∈ N .
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Theorem 5. All of the UIC constraints can be equivalently captured by the LDIC
constraint.
Proof. We consider the IC conditions of three visitors, n − 1, n, n + 1, ∀n ∈ N , as
follows:
τn−1 e(rn−1 ) − kx̂n−1 ≥ τn−1 e(rn ) − kx̂n
τn e(rn ) − kx̂n ≥ τn e(rn+1 ) − kx̂n+1

(7.9)

(7.10)

Based on Theorem 2, Eq. 7.10 can be analyzed:
τn >τn−1

k(x̂n+1 − x̂n ) ≥ τn [e(rn+1 ) − e(rn )] =====⇒
(7.11)
k(x̂n+1 − x̂n ) ≥ τn−1 [e(rn+1 ) − e(rn )]
Combining Eq. 7.9 and Eq. 7.11, we have τn−1 e(rn−1 ) − kx̂n−1 ≥ τn−1 e(rn ) −
kx̂n ≥ τn−1 e(rn+1 ) − kx̂n+1 . By applying the latter outcome for all of the UIC
constraints, we have τn−1 e(rn−1 ) − kx̂n−1 ≥ τn−1 e(rn ) − kx̂n ≥ τn−1 e(rn+1 ) − kx̂n+1 ≥
· · · ≥ τn−1 e(r|N | ) − kx̂|N | . Thus, we conclude that all of the UIC constraints can be
equivalently captured by the LDIC constraint, as expressed in Eq. 7.9.
Theorem 6. All of the DIC constraints can be equivalently captured by the LDIC
constraint.
Proof. We consider the IC conditions of three visitors, n − 1, n, n + 1, ∀n ∈ N , as
follows:
τn+1 e(rn+1 ) − kx̂n+1 ≥ τn+1 e(rn ) − kx̂n

(7.12)

τn e(rn ) − kx̂n ≥ τn e(rn−1 ) − kx̂n−1

(7.13)
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e↗

Given that τn > τn−1 , we have rn > rn−1 ⇐=⇒ e(rn ) − e(rn−1 ) > 0. Thus, we have
τn+1 > τn ⇔ τn+1 [e(rn )−e(rn−1 )] > τn [e(rn )−e(rn−1 )] ≥ k(x̂n − x̂n−1 ), where the last
step holds true based on Eq. 7.13. We can then apply the latter outcome recursively
for all of the LDIC constraints, as in τn+1 e(rn+1 ) − kx̂n+1 ≥ τn+1 e(rn ) − kx̂n ≥
τn+1 e(rn−1 ) − kx̂n−1 ≥ · · · ≥ τn+1 e(r1 ) − kx̂1 . Therefore, we conclude that all of the
DIC constraints can equivalently be captured by the LDIC constraint, as expressed
in Eq. 7.13.

Combining the outcomes of Theorem 5 and 6, we conclude that all of the IC
constraints can be reduced to the LDIC constraint, i.e., τn e(rn ) − kx̂n ≥ τn e(rn−1 ) −
kx̂n−1 . By considering the IR and IC constraints’ reductions, the optimization problem (7.8a)-(7.8d) can be written as follows:

max

{rn ,x̂n }∀n∈N

UM (x̂) =

|N |
X

[Pn (x̂n − crn )]

(7.14a)

n=1

s.t. τn e(r1 ) − kx̂1 = 0 (IR)

(7.14b)

τn e(rn ) − kx̂n ≥ τn e(rn−1 ) − kx̂n−1

(LDIC)

0 ≤ r1 < r2 < · · · < rn < · · · < r|N |

(7.14c)
(7.14d)

The optimization problem (7.14a)-(7.14d) is convex and can be solved by standard
convex optimization tools. The outcome is the optimal contracts {rn∗ , x̂∗n }, ∀n ∈ N .
Thus, the museum operator determines the optimal allocated rewards rn∗ , ∀n ∈ N
to the visitors, while the visitors decide their optimal contribution x̂∗n , ∀n ∈ N ,
consisting of the ratio of the number of provided evaluations about the exhibits and
their time invested in the museum touring. The analysis presented in this section is
graphically captured in Fig. 7.2.
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7.6

Evaluation & Results

In this section, a detailed set of numerical results are presented in order evaluate the
performance of the proposed framework and reveal its operation benefits. In particular, the pure operation characteristics and performance of the proposed framework is
presented in Section 7.6.1 considering both the complete and incomplete information
scenarios, while the impact of the visitors personal cost to provide their contribution
on the overall museum CPSS operation is discussed in Section 7.6.2. The benefits
of addressing the visitors in a personalized manner, while considering their unique
characteristics, are shown in Section 7.6.3. Finally, a thorough comparative evaluation is demonstrated in Section 7.6.4, which considers different alternative scenarios
of visitors’ invested contribution and their impact on both their satisfaction and the
overall social welfare of the CPSS.
For the evaluation purposes, we have simulated a large size museum, considering
ax
En ∈ [0, 380, 000], tn ∈ [1, 360] min, and tM
following a random and uniform
n

distribution in [60, 360]min. Also, we assume that pn , Pn , and kn are uniformly
distributed in (0, 1]. Finally, we consider |N | = 100 visitors, and c = 2, k = 5, unless
otherwise explicitly stated.

7.6.1

Pure Operation Performance

In this section, we examine the pure operation performance of the proposed museum
and visitors interaction and feedback orchestration mechanism, with consideration
of both the benchmarking scenario which features complete information, and the
realistic scenario which features incomplete information regarding the visitors’ types.
Fig. 7.3a shows the visitors’ types, τn , as a function of their index (ID), where the
visitors have been sorted with respect to an increasing value of their type. Similarly,
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Figure 7.3: Visitors’ (a) Type, (b) Contribution, (c) Reward, and (d) Utility as a
function of their ID under the complete and incomplete information scenarios.

Fig. 7.3b-7.3d illustrate the visitors’ normalized contribution x̂n , their received reward rn , and their corresponding achieved utility Un (x̂n ), respectively, as a function
of their ID under the complete and incomplete information scenarios. The results
reveal that the visitors of greater type provide greater contribution (Fig. 7.3b) to the
operation of the museum and thereby receive a greater reward (Fig. 7.3c), following
the fairness (Theorem 2) and monotonicity (Theorem 3) properties. Accordingly,
the visitors of higher type eventually enjoy a greater utility (Fig. 7.3d) based on the
rationality property (Theorem 4). Moreover, focusing on the comparison of the complete and incomplete information scenarios, we observe that the museum operator
can fully exploit the visitors’ capabilities in collecting their contributions. This is derived from the fact that the visitors provide a greater contribution under the complete
information scenario (Fig. 7.3b), and are thus rewarded more than in the incomplete
information scenario (Fig. 7.3c), while achieving their minimum-acceptable utility
(i.e., zero) which is just sufficient enough to incentivize their participation in the
overall process (Fig. 7.3d). The latter outcome is important to the museum op-
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Figure 7.4: (a) Visitors’ incentive compatibility, (b) Museum operator’s cumulative
utility, and (c) Social welfare.
erator, who strives to wisely invest their resources such that valuable information
is collected from the visitors, while the latter ones spend wisely their time in the
museum touring.
Fig. 7.4a depicts the achieved utility for three indicative visitors’ types, i.e.,
types 70, 80, and 100, considering the optimal contracts that were determined under the incomplete information scenario for each corresponding visitor’s index, i.e.,
{rn∗ , x̂∗n }, ∀n ∈ N . The results confirm that a visitor will achieve the highest relative
utility when they receive a contract that has been designed with their own unique
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type and characteristics in consideration. For example, the visitor of type 80 will
∗
, x̂∗80 }, while
receive the maximum utility for the optimal personalized contract {r80

lower utility is achieved for any other optimal contract {rn∗ , x̂∗n }, n ̸= 80, ∀n ∈ N that
is not aligned to its personal type τ80 . The following observation respects and confirms the incentive compatibility property (Definition 2) and shows the importance
of treating the visitors in a personalized manner. Furthermore, Fig. 7.4a shows that
the visitors of higher type will experience higher utility, when receiving their personalized contract. The latter observation derives from the rationality condition, as
presented in Theorem 4. Moreover, Fig. 7.4b and Fig. 7.4c illustrate the museum
operator’s cumulative utility and the overall CPSS’s social welfare as a function of
the number of visitors. The results reveal that, as expected, better outcomes can
be achieved under the complete information scenario. However, it should be noted
that the performance achieved in the realistic scenario of incomplete information
is approximately 35% less than in the ideal case of complete information, thereby
showing that the proposed framework is robust and efficient under the uncertainties
introduced by realistic conditions.

7.6.2

Impact of Visitor’s Personal Cost

In this section, we examine the impact of the visitor’s personal cost k, k ∈ R+ on the
interaction among the visitors and the museum operator. The visitor’s personal cost
may stem from various factors, such as the visitor’s smartphone’s battery drainage
during the exhibit evaluations via the museum’s mobile application, delay in touring
in order to provide evaluations about the exhibits, and others. Three different comparative scenarios are considered capturing a (i) high (k = 5), (ii) medium (k = 3),
and (iii) low (k = 2) personal cost.
Fig. 7.5a-7.5c show the visitor’s utility as a function of the visitor’s ID, the
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Figure 7.5: Impact of the visitor’s personal cost on the system’s operation.

museum operator’s utility, and the overall social welfare as a function of the number
of visitors, respectively. The results demonstrate that the higher the visitor’s personal
cost is, the less utility they enjoy (Fig. 7.5a). Moreover, given the hesitant behavior
of the visitors to provide their contribution when they experience higher personal
cost, the museum operator’s utility (Fig. 7.5b) and the overall social welfare (Fig.
7.5c) achieve low levels as well.
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Figure 7.6: Labor economics-based vs type-agnostic interaction and feedback orchestration.

7.6.3

Visitors’ Unique Types and Characteristics

In this section, we examine the impact of considering the visitors’ unique types and
characteristics, in the overall proposed framework of museum and visitors interaction
and feedback orchestration. In particular, we consider the proposed labor economicsbased approach under the realistic incomplete information scenario, and compare it
against a type-agnostic scenario, where the rewards are allocated to the visitors in a
|N
P|

homogeneous manner, i.e., rn (x̂n ) =

τn

n=1

|N |

x̂n .

Fig. 7.6a-7.6b illustrate the visitors’ utility with respect to their ID, and the
museum operator’s cumulative utility as a function of the number of visitors, respectively, considering both the incomplete information and the type-agnostic scenarios.
The results reveal that the visitors achieve, on average, 25% better utility (Fig.
7.6a) under the proposed labor economics-based approach when compared to the
type-agnostic approach. This outcome stems from the personalized treatment of the
visitors by the museum operator in our proposed framework, where the museum
operator provides rewards well-aligned to the visitors’ characteristics. Also, it is
observable that the type-agnostic scenario over-rewards visitors of lower types and
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under-rewards visitors of higher types, thereby making the rewards allocation less
fair. Moreover, based on the results presented in Fig. 7.6b, we conclude that the proposed labor economics-based scheme achieves to also outperform the type-agnostic
one from the overall system perspective (i.e., museum operator’s utility). Specifically
a 4% improvement is observed for the case 100 visitors while, based on observed
trends, it is evident that an even greater improvement upon type-agnosticism could
be achieved for cases with larger populations of visitors.

7.6.4

Comparative Evaluation

In this section, a thorough comparative evaluation is provided considering various scenarios regarding the visitors’ contribution x̂n . In addition to our proposed
framework, four different alternatives are considered: (i) Minimum contribution, i.e.,
x̂n = min{x̂n }∀n∈N , (ii) Maximum contribution, i.e., x̂n = max{x̂n }∀n∈N , (iii) Random contribution, and (iv) Guided contribution, i.e., x̂n = f (x̂∗n ) =

−log(τn )
.
100

Fig. 7.7a shows the visitors’ utility with respect to their ID, while Fig. 7.7b-7.7c
present the museum operator’s utility, and the CPSS’s social welfare, respectively, as
a function of the number of visitors. The results reveal that the visitors’ maximum
contribution scenario benefits the museum operator but causes visitor satisfaction to
be low and, thus, yields low social welfare. The exact opposite holds true for the minimum contribution scenario, wherein the visitors are not engaged with the museum’s
operation. The random and guided contribution scenarios present an intermediate
performance for both the visitors’ and the museum operator’s benefits as compared
to the aforementioned extreme scenarios of maximum and minimum contribution.
Finally, it is observed that our proposed framework benefits the visitors in terms of
improving their perceived satisfaction, while also supporting the museum operator’s
needs to collect feedback from the visitors and incentivize them to wisely spend their

143

Chapter 7. Museum and Visitors Interactions Enabled by Labor Economics
10-3
0

Visitors Utility

a)

-1
Incomplete
Min
Max

-2

Museum Operator's Utility

-3

0

20

0.025
0.02

Random
Guided

40

60

Visitors Index

80

Incomplete
Min
Max effort

Random
Guided

20

60

100

b)

0.015
0.01
0.005
0

0

40

80

100

Number of Visitors
0

Social Welfare

c)

-0.01
Incomplete
Min
Max
Random
Guided

-0.02

-0.03

0

20

40

60

80

Number of Visitors

100

Figure 7.7: Comparative evaluation.

time during their museum touring. The combined benefit of our proposed framework
is depicted in the superior social welfare achieved, which shows a five-fold improvement compared to the maximum contribution scenario, where the visitors provide
the maximum possible number of evaluations and invest the minimum acceptable
time for their tour.
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7.7

Conclusion and Future Work

In this chapter, the problem of jointly orchestrating the museum operator’s and the
visitors’ interaction, as well as the feedback provided by the visitors while accounting
for their behavioral characteristics, is considered. The problem is treated and solved
under the prism and reasoning of a labor-economics-based approach. In particular,
the museum is treated as a cyber-physical-social system and the visitors’ unique
characteristics are derived to define their unique types. Following the principles of
labor economics, an optimization problem is formulated and solved to jointly determine the visitors’ optimal contributions in the museum’s operation and the optimal
rewards allocated by the museum operator to incentivize the visitors’ engagement.
The scenarios of both complete and incomplete information use cases regarding the
visitors’ characteristics are examined, for benchmarking and realistic implementations purposes, respectively. A set of detailed simulations considering a large size
museum, e.g., Louvre Museum, is provided to demonstrate the performance and
benefits of the proposed framework.
Part of our current and future work refers to the actual implementation of the
proposed framework in a mobile Android and iOS application, and its pilot testing
at the Acropolis Museum in Athens, Greece.
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Prosumer-centric Self-sustained
Smart Grid Systems

8.1

Introduction

Smart Grid (SG) systems have been introduced as an alternative solution to traditional power systems which operate in a centralized manner, generating power in
large power stations via the exploitation of fossil fuel resources, and distributing
the generated power to consumers [153]. SGs consist of multiple microgrids, which
are small-scale power supply networks, accommodating conventional energy units,
renewable energy sources, and energy storage systems [154]. One key enabler of SGs
is the new type of users, named prosumers, who are able to generate, store, sell,
and buy energy by mainly exploiting solar photovoltaic panels and storage devices
[155], among others. The prosumers are equipped with smart meters to exchange
(sell/buy) power with the Microgrid Operator (MGO), thus creating a local energy
trading system [156]. In this chapter, we capture the prosumers’ interactions with the
MGO in terms of selling and buying power based on a labor economics framework,
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while guaranteeing the joint optimization of their profits and enabling the overall
microgrid system to converge to a stable point of operation.

8.1.1

Related Work

Several recent research works focus on the operation of microgrid systems aiming to
satisfy the consumers’ or prosumers’ power demand via dealing with the Demand
Response Management (DRM) problem [157]. In [158], the interactions among multiple microgrid systems are studied based on the Nash bargaining theory in order
to incentivize each microgrid to participate in the proactive energy trading and fair
benefit sharing. The authors formulate the corresponding joint optimization problem and solve it by decomposing the problem into two sequential problems, where
the first minimizes the social cost and the second one optimizes the trading benefit
sharing. The problem of high-levels stochasticity in the energy production of the
renewable energy sources is studied in [159]. The authors provide a systematic approach to deal with this problem and provide the enhanced flexibility to the system
to satisfy the consumers’ power demand via exploiting the fast-ramping units, the
energy storage, and the hourly demand response. In [160], the authors introduce
a novel transactive energy control mechanism and a pricing rule to capture the interactions among multiple microgrids, aiming at jointly minimizing their operating
cost and optimizing the utilization of the renewable energy sources. The authors
have provided a detailed comparative evaluation to other centralized and decentralized transactive energy control mechanisms to show the benefits of the proposed
approach in terms of the microgrids’ effective operation and computational efficiency
in microgrids’ coordination.
The problem of reducing prosumers’ electricity bills, while guaranteeing their
minimum power demand constraints is studied in [161] via the introduction of an
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intelligent residential energy management system. A predictive mechanism of the
power demand and supply in a microgrid is introduced in [162] by designing a smart
load estimator based on a neural networks’ approach. The designed mechanism
considers the ambient temperature, the time of day, the hourly price, and the peak
demand. It should be noted here that the above research works follow a system-based
approach emphasizing on the operation of the microgrid, without however accounting
for the unique and personal characteristics of the prosumers.
Focusing on the prosumer-centric microgrid systems, a prospect-theoretic energy
trading approach is introduced in [163], in which the prosumers’ risk-aware characteristics are considered based on the uncertainty that the selling/buying energy
price introduces. The authors formulate a single-leader multiple-follower Stackelberg game, where the microgrid operator (leader) announces the optimal price and
the prosumers (followers) determine the amount of energy that they sell or buy, with
all the involved entities aiming to optimize their profit. A similar Stackelberg-based
approach is followed in [18] that also introduces a reinforcement learning mechanism
to enable the consumers to select the utility company that they will purchase energy
from, in an autonomous manner. In [164], the prosumers consider the energy as a
heterogeneous product depending on the generation technology, its location in the
SG, and its owner’s reputation. Accordingly, an optimization problem is formulated
to minimize the costs of energy losses and battery depreciation, while accounting for
the prosumers’ preferences regarding the energy.
Placing further emphasis on exploiting the prosumers’ unique power generation
and demand characteristics, a pricing-based DRM problem is introduced in [165],
which jointly considers the prosumers’ behavioral characteristics in terms of consuming electricity and the electricity demand of their household devices, which can be of
various types. In [166], the authors introduce a distributed system-wide framework
aimed at minimizing the prosumers’ payments, while guaranteeing their privacy and
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comfort constraints, via dynamically adapting the system load profile. In [167, 168],
the authors study the impact of the communication unreliability among the MGO
and the prosumers on the DRM performance and the electricity price by formulating
a joint maximization problem of the DRM performance with respect to the electricity
consumption and price, and solve it by leveraging the dual decomposition method.
Labor economics and Contract Theory have been also introduced in the literature
in order to incentivize the prosumers to follow a desired behavior within a microgrid
[39]. In particular, in [20], the authors introduce a labor economics framework to
capture the interactions of the prosumers and the MGO. A contract-theoretic optimization problem is formulated and solved to determine the optimal amount of
purchased electricity and the optimal rewards provided by the MGO to the prosumers for the sake of both parties having optimized profit. It is highlighted that
this research work considers the prosumers only as buyers and not sellers.

8.1.2

Contributions and Outline

Despite the efforts made in the previous research works, in regards to system-centric
or prosumer-centric operation of microgrids, how to incorporate the dual role of the
prosumer, i.e., seller and buyer, within the operation of the microgrid system still
remains an open issue. Furthermore, within such a setting, facilitating the smooth
and seamless operation of the microgrid system, while incentivizing the prosumers
to act in a desirable manner and simultaneously considering their unique personal
energy generation and demand characteristics is even more challenging.
In this research work, we strive exactly to tackle these issues by introducing a
contract-theoretic framework to capture the interactions of the prosumers, acting
either as sellers or buyers, with the microgrid [39]. In particular, a labor economicsbased approach is designed and evaluated, exploiting the principles of Contract The-
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ory to jointly achieve the satisfaction of the various system entities, that is the MGO
and the prosumers, which often present competing interests. Accordingly, the relations between the MGO and the prosumers (sellers or byers) are captured following
the model of employer-employee relationship, while aiming to jointly satisfy the profit
and requirements of the involved competing parties. Specifically, the main contributions of this research work that differentiate it from the rest of the existing literature
are summarized below.

1. A microgrid system consisting of the microgrid operator (MGO) and the prosumers, who generate energy based on renewable energy sources (e.g., solar
photovoltaic panels) and are equipped with energy storage (e.g., Lithium-ion
batteries) is introduced. Within the considered microgrid, the prosumers can
dynamically act as sellers or buyers based on their energy generation, demand,
and storage characteristics over time.
2. The interactions among the sellers and the MGO are captured via a contracttheoretic optimization problem which determines the optimal amount of energy
that the sellers sell to the MGO at a specific announced price, and the optimal
rewards (e.g., price discount) offered by the MGO. The goal of the formulated
problem is to maximize the MGO’s profit, while jointly optimizing the profit
of the sellers via considering their unique personal energy generation, demand,
and storage characteristics.
3. Focusing on the buyers’ side, a different contract-theoretic optimization problem is formulated to study the interactions among the buyers and the MGO.
The MGO provides personalized rewards to the buyers, e.g., fixed price, considering their energy demand, while the buyers invest their ”effort”, i.e., money,
to purchase the amount of energy that covers their demand. The optimal personalized contracts, i.e., optimal personalized reward and purchased energy per
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buyer, are determined to bring the dynamic interaction of the MGO and the
prosumers into a stable mode of operation.
4. A detailed series of experiments are performed to show the drawbacks and
benefits of the proposed prosumer-centric self-sustained smart grid system’s
operation approach. This is realized under both a benchmarking scenario of
complete information and a realistic scenario of incomplete information regarding the prosumers’ energy generation, demand, and storage characteristics. A
scalability analysis is performed to show the efficiency and robustness of the
proposed framework. Also, a detailed study is performed regarding the impact
of the prosumers’ energy generation and demand characteristics, as well as the
MGO’s pricing policies, on the interactions of the sellers and buyers with the
MGO.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 introduces the humancentric smart grid system model, while Sections 8.3 and 8.4 introduce and solve
the contract-theoretic optimization problems for the sellers and buyers, respectively.
Simulation and comparative results are presented in Section 8.5. Finally, Section 8.6
concludes the chapter.

8.2

Human-centric Smart Grid System Model

A microgrid system is considered, consisting of the microgrid operator (MGO) and
the prosumers. The prosumers can generate energy via various alternative options,
such as solar photovoltaic panels and small wind turbine power generation systems, and can also store the energy in storage systems, such as Lithium-ion batteries [169]. Each prosumer’s residential infrastructure is equipped with a smart
meter to dynamically measure the energy generation, demand, storage, and ex-

151

Chapter 8. Prosumer-centric Self-sustained Smart Grid Systems

change (selling or buying) power with the MGO. We examine the interactions of
the MGO and the prosumers at each time slot t, with the set of times slots denoted
as T = {1, . . . , t, . . . , |T |}. The sets of prosumers, sellers, and buyers are denoted
as N = {1, . . . , n, . . . , |N |}, S = {1, . . . , s, . . . , |S|}, and B = {1, . . . , β, . . . , |B|},
respectively, with S ⊆ N , B ⊆ N , and |S| + |B| = |N |.
Each prosumer has a set of home appliances, An = {1, . . . , an , . . . , |An |}, which at
the duration of one time slot t (e.g., one hour) can be either on, i.e., δat n = 1, or off,
P
i.e., δat n = 0. Thus, their total energy demand is dtn = ∀an ∈An δat n Ean [kWh] in the
duration of a time slot t, where Ean [KWh] is the energy consumption of the appliance
an when it is operating during time slot t [170]. It should be noted that a prosumer
ax
in
.
can shift the operation of some appliances over time, thus, dM
≤ dtn ≤ dM
n
n
in
[kWh] denotes the total energy demand of the appliances of the
Specifically, dM
n

prosumer n that are non-shiftable over time, e.g., refrigerator or alarm system, while
ax
[kWh] captures the maximum possible energy demand if all of the prosumer’s
dM
n

appliances are active. Thus, the prosumers’ energy demand vector is defined as
D = [dt1 , . . . , dtn , . . . , dt|N | ] per time slot t. Also, the prosumers can generate energy
by exploiting their own renewable energy sources. Thus, the prosumers’ renewable
t
energy generation vector is defined accordingly as G = [g1t , . . . , gnt , . . . , g|N
| ] [kWh]

per time slot t. The prosumers can act either as sellers or buyers per time slot t
based on their personal energy generation and demand characteristics. Thus, in the
following analysis, we examine the sellers and buyers cases.
Sellers Case: If gnt + bt−1
≥ dtn , the prosumer can cover their energy demand
n
without purchasing energy from the MGO, while also dynamically deciding to sell the
energy generation surplus to the MGO. The energy generation surplus is calculated
as bt+1
= btn + (gnt − dtn ) [kWh], where a percentage ets ∈ [0, 1] of it can be sold to
n
the MGO. The energy generation surplus is assumed to be stored in the prosumer’s
energy storage system, e.g., Lithium-ion batteries. In this case, the prosumer n acts
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as a seller. The sellers can be incentivized by the MGO to sell their energy surplus
into the energy market instead of storing it locally for future use, if appropriately
designed personlized rewards, such as fixed energy price, are provided by the MGO.
Buyers Case: If gnt + bnt−1 < dtn , the prosumer’s total generated and stored energy
is not sufficient to cover their energy demand dtn . Thus, the prosumer n acts as a
[kWh] amount of energy from the MGO,
buyer β, and aims to purchase dtn −gnt −bt−1
n
in consideration of their personal energy needs which are shaped by their respective
shiftable and non-shiftable demands.
In the subsequent two sections, we study the overall interactions of the sellers
and the buyers with the MGO, in terms of selling a purchasing energy, with consideration of their unique personal energy generation and demand characteristics.
The architecture of the overall prosumer-centric self-sustained smart grid system is
presented in Fig. 8.1.

Microgrid
Operator
Prosumers
Personalized
Rewards
Buying/Selling
Energy

Figure 8.1: Prosumer-centric self-sustained smart grid system.
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8.3

Sellers’ & Electricity Market’s Interactions

In this section, we capture the interactions of the sellers with the MGO in terms of
determining the optimal amount of energy that they sell based on the appropriate
incentives, i.e., rewards, provided by the MGO. Each seller s, ∀s ∈ S ⊆ N is characterized by their type τst =

P

bt+1
s
t+1
∀sϵS bs

∈ [0, 1], which represents their normalized energy

surplus among the sellers, thus, showing their potential to sell energy to the MGO.
t
.
For notation convenience in the presentation, we consider τ1t < · · · < τst < · · · < τ|S|

Based on the principles of Contract Theory [39], each seller acts as an ”employee”
investing their personal effort to the ”employer”, i.e., MGO, while the MGO incentivizes the sellers by providing personalized rewards, e.g., fixed energy price, in order
for the MGO and the sellers to jointly optimize their achieved utility. The sellers’
and the MGO’s utility functions, as defined below in Eq. 8.1 and Eq. 8.2, respectively, represent their actual profit (i.e., satisfaction). The seller’s effort is defined as
ets =

bt+1
s
max∀sϵS {bt+1
}
s

∈ [0, 1], showing the relative capability of each seller to sell energy

t
, we have et1 < · · · < ets < . . . et|S| .
to the MGO. Given that τ1t < · · · < τst < . . . τ|S|

The MGO provides personalized rewards rst = τst ets to the sellers to incentivize them
to sell their available energy surplus. Therefore, a seller with a higher potential to
sell energy, who indeed sells a large amount of energy, will receive a high reward.
The interaction among the MGO and the sellers, aiming at the joint optimization of
their profit by participating in the energy market, concludes to an optimal contract
t∗
t∗
(et∗
s , rs ) consisting of the optimal seller’s effort es and the MGO’s optimal provided

personalized reward rst∗ .
Based on the above discussion, the utility functions of the sellers and the MGO
are designed as the actual profit of the participants, while interacting among each
other in the microgrid. The seller’s utility is captured by the received revenue from
selling energy to the MGO (first term of Eq. 8.1) while also considering their personal
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cost to locally produce the energy via the exploitation of their personal renewable
energy source infrastructure (second term of Eq. 8.1).
Ust (ets ) = τst ϵ(ets ) − pS ets

(8.1)

The seller’s personal cost to produce their energy locally is denoted as pS ∈ R+
and, in the current analysis, is assumed to be a unitless number. This parameter
can be mapped to monetary units, i.e., [$/kWh], when transferring this model in a
real-life implementation and business case. Also, the function ϵ(ets ) represents the
evaluation function, i.e., the way a seller interprets the received reward as personal
satisfaction based on the enjoyed revenue. The evaluation function is a strictly
increasing, concave, and continuous function with respect to the received reward,
as a seller satisfaction increases monotonically with respect to the received reward,
while at some point, the seller’s satisfaction becomes saturated. For demonstration
p
purposes, and without loss of generality, we consider ϵ(ets ) = rst (ets ).
The MGO’s utility from interacting with the sellers is defined as follows:
t
UM
GO,buy (e)

=

|S|
X

P rst [ets − rst (ets )]

(8.2)

s=1

where e = [et1 , . . . , ets , . . . , et|S| ] is the sellers’ effort vector. In general, the MGO is
unaware of the sellers’ energy generation demand and storage characteristics, which
define the sellers’ types. Thus, the MGO estimates each seller’s type τst with prob|S|
P
abilility P rst , where
P rst = 1. Several types of probability distributions, such as
s=1

Gaussian, Poisson, and others, can be adopted based on the nature of the examined
energy market. The specific distributions of the seller’s types, and the corresponding
probabilities P rst , can be determined in a real-life scenario according to the prosumers’ energy characteristics that can be collected from their monthly electricity
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bills, based on a statistical or machine learning analysis. Note that Eq. 8.2 represents the MGO’s profit from buying energy from the sellers via their invested effort
ets (first term of Eq. 8.2), while considering the MGO’s cost to provide rewards rst to
the sellers (second term of Eq. 8.2).

8.3.1

Complete Information Scenario

Initially, we consider the benchmarking scenario, where the MGO has complete information about the sellers’ types. The MGO aims to maximize its own profit from
each seller of known type τst (Eq. 8.3a), while providing sufficient rewards to the sellers to maintain their business interactions and energy surplus sales (Eq. 8.3b). Thus,
under the complete information scenario regarding the sellers’ types, the interactions
between the MGO and the sellers can be captured by the following contract-theoretic
optimization problem:
max [ets − rst (ets )]

(8.3a)

{ets }∀s∈S

s.t. τst ϵ(ets ) − pS ets ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S

(8.3b)

In this case, given that the MGO will provide just the sufficient rewards to incentivize the sellers to sell their energy surplus, Eq. 8.3b can be considered as an
equality.
Theorem 1. The optimal personalized contract between the MGO and each seller
t2

τs
t∗
under the complete information scenario is (et∗
s , rs ) = ( 2 ,
2pS

2

τst
2 ).
4pS

Proof. By solving Eq. 8.3b as an equality with respect to the reward, we have
t

2

rst = ( pSτ tes ) . By substituting the latter outcome in Eq. 8.3a, taking the first order
s

derivative with respect to the effort ets , and setting the outcome equal to zero, we
conclude that ets =

2

τst
2 .
2pS

t2

τs
t∗
Thus, the optimal contract is (et∗
s , rs ) = ( 2 ,
2pS
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The above outcome can be used mainly for benchmarking purposes, as sellers will
not reveal their private information regarding their types, i.e., energy surplus, to the
MGO, in a real-life scenario.

8.3.2

Incomplete Information Scenario

In the remaining analysis of this section, we examine the incomplete information scenario regarding the sellers’ types. In pursuit of capturing the interactions between
the sellers and the MGO, five fundamental conditions are examined: individual rationality (IR), incentive compatibility (IC), fairness, monotonicity, and rationality.
Those conditions are necessary and sufficient in order to guarantee the feasibility and
existence of an optimal contract among the MGO and the sellers. Each condition is
analyzed and proved below, while its physical meaning is provided within the context
of the MGO’s and the sellers’ interaction.
Definition 1. (Individual Rationality (IR)) Each seller should receive a non-negative
t∗
utility, i.e., Ust (ets ) = τst ϵ(ets ) − pS ets ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S, from the optimal contract (et∗
s , rs ).

Definition 2. (Incentive Compatibility (IC)) Each seller achieves the maximum possible utility when they receive a contract aligned with their personal energy generation,
demand, and storage characteristics, i.e., τst ϵ(ets ) − pS ets ≥ τst ϵ(ets′ ) − pS ets′ , ∀s, s′ ∈ S.

The physical meaning of the IR and IC conditions is that each seller should be
appropriately incentivized by the MGO by enjoying a positive profit aligned with
their personal characteristics in order to sell their energy in the microgrid.
Proposition 1. (Fairness) An optimal contract is fair, i.e., a seller of higher (or
equal) type should enjoy a higher (or equal) reward: rst > rst ′ ⇔ τst > τst′ (rst = rst ′ ⇔
τst = τst′ ).
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Proof. We prove the sufficiency and necessity of the fairness condition. Assuming
that τst > τst′ , we can write the following IC constraints for the sellers s, s′ , ∀s, s′ ϵS,
s ̸= s′ .
τst ϵ(ets ) − pS ets ≥ τst ϵ(ets′ ) − pS ets′

(8.4)

τst′ ϵ(ets′ ) − pS ets′ ≥ τst′ ϵ(ets ) − pS ets

(8.5)

By adding Eq. 8.4 and Eq. 8.5, we have:
(τst − τst′ )ϵ(ets ) ≥ (τst − τst′ )ϵ(ets′ )

(8.6)

We know that τst > τst′ , and ϵ(rst (ets )) is a strictly increasing function with respect
to rst , thus we conclude that rst > rst ′ .
On the other hand, assuming that rst > rst ′ , we derive that ϵ(rst (ets )) > ϵ(rst ′ (ets′ )),
thus we rewrite Eq. 8.6 as: τst [ϵ(rst (ets )) − ϵ(rst ′ (ets′ ))] ≥ τst′ [ϵ(rst (ets )) − ϵ(rst ′ (ets′ ))] and
we conclude that τst > τst′ . Similarly, we can prove rst = rst ′ ⇔ τst = τst′ .
Proposition 2. (Monotonicity) An optimal contract should have monotonic behavior, i.e., a seller of a higher type will sell more energy and receive a higher reward.
Proof. A seller of higher type receives a higher reward based on Proposition 1, i.e.,
t
t
r1t < · · · < rst < · · · < r|S|
⇔ τ1t < · · · < τst < · · · < τ|S|
. Then, based on the

monotonic relationship among the reward rst and the effort ets , i.e., rst = τst ets , we
conclude that et1 < · · · < ets < · · · < et|S| .
Proposition 3. (Rationality) An optimal contract should be rational, i.e., a seller
of higher type should enjoy a higher utility.
Proof. We write the IC condition for two indicative sellers s ̸= s′ , ∀s, s′ ∈ S:
τst >τ t′

τst ϵ(ets ) − pS ets ≥ τst ϵ(ets′ ) − pS ets′ ⇐===s⇒ τst ϵ(ets ) − pS ets ≥ τst′ ϵ(ets′ ) − pS ets′ ⇔ Ust (ets ) ≥
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Ust′ (ets′ ). We generalize this outcome for any seller s, ∀s ∈ S: τ1t < · · · < τst < · · · <
t
t
.
⇔ U1t < · · · < Ust < · · · < U|S|
τ|S|

The physical meaning of the latter three conditions, i.e., fairness, monotonicity,
t∗
and rationality, is that an optimal contract (et∗
s , rs ) should guarantee all of them in

order to incentivize the sellers to sell part or all of their energy surplus during each
time slot t, instead of locally storing it for future use. Based on the above analysis, the
interactions among the MGO and the sellers can be captured as a contract-theoretic
optimization problem aimed at determining the optimal personalized contracts. The
optimization problem aims at jointly maximizing the MGO’s profit (Eq. 8.7a), while
guaranteeing the IR (Eq. 8.7b), IC (Eq. 8.7c), and fairness, monotonicity, and
rationality conditions (Eq. 8.7d), and it is formally stated as follows.

max

{ets ,rst }∀s∈S

|S|
X

[P rs(t) (ets − rs (ets ))]

(8.7a)

s=1

s.t. τst ϵ(ets ) − pS ets ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S

(IR)

(8.7b)

τst ϵ(ets ) − pS ets ≥ τst ϵ(ets′ ) − pS ets′ , ∀s ̸= s′ , s, s′ ∈ S (IC)

(8.7c)

t
0 ≤ r1t < r2t < · · · < rst < · · · < r|S|

(8.7d)

The above optimization is clearly non-convex. Thus, we will reduce its constraints
and rewrite it as a convex optimization problem to allow for a tractable and feasible
solution. Starting with the IR constraint (Eq. 8.7b) and based on the IC and
monotonicity conditions, we have: τst ϵ(ets ) − pS ets ≥ τst ϵ(et1 ) − pS et1 , ∀s ∈ S. Also,
we know that τst > τ1t , ∀s ∈ S, thus, τst ϵ(ets ) − pS ets ≥ τ1t ϵ(et1 ) − pS et1 ≥ 0. Also,
given that the MGO provides just-sufficient rewards to incentivize the sellers to
participate in the microgrid, we can equivalently replace the constraint in Eq. 8.7b
with τ1t ϵ(et1 ) − pS et1 = 0. Focusing on the reduction of the IC constraints (Eq. 8.7c),
we introduce the following terminology: (i) s, s′ , s′ ∈ {1, . . . , s − 1}: downward
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IC constraints, (ii) s, s − 1, ∀s ∈ S: local downward IC constraints, (iii) s, s′ ,
s′ ∈ {s + 1, . . . , |S|}: upward IC constraints, and (iv) s, s + 1, ∀s ∈ S: local upwards
IC constraints.
Lemma 1. All the downward IC constraints are captured by the local downward IC
constraints.

Proof. We write the IC conditions for three sellers, s − 1, s, s + 1, as follows:
t
t
ϵ(ets ) − pS ets and τst ϵ(ets ) − pS ets ≥ τst ϵ(ets−1 ) − pS ets−1 .
ϵ(ets+1 ) − pS ets+1 ≥ τs+1
τs+1
t
τs+1
>τst

ϵ↗

t
We know that ets > ets−1 ⇐=⇒ ϵ(ets ) > ϵ(ets−1 ) ⇐====⇒ τs+1
[ϵ(ets ) − ϵ(ets−1 )] >

τst [ϵ(ets ) − ϵ(ets−1 )] ≥ pS (ets − ets−1 ). We apply recursively the latter outcome for all
t
t
t
ϵ(et1 ) − pS et1 .
ϵ(ets−1 ) − pS ets−1 ≥ · · · ≥ τs+1
ϵ(ets+1 ) − pS ets+1 ≥ τs+1
the sellers: τs+1

Thus, we conclude that τst ϵ(ets ) − pS ets ≥ τst ϵ(ets−1 ) − pS ets−1 , i.e., all the downward
IC constraints are captured by the local downward IC constraints.
Lemma 2. All the upward IC constraints are captured by the local downward IC
constraint.

Proof. We write again the IC conditions for three indicative sellers, s − 1, s, s + 1,
as follows:
t
t
τs−1
ϵ(ets−1 ) − pS ets−1 ≥ τs−1
ϵ(ets ) − pS ets

(8.8)

τst ϵ(ets ) − pS ets ≥ τst ϵ(ets+1 ) − pS ets+1

(8.9)

Based on Eq. 8.9 and the fairness condition, we have the following expression:
pts (ets+1 − ets ) ≥ τst [ϵ(ets+1 ) − ϵ(ets )]
t

t

t
≥τs ≥τs−1 τs−1
[ϵ(ets+1 ) − ϵ(ets )]
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Based on Eq.

t
t
8.8, 8.10, we have: τs−1
ϵ(ets−1 ) − pS ets−1 ≥ τs−1
ϵ(ets ) − pS ets ≥

t
t
t
ϵ(ets+1 ) − pS ets+1 , showing
ϵ(ets−1 ) − pS ets−1 ≥ τs−1
ϵ(ets+1 ) − pS ets+1 . Thus, τs−1
τs−1

that all the upward IC constraints hold true, if the IC condition is satisfied for the
t
t
seller with type τs−1
. We apply recursively this outcome: τs−1
ϵ(ets−1 ) − pS ets−1 ≥
t
t
ϵ(et|S| ) − pS et|S| . Thus, all the upward IC constraints
ϵ(ets+1 ) − pS ets+1 ≥ · · · ≥ τs−1
τs−1

are captured by the local downward IC constraints.
Based on the above analysis of the reduction of the IR and IC constraints, we
can rewrite the contract-theoretic optimization problem (8.7a)-(8.7d) as follows:
max

{ets ,rst }∀s∈S

|S|
X

[P rs(t) (ets − rs (ets ))]

(8.11a)

s=1

s.t. τ1t ϵ(et1 ) − pS et1 ≥ 0

(8.11b)

τst ϵ(ets ) − pS ets = τst ϵ(ets−1 ) − pS ets−1

(8.11c)

t
0 ≤ r1t < r2t < · · · < rst < · · · < r|S|

(8.11d)

The optimization problem (8.11a)-(8.11d) is a convex optimization problem and
t∗
the optimal contract (et∗
s , rs ) can be determined based on standard convex optimiza-

tion methods [85]. Detailed numerical results are presented in Section 8.5.

8.4

Buyers’ & Electricity Market’s Interactions

In this section, we focus on capturing the interactions of the buyers with the MGO.
The goal of each buyer β, ∀β ∈ B ⊆ N is to purchase the remaining amount of energy
(dtβ − gβt − bt−1
β ) [kWh], that cannot be supported by her local energy generation.
The MGO aims to incentivize the buyers to buy the total amount of energy that
they need, by providing personalized rewards rβt . In our proposed approach, the
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interactions between the MGO and the buyers are captured via a contract-theoretic
model.
In particular, the buyers invest an ”effort” etβ ∈ [0, 1], which represents the
percentage of energy that they buy with respect to their total energy need, i.e.,
t
dtβ −gβt −bt−1
β . Each buyer is characterized by a type τβ =

dtβ −gβt −bt−1
β
maxβ∈B {dtβ −gβt −bt−1
β }

, showing

its relative potential compared to the rest of the buyers in terms of buying energy.
The MGO offers personalized rewards rβt = τβt etβ to each buyer, e.g., fixed energy
price, in order to incentivize them to buy energy and not postpone or decrease their
energy needs. The buyers’ utility is defined as the gained profit from buying energy
from the MGO and is defined as follows:
Uβt (etβ ) = τβt f (etβ ) − pM etβ .

(8.12)

The first term of Eq. 8.12 captures the buyer’s personalized satisfaction from
purchasing energy, where f (etβ ) is the buyer’s satisfaction function, e.g., f (etβ ) =
q
rβt (etβ ). The latter one captures the buyer’s satisfaction from the consumption
of the energy that they buy from the MGO. The buyer’s satisfaction is a strictly
increasing, continuous, and concave function with respect to the received reward rβt ,
as the buyer becomes more satisfied by covering more of their appliances’ energy
needs while such satisfaction becomes saturated at a specific upper limit of energy
need. Also, pM ∈ [0, 1] here is considered as a normalized dimensionless parameter
representing the energy price, however in a real-life implementation it can be mapped
to realistic values and units [$/kWh] [171]. The MGO’s utility from selling energy
to the buyers is obtained as its total profit, and id defined as follows:
t
UM
GO,sell (ebuy )

=

|B|
X

P rβt [pM etβ − rβt (etβ )]

(8.13)

β=1

As mentioned before, in the general case, the MGO has partial available information about the potential of each buyer to buy energy, thus, it probabilistically
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estimates each buyer’s type τβt with probability P rβt , where

P|B|

β=1

P rβt = 1. Similarly

to the sellers’ case, several types of probability distributions can be adopted based on
the nature of the examined energy market to realistically capture the buyers’ characteristics. The goal of the MGO is to maximize its profit, while guaranteeing that the
buyers will buy energy from the microgrid market. Considering the benchmarking
scenario of complete information of the buyers’ types, the interactions between the
MGO and the buyers are formulated as a maximization problem of the MGO’s profit
(Eq. 8.14a), while considering the optimization of the buyers’ utilities (Eq. 8.14b).
max [pM etβ − rβt (etβ )]

(8.14a)

{etβ }∀β∈B

s.t. τβt f (etβ ) − pM etβ ≥ 0, ∀β ∈ B

(8.14b)

Theorem 2. The optimal contract among the MGO and each buyer β under the
2

complete information scenario is

t∗
(et∗
β , rβ )

=

2

τt
τt
( 2pβM , β4

).

Proof. It follows the same philosophy, reasoning and steps of Theorem 1.
Under the realistic scenario of incomplete information regarding the buyers’ types,
the conditions of IR (Eq. 8.15b), IC (Eq. 8.15c), and fairness, monotonicity, and rationality (Eq. 8.15d) should hold true. Also, the optimal contract jointly maximizes
the MGO’s utility, i.e., profit, as follows.

max

{etβ ,rβt }

∀β∈B

|B|
X

(t)

P rβ [pM etβ − rβt (etβ )]

(8.15a)

β=1

s.t. τβt f (etβ ) − pM etβ ≥ 0, ∀β ∈ B

(IR)

τβt f (etβ ) − pM etβ ≥ τβt f (etβ ′ ) − pM etβ ′ , ∀β ̸= β ′
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t
0 ≤ r1t < r2t < · · · < rβt < · · · < r|B|

(8.15d)

Following similar reasoning as in Section 8.3, we can rewrite the above optimization problem and solve it with standard convex optimization methods as follows:

max

{etβ ,rβt }

∀β∈B

|B|
X

(t)

P rβ [pM etβ − rβt (etβ )]

(8.16a)

β=1

s.t. τ1t f (et1 ) − pM et1 = 0

(8.16b)

τβt f (etβ ) − pM etβ ≥ τβt f (etβ−1 ) − pM etβ−1

(8.16c)

t
0 ≤ r1t < r2t < · · · < rβt < · · · < r|B|

(8.16d)

t∗
The solution of the above problem concludes to the optimal contracts (et∗
β , rβ ), ∀β ∈

B, determining the amount of purchased energy of the buyers and the MGO’s offered
personalized rewards to the buyers.

8.5

Numerical Results

In this section, a detailed evaluation analysis of the proposed contract-theoretic approaches is presented, via modeling and simulation, in order to demonstrate and
assess the sellers and buyers interactions with the microgrid operator. Specifically,
the pure operation characteristics and performance of the proposed framework for
both the sellers and the buyers are presented in Section 8.5.1. The behavior of the
prosumers, in terms of acting either as sellers or buyers, is studied in more detail in
Section 8.5.2 with respect to the energy price, the energy generation cost, and the
prosumers’ energy generation characteristics during a day. Finally, the joint behavior
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of the prosumers and the MGO throughout the day for different energy generation
use case scenarios is studied in Section 8.5.3, towards demonstrating and gaining
more insights about their tight interconnection and interactions.
In the rest of the simulation results, we consider the following parameters: dtn ∈
[0.50, 1.50] kWh, gnt ∈ [0, 2] kWh, pM = 2, pS = 2 [172]. Furthermore, for demonstration purposes and unless otherwise explicitly stated, we examine the system operation
for |T | = 24 hours and |N | = 100 prosumers. The probabilities P rst and P rβt are
obtained assuming that the sellers’ and buyers’ types follow uniform distributions.
For all the presented numerical results, a Monte Carlo analysis has been performed
of 10, 000 executions to receive more representative outcomes.

8.5.1

Pure Operation Performance

Initially, the pure operation performance of the proposed prosumer-centric selfsustained smart grid system model based on the contract-theoretic approach is presented to capture the interactions of both the sellers (Section 8.3) and the buyers
(Section 8.4) with the MGO. One indicative time slot t is considered, where both
types of interactions are analyzed.
In particular, Fig. 8.2a - 8.2d present the sellers’ and buyers’ types (τst , τβt ), efforts
(ets , etβ ), rewards (rst , rβt ), and utilities (Ust , Uβt ), respectively, under the scenarios of
complete and incomplete information of the prosumers’ types from the MGO’s perspective. For demonstration purposes, the sellers’ and buyers’ IDs have been sorted
with respect to their increasing types. The results show that the higher the seller’s
type is (Fig. 8.2a), the more energy surplus it has, thus, it is incentivized more by
the MGO to sell its available energy by being offered a higher reward (Fig. 8.2c
- left vertical axis). Consequently, it appears that indeed it sells more energy by
investing a greater effort (Fig. 8.2b - left vertical axis). Thus, the seller of greater
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Figure 8.2: Sellers’ and buyers’ types, efforts, rewards, and utilities with respect to
their index under the complete and incomplete information scenarios.

energy surplus ultimately achieves a higher utility (Fig. 8.2d - left vertical axis).
With reference to the sellers, and by comparing the complete (i.e., benchmarking)
and the incomplete (i.e., realistic) information scenarios, we observe that under the
former, the MGO can fully exploit the sellers’ energy surplus. This in turn means
that the MGO provides to the sellers higher rewards to incentivize them to sell the
vast majority of their available energy (Fig. 8.2c - left vertical axis), which indeed
translates to having the sellers actually selling a higher amount of energy (Fig. 8.2b
- left vertical axis), as compared to the incomplete information scenario.
Focusing our analysis on the buyers perspective and interactions with the MGO,
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Figure 8.3: Incentive compatibility condition.

we observe that a buyer with higher need to purchase energy, i.e., of higher type
(Fig. 8.2a), is incentivized more by the MGO to do so (Fig. 8.2c - right vertical
axis). Thus, a buyer of higher type by ultimately purchasing more energy (Fig.
8.2b - right vertical axis), it covers the majority of its energy needs and accordingly
achieves a higher utility (Fig. 8.2d - right vertical axis). Comparing the complete and
incomplete information scenarios with reference to the buyers, the results confirm our
theoretical analysis and observation, by clearly demonstrating that higher rewards
are provided to the buyers (Fig. 8.2c - right vertical axis) in the complete information
scenario, who purchase more energy (Fig. 8.2b - right vertical axis) compared to the
incomplete information scenario. It should be highlighted that under the complete
information scenario, both the sellers and the buyers achieve zero utility (Fig. 8.2d
- right vertical axis), as the MGO provides just the sufficient rewards to marginally
incentivize them to contribute to the microgrid’s smooth and seamless operation.
Also, the results confirm that the individual rationality, incentive compatibility,
fairness, monotonicity, and rationality conditions hold true for both the sellers and
the buyers under all the examined scenarios. Specifically, Fig. 8.3a-8.3b present
the sellers’ and buyers’ utility for the corresponding optimal contracts derived for
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each type for three indicative sellers and buyers with IDs s = {30, 40, 50}, and
β = {30, 40, 50}, respectively. The results reveal that both the sellers and the buyers
achieve the highest possible utility, when receiving the optimal personalized contract
that is designed accounting for their unique energy generation, demand, and storage
characteristics. This observation confirms the validity of the incentive compatibility
condition. Also, the results show that a seller or buyer of a higher type achieves a
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higher utility, confirming the validity of the rationality condition.
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Figure 8.4: MGO’s utility and social welfare under the complete and incomplete
information scenarios.

Moreover, Fig. 8.4a-8.4b illustrate the MGO’s utility and overall microgrid system’s social welfare as a function of the number of prosumers residing in the microgrid
system under the complete and incomplete information scenarios. The results show
that better MGO’s utility and social welfare is achieved under the complete information scenario, as the MGO can provide more targeted rewards by knowing the sellers’
and buyers’ exact types. However, it is highlighted that the incomplete information
scenario, which is a realistic implementation of the microgrid system, achieves acceptable social welfare, especially, for increasing number of prosumers, with only 7%
worse social welfare compared to the complete information scenario, for the case of
100 prosumers.
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8.5.2

Prosumer’s Behavior throughout the Day

In this subsection, we study the impact of various system and prosumer characteristics, such as energy price pM , energy generation cost pS , and prosumer’s energy
generation gnt , ∀n ∈ N, ∀t ∈ T , on the behavior of the prosumers in terms of acting
as sellers or buyers, throughout the operation of a day.
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Figure 8.5: Percentage of prosumers acting as sellers to achieve maximum (a) prosumers’ average utility (i.e., prosumer-centric), (b) MGO utility (i.e., MGO-centric),
and (c) social welfare, vs. increasing number of prosumers, under three scenarios

In particular, Fig. 8.5a-8.5c present the percentage of prosumers that act as
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sellers in order to maximize the average prosumers’ utility, the MGO’s utility, and
the social welfare, respectively, as a function of the number of prosumers in the
microgrid. Three different scenarios of energy price pM and energy generation costs
pS are considered: (i) Even Cost with pM = pS = 2, (ii) High Buyer Cost with
pM = 6, pS = 2, and (iii) High Seller Cost with pM = 2, pS = 6. The results
reveal that when the energy generation cost is high (High Seller Cost scenario), a
smaller percentage of sellers is incentivized to sell energy, as their energy production
cost is high, and the sellers prefer to keep their generated energy for future use.
In contrast, when the energy price is high (High Buyer Cost scenario), the sellers
can achieve a higher profit by selling their generated energy to the MGO, thus, a
higher percentage of prosumers acts as sellers. The Even Cost scenario presents an
intermediate behavior between the High Seller and the High Buyer Cost scenarios.
Also, comparing the prosumer-centric approach (Fig. 8.5a) against an MGO-centric
approach (Fig. 8.5b) that aims at maximizing the MGO utility, we observe in the
latter case a higher offset of the percentages of the prosumers acting as sellers for
the High Seller and Even Cost scenarios, as the MGO aggressively provides rewards
to the prosumers to sell their energy. The opposite holds true for the High Buyer
scenario, as the MGO prefers to sell its available energy to the buyers at a higher
price, as compared to buying energy from the sellers. An intermediate behavior of
the percentages of the prosumers acting as sellers is observed when the goal is to
solely maximize their social welfare (Fig. 8.5c), as the selfish behavior of the MGO
and the prosumers is balanced.
Fig. 8.6a-8.6b present the prosumers’ average energy generation and the percentage of them that act as sellers during the day, respectively, for two comparative
scenarios: (i) High Generation scenario, and (ii) Low Generation scenario, where
the prosumers have high and low energy generation capacity, respectively. The prosumers’ energy generation is solely based on solar photovoltaic panels. The results
reveal that during the sunny periods of the day, the prosumers generate more energy

170

Chapter 8. Prosumer-centric Self-sustained Smart Grid Systems

Average Energy Generation

a)

0.4
0.3
0.2
High Generation
Low Generation

0.1
0

5

10

15

20

24

% of Prosumers as Sellers

100

0.5

b)

80
60
40
20

High Generation
Low Generation

0

Hour of the Day

5

10

15

Hour of the Day

20

24

Figure 8.6: Average energy generation and percentage of prosumers acting as sellers
under high and low energy generation

(Fig. 8.6a), thus, a greater percentage of them is incentivized to act as sellers (Fig.
8.6b) in both examined scenarios. Additionally, in the High Generation scenario, it
is observed that the prosumers generate sufficient amount of energy to cover their
personal energy needs, thus, they act as sellers for the majority of the day’s duration. It is noted that the energy price and the energy generation costs are assumed
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171

Prosumer's Utility

4

10-3

a)
High Generation
Low Generation

3

2

1
5

10

15

20

Microgrid Operator's Utility

Chapter 8. Prosumer-centric Self-sustained Smart Grid Systems
0.25
0.2

b)

High Generation
Low Generation

0.15
0.1
0.05

24

Hour of the Day

0

5

10

15

20

24

Hour of the Day
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The above analysis and evaluation is further extended in Fig. 8.7 and Fig. 8.8
where both the prosumers and MGO average utilities are presented for two different
scenarios: High Buyer Cost with pM = 6, pS = 2 (Fig. 8.7), and High Seller Cost
with pM = 2, pS = 6 (Fig. 8.8), respectively. The energy generation characteristics
of the prosumers for both scenarios follow the behavior presented in Fig. 8.6a. The
results reveal that when the energy price pM is high and the energy generation cost
pS is low, more prosumers act as sellers, thus, their average utility is higher (Fig.
8.7a), compared to the alternative scenario (Fig. 8.8a). This trend is expected as the
prosumers generate energy with low cost. The offset of the High and Low Generation
scenarios in Fig. 8.7a and Fig. 8.8a stems from the corresponding percentage of
prosumers that act as sellers. Also, the benefit of the prosumers corresponds to the
loss of the MGO, thus, the exact flipped trend is observed in Fig. 8.7b and Fig. 8.8b
regarding the achieved MGO’s utility.
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Figure 8.9: Percentage of prosumers acting as sellers, prosumers’ average utility, and
MGO’s utility during the day for the three energy generation scenarios (pM = 6, pS =
2)

8.5.3

Impact of Energy Generation and Demand on the Prosumers’ and MGO’s Interactions

In the following, we focus our study on the impact of the prosumers’ energy generation and demand characteristics on their interactions with the microgrid system
during a day. We consider an evolving behavior where the prosumers’ demand is low
for t ∈ [0, 8], then it increases for t ∈ [8, 16], and then drops again for t ∈ [16, 24],
representing the realistic prosumers’ energy demand during the day. The aforementioned case, is evaluated and studied under three different scenarios regarding the
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prosumers’ energy generation capacity, i.e, High, Medium, and Low. Following a
similar methodology with our evaluation in the previous figures in this subsection
(i.e., considering high buyer cost and high seller cost alternatives), two sets of results
are produced and presented, differentiated exactly with respect to the considered
energy price pM and the energy generation cost pS , i.e., pM = 6, pS = 2 for Fig.
8.9-8.10 and pM = 2, pS = 6 for Fig. 8.11-8.12.
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Figure 8.10: Achieved utility in the system of Fig. 8.9 for different percentages of
prosumers functioning as sellers.

Specifically, Fig. 8.9a-8.9c present the percentage of prosumers acting as sellers,
their average utility and the MGO’s utility during the day, respectively, for the three
aforementioned energy generation scenarios. The results reveal that in the High
energy generation scenario, all the prosumers act as sellers, as they have sufficient
energy surplus to support their personal energy need, while the exact opposite holds
true in the Low energy generation scenario (Fig. 8.9a). In order to gain insight about
the behavior of the curves for the Medium energy generation scenario, we should turn
our attention to Fig. 8.10.
Particularly, with reference to the Medium energy generation scenario, Fig. 8.10
presents the behavior of the prosumers’ average utility (Fig. 8.10a) and the MGO’s
utility (Fig. 8.10b) for different percentages of prosumers acting as sellers (horizontal
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axis). We observe that the maximum prosumers’ average utility is achieved, when
approximately 60% of the prosumers act as sellers. Correlating this value with the
results in Fig. 8.9a, we observe that approximately 60% of the prosumers act as
sellers, except for the time interval 11 am - 3 pm, when the prosumers’ energy demand
becomes high, and accordingly fewer prosumers are acting as sellers. Also, given that
the energy generation cost is low, i.e., pS = 2, as compared to the energy price, which
is high, i.e., pM = 6, the prosumers that generate a lot of energy achieve higher utility
compared to the scenario of generating small amount of energy (Fig. 8.9b). The
exact opposite is observed from the MGO’s perspective (Fig. 8.9c). Focusing on the
Medium energy generation scenario, we observe that during the morning hours, i.e.,
t ∈ [0, 11], the prosumers generate more energy, thus accumulating energy surplus,
and approximately 60% of them act as sellers (Fig. 8.9a), achieving the maximum
possible utility (Fig. 8.10a), thus, their average achieved utility increases during this
time frame (Fig. 8.9b). In the slot t ∈ [10, 11], their energy demands increase and
the percentage of prosumers acting as sellers drops to 20% (Fig. 8.9a), achieving the
lowest possible utility (Fig. 8.10a), driving their average utility to drop (Fig. 8.9b).
Similar analysis and reasoning can be derived and followed for the rest of the day.
Still focusing on the Medium energy generation scenario but from the MGO’s
perspective, we jointly study Fig. 8.9c and Fig. 8.10b. We observe that for the
time periods t ∈ [0, 10] ∪ [15, 24], where the percentage of the prosumers acting as
sellers is approximately 60% (Fig. 8.9a), the MGO achieves a relatively high utility
(Fig. 8.10b), and slowly increases its profit during those time periods. On the other
hand, for the time interval t ∈ [10, 15], where only 20% of the prosumers act as
sellers (Fig. 8.9a) due to their personal high energy demand, the MGO achieves the
highest possible utility (Fig. 8.10b), as the MGO has set its price at a high value,
i.e., pM = 6. Thus, during this period, the MGO accumulates a higher profit.
Last, a symmetric scenario is presented in Fig. 8.11 and Fig. 8.12, where a
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Figure 8.11: Percentage of prosumers acting as sellers, prosumers’ average utility,
and MGO’s utility during the day for the three energy generation scenarios (pM =
2, pS = 6)

low energy price (pM = 2) and high energy generation cost (pS = 6) is considered
instead. The point that should be highlight here is that the average utility of the
prosumers with high energy generation is lower compared to the ones with low energy
generation as the energy generation cost is higher. The exact opposite behavior is
presented by the MGO’s utility, as more prosumers tend to buy energy from it.
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Figure 8.12: Achieved utility in the system of Fig. 8.11 for different percentages of
prosumers functioning as sellers.

8.6

Conclusions

In this chapter, the paradigm of prosumer-centric self-sustained smart grid systems
is introduced, by capturing and properly modeling the interactions of the prosumers
with the microgrid operator via a labor economics based approach. The prosumers
throughout the system operation may serve as sellers or buyers, based on their
personal energy generation, demand, and storage characteristics. The MGO offers
personalized rewards to the sellers and buyers to incentivize them to sell and purchase energy, respectively. The contract-theoretic optimization problems between
the MGO and the sellers and the MGO and the buyers respectively, are formulated
and solved to determine the optimal personalized contracts, i.e., rewards and amount
of sold/purchased energy. Detailed numerical and comparative evaluation results obtained via modeling and simulation - are presented to demonstrate the operation of
the proposed framework and highlight its main characteristics, under various diverse
scenarios.
Part of our current and future work is to incorporate the prosumers reactions to
the energy price fluctuation, which introduces risk in their decision to act as sell-
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ers or buyers. In our efforts to study and address this problem, the principles of
Prospect Theory are adopted. Furthermore, along the same lines, we plan to consider a system where multiple MGOs may co-exist and therefore the prosumers may
dynamically get associated with different MGOs at different times, thus introducing
several uncertainties within a more competitive market overall.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Works

This dissertation proposes novel theory and scalable algorithms for decentralized intelligent decision making models, frameworks, and algorithms to support the smooth
operation of Cyber Physical Social Systems.

9.0.1

Summary of Contributions

In this dissertation, we focus our research activities on devising decentralized intelligent decision making models, frameworks, and algorithms to support the smooth
operation of Cyber Physical Social Systems. The proposed decentralized intelligent
decision making models are jointly exploiting theories from the field of Economics,
such as Game Theory and Contract Theory, and from the field of Computer Science,
such as Reinforcement Learning concepts. Reinforcement learning is applied to allow
for humans to make informed decisions in the considered Cyber Physical Social Systems based off of the environment around them. Additionally, contract theoretic and
game theoretic models allow for us to accurately depict the relationships between the
different involved entities in the examined system.
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Five main research problems have been examined in this Ph.D. dissertation, which
can be summarized as follows:

• socio-physical human orchestration in smart cities,
• socio-aware public safety framework design,
• unmanned aerial vehicle or UAV-enabled dynamic multi-target tracking and
sensing framework,
• resource orchestration in wireless powered communication public safety systems, and
• health data acquisition from wearable devices during a pandemic by following
a techno-economics approach
• museum and visitors interactions enabled by labor economics
• prosumer-centric self-sustained smart grid systems

9.0.2

Future Work

The work summarized in this Ph.D. dissertation proposes a meaningful and general framework, where the control intelligence and decision making process is done
by the humans towards sophisticated sensing the dynamic environment and making
autonomous decisions. Part of our current and future work targets at addressing
the problem of modeling and orchestrating the interactions in a variety of different
cyber-physical-social systems. As each CPSS is unique each one may need to have the
model utilized tailored to that specific CPSS. For example in Chapter 7, the museum
operator provides monetary rewards to the visitors in exchange for their contributions, which are expressed as their total number of provided feedback evaluations of
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visited exhibits over their touring time. The interactions among the museum operator and visitors are captured in appropriately designed utility functions following
the principles of labor economics, while the visitors’ behavioral characteristics are
utilized to define their unique types. Under such a setting and formulation, the goal
of the museum operator is to optimize their profit and benefits, while jointly satisfying the visitors’ quality of experience prerequisites, as reflected via their utility
functions. The corresponding optimization problem is treated and solved under the
general and realistic case of incomplete information, wherein the museum operator
estimates the visitors’ types probabilistically. The resulting outcome, referred to as
”optimal contract” jointly determines the visitors’ optimal contributions, as well as
the museum operator’s optimal amount of personalized rewards provided to each visitor. This model follows the general trend that has been utilized for other CPSS but
required some slight adjustments to fit that specific CPSS, such as understanding the
different ways museum visitors view and evaluate the museum. These adjustments
allowed us to create a more holistic approach. Applying the general approach and
tuning the approach to more CPSSs, as mentioned previously, is the basis of our
future work.
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